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4Abstract
One of the significant tasks of education is to enable one to learn to live a meaningful
life. It wil be argued that “nature” is a rich and fundamental source of meaning in this 
respect and yet that what is taught about nature in many conventional curricula is
severely limited, resulting in an impoverishment of meaning. The central aim of this
thesis is to identify and elucidate meanings of nature that have rich educational
significance and to begin to explore their implications for pedagogy.
The investigation consists in three broad parts. The first is an analysis of a current set
of curriculum guidelines in order to reveal some underlying ways in which limited
understandings of nature are represented and promulgated. The Taiwanese Grade 1-9
Curriculum Guidelines is taken to exemplify this, and also the way in which global
educational reform has resulted in the incorporation of a modern “Western” view of 
nature that is defective in two key respects: an underlying “homogenisation” and an 
underlying “disembodiment” in our understanding. It is argued that these result in the
oversimplification of the content and process of learning with regard to nature.
In order to extricate our learning from the pitfall of oversimplification by inviting a
richer experience of nature, this thesis explores our conceptions of nature. Five
themes are identified to anchor the numerous, various, and complex conceptions of
nature. Each theme with its implying polarities illuminates the significance of the
human conceptualisation of nature as an on-going dynamic and dialectic process. It
will be argued that the investigations invite us to reconfigure the curriculum so as to
accommodate heterogeneous and plural views of nature and reveal the abundance of
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6PART I
Nature and Education
Humanity follows the Earth; Earth, Heaven; Heaven, Tao and Tao,
Nature.
(Lao Tsu, Dao Te King)1
Nature speaks with a thousand voices, and we have only begun to
listen.
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1985, p.77)
1 There are numerous English versions of Dao Te King (Tao Te Ching). The version cited here is
adopted from a German website “Das Tao Te King von Lao Tzi”, cataloging 128 versions of 24
languages. Among them are 84 English versions. After comparison of these translations one by one, the




Nature as an Issue for Meaningful Education
One of the significant tasks of education is to enable one to learn to live a meaningful
life. But what is a meaningful life? What is the meaning of my life? This is a question
which has kept haunting human mind for millennia. The most important motif for
many philosophers’ pursuits, implicitly or explicitly, is to seek the meaning or 
meanings or the most important or valuable things in life (Metz, 2007). A meaningful
life for one can thus be understood as a life in which one can experience the most
important things for one’s life. Paradoxicaly, the meaningfulness does not lie in the 
sheer possession of the important things but in the relationships between subjects and
objects. For example, stamps could be the most important things for a stamp collector.
Yetwhat makes a stamp colector’s life meaningful is not only the sheer possession of 
the stamps themselves but also the experiences associated with the stamps, such as
memories, psychological satisfactions, feelings and knowledge and, the sheer
fascination and joy (sometimes mixed with frustrations) of the activity itself.
Something in experience that is conveyed and connoted makes this stamp or these
stamps important and thereby makes the colector’s life directional, interesting and 
meaningful.
Thus the concept “meaning” in this thesis is not used in a strict linguistic sense 
to mean denotations but in a broad sense to denote something that is signified,
conveyed, connoted in and related to experience. “A “meaningful” object”, tangible or 
8intangible, meansthat this object can remind one of one’s life experiences and inspire 
many or rich meanings and abundant significance. In other words, a meaningful
object is an object full of meanings; it can help one to apprehend many meanings from
this moment of experience. It can illuminate plentiful relationships with many other
objects. An object with rich meanings can inspire diverse and multiple experiences.
In contrast, a “meaningless” object with poor meaning and meagre significance is in 
weak or thin relationships with other objects. Therefore, a meaningful life is a life full
of meanings --- a living process within which diverse, different, interesting and
fruitful experiences are activated, connected or related and refreshed through various
and continuous relationships and interconnections.
A meaningful education is an educational process which can improve a
meaningful or meaning-full life; to unpick that, this process can be enhanced by
“right” people and “appropriate” materials which can help learners to understand the
multiplicity of the relationships interwoven within the very moment of learning. This
view of education can be understood to some extent in terms of the deep approach to
learning proposed by Marton and Säljö (1984). A deep approach to learning is that the
learners engage with the materials in an active and reflective attitude and acquire
fertile meanings from them, while learners in a surface approach lack such a probing,
caring, actively exploring attitude and fail to gain rich meanings during the process
(Marton & Säljö, 1984). Overall, whether an education is rich or poor in meaning
consists in the interrelationships between subjects and objects, learning approaches
and materials, or pedagogical methods and curricula.
In this respect, the concept “nature” might be one of the richest and the most 
fundamental sources of meaning and inspiration; it has been and still is one of the
most important themes concerning human beings through history, and across cultures.
However, a single set or sets of unified definitions of nature cannot be specified
without debate. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty (2003): “There is nature wherever there is 
a life that has meaning… Nature is what has a meaning…Yet nature is diferent from 
man: it is not instituted by him…” Life that has meaning is nature or a part of nature,
thus nature has meaning. Yet the meaning of nature is not something to be discovered
insofar as life is a process and so is nature. The meaning of nature is revealed during
the interaction between human beings and nature. With regard to nature and human
9beings, we may also say that, there is nature wherever and whenever there is humanity.
“Nature”, as a source of life, meaning and inspiration, should be thus taken as an
important issue in education. This point invites us to think about whether current
educational practices pay adequate heed to the concept of nature.
It seems difficult to find in educational discourse adequate and sufficient
discussions distinctively focusing on the concept of nature. On the one hand, the
educational discourse which highlights this term is often limited to the fields of
environmental education (EE) and science education (SE) (Bonnett, 2007). One of the
ways of revealing whether our present educational practices pay adequate attention to
“nature” could be the analysis and examination of the curiculum related to EE and 
SE. On the other hand, the concept of nature has great influence on human
understanding related to epistemology, metaphysics, theology, aesthetics, ethics,
worldview, etc. The concept of “nature” has been embraced in the assumptions about 
“human nature”, “natural environment”, “natural law”, “the wild” and “the quality 
opposite to ‘man-made’ or ‘artificial’” by general educational literature. This point 
shows that the meaning of nature could be far wider and richer than we learn in EE or
SE. The general discourses about nature might provide us with inspiration to
reconsider the meaning of nature with respect to education and to enrich education
and life.
The above thoughts point out two tasks ahead: the revealing of the meaning of
nature conceived in current educational practices such as curriculum and exploration
of the meaning of nature in more general and broader varieties of discourse. The first
task will demonstrate the shortcomings and lead on to the following exploration to
identify the causes of the shortcomings and seek ways of overcoming the problems.
Let me give a brief explanation of the two tasks. The first task is to examine the
meaning of the conception of nature in current educational practices to reveal whether
those practices provide learners with a curriculum which is beneficial for developing a
meaningful life by, or through its conception of nature. Here I may take the
Taiwanese Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines as an example for discussion. Two
central points causing the oversimplification of the conception of nature implied in the
curiculum can be identified: “homogenisation” and “disembodiment”. The 
elucidation of the sense of nature in the curriculum is undertaken in the hope that the
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curriculum can be made more helpful for us to learn to live a richer life. This task will
be undertaken in Chapter 2.
The second task can be understood as the main exploration of this thesis which
will be carried out from Chapters 3 to 7. In order to make our understanding, learning
and living more meaningful, we are brought to enquiries concerning nature: What
kinds of concept of nature would be helpful to enrich our education and thus be
referred to in curricula? What kinds of learning process relating to such
conceptualisations might prove more meaningful and insightful?
As mentioned, the concept of nature may be used in the assumptions about
“human nature”, “natural environment” and many other ideas without being 
highlighted. It might be dificult to find a “best” way to encompass “al” the meaning 
of nature. But if appropriate orientations to a more meaningful conception or
conceptions of nature can be identified, they may enrich education and life by being
included in curricula.
In order to identify the appropriate orientation, some introduction of past studies
may help. Enquiry into conceptions of nature and education may be divided into two
types: education-based and nature-as-key-concept-based. Works based on these two
types of enquiry are not exclusively separated from each other.
1) education-based
The first type of enquiry can be understood as education-based. The
concept of nature is as an assumption for supporting certain educational ideas or
practices. The importance of nature is apparent in the following three
educational fields. They are naturalistic education, natural science education,
and environmental education. The concept of nature is an indispensible idea
underpinning these educational fields but not in the same sense. Its meaning
varies in different fields. Let us have a brief overview.
Naturalistic education is often connected with child-centred education.
The most well-known figure could be Rousseau (1962). Many authors (Allen,
1937; Attfield, 2004; Harrison, 1992) point out that there may be contradictions
in Rousseau’s thought of nature and education; however, his view that “the 
inner development of our faculties and organs is the education of nature” 
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(Rousseau, 1962) has great influence on today’s child-centred education
(Oelkers, 2002). Another important source nourishing child-centred and
naturalistic education is Romanticism. Many authors (Halpin, 2006) point out
that Romanticism values love, imagination and human potential. Romantics
believe that there is consonance between human nature and nature and therefore
nature is helpful for human learning. In this light, “nature study” and “outdoor 
education” are regarded as important educational means (Postma, 2004; 
Stevenson, 2007).
As for natural science education, its focus is learning about natural
phenomena and natural law. In some respects, it can be taken as an ancient
discipline. The ancient study of nature includes the studies of cosmos, universe,
world, and supernatural deity (R. G. Collingwood, 1945; F. J. Collingwood,
1960; Copleston, 1966a). The function of ancient legends and myths, in the
sense of providing explanations of nature, is similar to that of modern scientific
theories although they are taken as different kinds of knowledge nowadays. At
the present time, cosmology and theology are no longer taken as parts of natural
science study. Yet the concept of nature still underpins these studies even
though they are understood as very diferent disciplines in modern people’s eyes. 
It is interesting to explore the turning point or the driving force of the split of
these studies and the meaning of nature assumed in these studies.
Compared with the above, environmental education can be taken as a
newly emerging subject. Its development is related to the increasing problems
and growing concern about our environment. At the initiative stage,
environmental education, in some respects, can be taken as a continuation of
outdoor education and nature study, aiming to raise appreciation and love of
nature (Postma, 2004; Stevenson, 2007). With the escalation of environmental
problems, the scope of environmental education is broadened to include social,
political, economic and ethical issues. This highlights the ethical aspect of the
human/nature relationship and the importance of interrogating the ethical
meaning of the idea of nature. Environmental ethics is thus one of the foci in
contemporary environmental as well as philosophical discourses.
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There have been innumerable works concentrating on environmental
ethics in recent decades (Attfield, 1983; Leopold, 1949; Light, 2000; Light &
Rolston III, 2003; Nash, 1985; Oelschlaeger, 1996; Rolston III, 1989a, 1989b;
Weston, 1996). The relationship between human and nature is highlighted and
under examination. Most of the authors attempt to articulate the human/nature
relationship in a normative language.
Overall, the concept of nature plays a crucial role in these educational
fields. It does not mean that there is clear understanding of the concept of nature.
On the contrary, the number of debates on the concept of nature is increasing
with growing environmental awareness and educational reflection. For example,
what is the definition of “nature” in the conservation movement? Is it required 
for an educator to be environmentally aware? Is it the same with that in
naturalistic education? What is the relationship between human and nature from
different perspectives, such as a naturalist view, scientist view, or Romantic
view? Does an environmental educator understand “nature” in the way of an 
environmentalist? What is meant or implied by “education for nature” or 
“education for environment”? There can be more questions about “nature” and 
“education” and they are dificult to answer in short paragraphs. However, what
we can find here is that many educational theories and practices all assume
“nature”, yet, in very diferent ways of understanding. Are those assumed 
conceptions of nature all helpful for a meaningful education and life? What kind
of conception or conceptions of nature could be mostly educationally
meaningful? Thus more clarification and discussion of the concept of nature
may help for contriving educational ideas and practices related to nature. This is
related to our second type of enquiry into nature.
2) nature-as-key-concept-based
The second type of enquiry concerning the concept of nature in relation to
education can be understood as key-concept-based and may be pursued out of
educational fields, such as through history, social studies and philosophy.
Authors of this kind of work aim at exploring the meaning of nature in different
respects. They may or may not develop and interpret educational implications
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from their work. However, whether they concern themselves directly with
education or not, educators or philosophers of education can still find
inspirations from works of this sort.
There are numerous works investigating the meaning of nature from
different perspectives, such as topic, issue, thinker, school of thought, culture,
region and timeline. For example, some works focus on a certain topic. For
instance, “nature” or “naturalness” is a key concept of the ancient Chinese 
classic Lao Tzu (or Dao Te King) authored by Lao Tzu (Liu, 1998). Lao Tzu is
well-known as a cornerstone of Taoist philosophy and religion in Chinese
culture. The meaning of its core concept “Dao” (or “Tao”) is multivocal, 
contentious and inspiring. However, many scholars admit that the most
important meaning of the idea of Dao could be “nature” or “naturalness” (Liu,
1998). As the concept of nature has many references including physical world,
nonhuman beings, natural law, particular properties of things, or forces
controlling events in physical world in Western context, the term Dao also
refers to many meanings, such as spontaneous state of all beings, supernatural
deity, truth that is spoken, the act of speaking, logos, essence, universe, and path
(or “way”). Among such many meanings, the concept of Dao as nature is mostly 
often used to describe the natural state of all beings. Since Dao is the ultimate
truth of universe, the best way of life is to follow it, to live in accordance with
its, or our own, natural state. Living in accordance with Dao (or nature) is not
equivalent with living by instinct. According to Lao Tzu, natural state is a state
of being harmonious with nature. In many respects, it is difficult for readers to
acquire a clear and distinct definition of nature in Lao Tzu. On the one hand,
Lao Tzu is written in a very laconic and archaic literary form. On the other hand,
the author Lao Tzu describes Dao as inefable, unnamable, and invisible: “If 
Tao can (be) Tao(ed) (expressed in words), then it’s not always Tao” (Lusthaus, 
1990, p. 192).2 Thus, the idea of Dao surpasses human comprehension and
cannot be expressed in human language. It is interesting to find that the
2 This sentence “If Tao can (be) Taoe(ed), then it’s not always Tao”is adopted from Dan Lusthaus’
very apt translation. “Tao”can be understood as “path”(or “way”) “speech”and “act of speaking”.
Thus this sentence is more often translated as follows: “The truth which can be spoken is not the
constant truth.”and“The way which can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging way”.
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meanings of the concept of Dao in Chinese context may be as complex and
plural as those of the concept of nature in a Western context.
Take another example. “Wilderness” is a key concept in Oelschlaeger’s 
enquiry into nature (1995). Oelschlaeger adopts a historical and key-concept
approach to the investigation of the meaning of “wilderness” from Paleolithic to 
postmodern times. There are works focusing on special issues, such as
“ecofeminism”, “sustainable development” or “sustainability” (Bonnet, 1999, 
2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2007; Stables, 1996, 2001). In the view of
ecofeminists (Kheel, 1995; Merchant, 1983, 1992, 1995; Plumwood, 1993;
Warren, 1995), one main theoretical cause responsible for environmental
problems is human mastery over nature. This mastery is asserted by
ecofeminists to be in tune with masculine oppression of women and with other
forms of oppression. Ecofeminists believe that the liberation of women is
helpful to some extent for enhancing human exploitation of nature. As for
“sustainable development”, it is an issue in debate (Stevenson, 2006). It was 
formally proposed in the United Nations report Our Common Future (WCED,
1987) as a certain solution to the dilemma of improving environmental
problems and meeting economic needs. For policy-makers, it could provide a
“common language” (Postma, 2004) for compromising expectations of 
environmental improvement and economic growth. However, it is criticised by
many as an oxymoron (Bonnet, 1999) or a “paradoxical compound policy 
slogan” (Stables, 1996). Thus, some authors suggest a reconceptualisation of the 
idea of sustainability, for example, as a frame of mind rather than a policy
(Bonnett, 2002). This could be more educational.
There are some works aiming at exploring the meaning of nature in the
view of particular thinkers. For example, many authors find an inspiration from
Martin Heidegger’s thought for developing environmental philosophy (Bonnet, 
2003; Zimmerman, 1983, 1986, 1993, 1994). Heidegger’s (1962, 1977) critique 
of technology and modernity perceptively reveals the dangers implied in
modernism towards environment and human existence. According to Heidegger
(1977), modern technology is characterised by the feature of “Enframe” 
(Gestell), meaning“revealing” (or alethia), “seting-upon”, “chalenging forth”, 
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“producing”, “presenting”, “unconcealment”, “occasioning”, “bringing forth”, 
and “destining”. Technology expands human exploitation of nature and,
paradoxically, confines human freedom by leading humans to forget about their
own being --- Dasein. On this point, we may understand why Zimmerman
(1986) relates Heidegger’s philosophy to deep ecology --- both criticise
modernist thinking and lifestyle. Arne Naess’s (1989) --- one founder of deep
ecology --- critique of modern technology and modern lifestyle in his Ecology,
community and lifestyle is in tune with Heidegger’s. Heidegger’s strategy of 
dealing with the forgeting is a cal for returning to “Being” or “Sein”. In my
point of view, the Heideggerian approach seems mystical and essentialist in
attitude. According to Heidegger, “man finds himself in Being and does not 
create it, nevertheless Being is not properly grasped by the categories of Nature.
For Nature, which Heidegger likes to call das Vorhandene, is also only a part of
Being, something within the whole or in Being” (Gray, 1952, p. 416). This is 
confusing: is Being supernatural? Yet Being is neither nature nor God;
moreover, Being cannot be grasped “through the being or in the beings --- or
anywhere else” (Heidegger, 1961, p. 27). Being is beyond humans and ineffable. 
In short, Being is nothing that can be understood through language. Heidegger
always describes Being as “self-revealing”, “self-disclosing” andparadoxically
“self-concealing”. However, what interests me is the answer to the question: 
what does Being conceal or reveal? As Heidegger (1998, p. 252) states, “Yet 
being – what is being? It ‘is’ It itself. … Being is essentialy farther than al 
beings and is yet nearer to the human being than every being, be it a rock, a
beast, a work of art, a machine, be it an angel or God”. He seems to say that 
there is no answer to what Being is or is not. In brief, although Heidegger
provides inspirations for criticising modernity and technology and for
developing environmental reflections, his idea of “Being” is puzzling for 
readers.
On this path of existential phenomenology, French philosopher Maurice
Merleau-Ponty may be helpful for overcoming the tendency of mysticism and
essentialism when conducting phenomenological interrogation of the concept of
nature in relation to education. His ideas of perception, bodily experience and
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nature3 and the potential for environmental philosophy have started attracting
scholars’ atention lately (Abram, 1995, 1996; Cataldi & Hamrick, 2007; Hung, 
2008). Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy could be inspiring for reconsidering the 
meaning of lived experience and lifeworld in relation to nature (Hung & Stables,
2008; Van Koppen, 2000; Van Manen, 1997). What kind of lived experience
can we have in nature? If nature can be helpful to enrich human lived
experience or lifeworld, it could be treated with more attention and care. This
could be a turning point for conceiving an education which can be friendly to
nature.
Moreover, some authors explore the meaning of nature from the
perspectives of certain schools of thought, such as “Romanticism” (Garard, 
1998) or “deep ecology” (Naess, 1989, 2005). These explorations give us 
different inspirations for conceiving of nature and the human/nature relationship.
For example, according to Garrard (1998), the most distinguishing point of
Romantics is their belief in the intrinsic value of nature. This seems to be in tune
with critiques of anthropocentrism which is criticised by many as one main
theoretical cause of environmental problems. None the less, Romantics highly
value individual freedom and autonomy. Then, how does a Romantic view
cherish human individuality and disapprove of anthropocentrism simultaneously?
What is meant by the Romantic value of nature? What is implied in the concept
of anthropocentrism? An enquiry into the Romantic view of nature and
humanity may be helpful for the exploration of the meanings of nature.
One point is common, explicitly or implicitly, for most of the above
discussions: a critique of modern technology. Modern technology is identified
by many as a crucial factor resulting in today’s environmental problems in 
practice. However, what concerns philosophers more is the underpinning of
modernist instrumental rationality which is regarded as a theoretical root of
human crisis (Habermas, 1971, 1996; Husserl, 1970). For example, according to
Habermas (1971), the production of knowledge and science is related to human
3 Merleau-Ponty did not publish works about the concept of nature; however, he still showed much
interest on this topic. During the years 1956 to 1960, he gave courses focusing on the idea of nature at
the Collège de France. The courses notes on nature were collected and published after his death, under
the title La Nature. The English version was published in 2003.
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interests. There are three types of human interest and rationality: technical,
practical and emancipatory. Correspondingly, these three types of rationality
provide legitimation for three different domains of science including natural
science, interpretive science and critical science (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). The
problem caused by modernism is an unbalanced over-expansion of technical
interest, or instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality denotes
“manipulation and control of the environment; prediction aboutobservable
physical or social events; reality, based on empirical knowledge and governed
by technical rules; and the criteria of effective control of reality, which
determines the appropriateness of action” (Merzirow, 1981, p. 4; cited in Ewert, 
1991). This instrumental rationality pervades all domains of knowledge and
results in a crisis in our lifeworld since all levels of human life are measured,
understood and practised according to the same technical criteria. Habermas’ 
critique, in tune with Husserl’s, pertinently describes the pervasiveness of the
modernist instrumental, materialist rationality and its edging out of other types
of rationality. This may result in the impoverishment of meaning in, for instance,
imaginative life and is thus worth notice: how then does the modernist
instrumental rationality become so pervasive and dominant? How does it
influence our understanding of nature and education? Overall, although
Habermas’ critique of modernist instrumental rationality is revealing, it is 
questionable whether human interest and rationality can be distinctively
separated into “only” three types and fit in three domains of knowledge. In my 
view, this classification could also over-simplify our understanding of nature if
these three types of interests and knowledge are taken as the only effective
orientations. The Habermasian position seems, in some respects, to rule out the
significance of affectivity and imagination in life and in education. These are
cherished by Romantics.
In addition, some works focus on the concept of nature in respect of the
relationship between environmental change and religion. For instance, Lynn
White (1967) identifies Christianity as one of the roots of today’s environmental 
problems. Some authors explore the concept of nature from particular cultures,
traditions; or geographical areas or regions (Corbeil, 2003; Soper, 1995, 1996;
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Weller, 2006). For example, Robert Weller (2006) has documented the
transformation of meaning of the concept of nature in Taiwan and in China. He
points out that the understanding of nature in modern Chinese tradition has been
heavily westernised due to the influence of globalisation although the
understanding of nature before it was influenced by Western ideas in the 19th
and early 20th century was generally used to denote various ways of thinking
about the environment and how people should live in it. Weler’s finding may 
help this thesis to contextualise the exploration of the meaning of nature in the
western tradition.
Among these many perspectives, works studying nature chronologically
can exhibit more detailed and comprehensive meanings of nature in different
periods of time. Let us have a more detailed discussion. For example, Man and
Nature authored by George Perkins Marsh (1874) might be seen as an early and
significant work revealing how human beings change the natural landscape and
the implied cultural and social factors. Clarence J. Glacken’s (1967) Traces on
the Rhodian Shore is one of the classics for its detailed expositions of the
development of natural environment. Its subtitle manifests the main target of
this work: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the
End of the Eighteenth Century. There are three main ideas as the axes of this
book: the idea of the Earth designed for man, the idea of environmental
influences, and the idea of humankind as a geographical agent. However, these
two books make elaborate investigation of the relationship between human
action and environmental changes and the implied social, cultural and
intellectual factors. Yet there are still limits when we attempt to retrieve
meanings of nature from the above works to enhance curriculum: firstly, by
focusing on the physical environmental changes and the related human action,
the works above read as encyclopaedias of history of geography rather than
exploration of the meaning of the concept of nature. Moreover, there is a
difficulty caused by the study of environmental history itself. As an
interdisciplinary field, environmental history may not be specified by a clear
definition because there are innumerable materials and data coming from other
fields such as agriculture, geography, natural sciences, and so on.
19
Peter Coates in his Nature: Western Attitudes since Ancient Times (1998)
explores “historical nature” from ancient times to the modern era. Atempting to 
outline the major categories of the meanings of nature in the Western context,
he provides five categories: nature as a physical place; nature as collective
phenomena of the world; nature as an essence, quality and/or principle; nature
as an inspiration, guide, and source of authority governing human affairs; and
nature as the conceptual opposite of (artificial) culture (Coates, 1998, p. 3).
Coates, on the one hand, perceptively reveals the complexity and ambiguity of
the idea of nature and its inconsistency with environmental actions throughout
history; on the other hand, his elucidation of the varied meanings of nature may
be somewhat insufficient because he fails to provide further claims and
implications for practices --- whether on an ethical or political level. Moreover,
one point that might need notice is that his discussion related to the
“postmodern” is relatively scant. As the author promises, this work aims at 
displaying Western attitudes towards nature since ancient times, the discussion
of the “postmodern nature” is comparatively slight --- only three pages in the
last chapter --- although the term “postmodern” is defined as a period of time 
after modern times or a certain cultural, social and philosophical ethos or
characteristics distinguishable from those of modernity.
Compared with Coates’s work, Bruce Morito’s Thinking Ecologically:
Environmental Thought, Values and Policy (2002) investigates the concept of
nature from many aspects, incorporating a historical approach and discussion of
values, ethics, policy and sustainable development. The meaning of nature is
divided into three kinds of world view according to three periods of time:
animism in classic times, mechanism in modern times, and ecological thinking
after the rise of evolutionary and ecological theories. Morito strives to present a
world view adopting ecological process as the context of thinking, viz.
“thinking ecologicaly”. In order to atain this world view as “thinking
ecologicaly”, the “understanding of the history of ideas…began to appear…as a 
path to greater inclusion of perspectives, as shifts in world view seemed to
undermine former world views, while building on them” (Morito, 2002, p. 2). 
Some part of this paragraph is acceptable and some debatable. The emergence
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of a world view is very possibly established on the ground of the former world
views but not necessarily based on the destruction of the former views. It might
be an extension or refinement. In addition, Morito’s perspective seems to take 
the development of world views as a linear progress along history. In this sense,
the world view is taken as a unitary view and the implied complexity, plurality
and ambiguity of nature could be overlooked.
In addition to the historical approach, there are other different approaches
to the understanding of nature by taking particular theoretical perspectives.
Many contemporary reconsiderations of the idea of nature can be understood as
reactions to modernism. Modernism is generally recognised as one of the
important causes of environmental crisis; accordingly, many doctrines or ideas
contra modernism have been proposed as antidotes, including non-Western,
non-modern, traditional or postmodern ways of thinking. For example, Neil
Evernden (1992), David R. Griffin (1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 2000), Max
Oelschaeger (1991), Richard Rorty (1980) and many other authors have made
in-depth investigation of the concept of nature although their thoughts
concerning the issue of nature and approaches are quite different.
As postmodern responses to modernism, these authors’ thoughts may be 
briefly divided into two categories --- adapted from Grifin’s (1988a, 1988b, 
2000) view: deconstructive and constructive postmodernism (Hung, 2007). Put
simply, deconstructive postmodernism can be characterised by the features of
anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism by revealing that the taken-for-
granted and everlasting ideas, values, beliefs and truths (“eternal verities and
orthodoxies”) are socially and culturally linguistic constructs and so no more
transcendental and perennial reality “foundations” can be found “out there”. 
Jacques Derida is taken as one of the leading “deconstructive”thinkers.
Viewed in this light, “nature” is a social construction whose meaning depends
on the context. Adopting this approach, some authors announce the end of
“nature” such as Michael E. Soulé and Gary Lease (1995), and Wiliam Cronon. 
Michael E. Soulé and Gary Lease, as editors of Reinventing Nature: Responses
to Postmodern Deconstruction, state in the Preface that “The so-called
deconstructionist view…asserts that al we can ever perceive about the world 
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are shadows, and that we can never escape our particular biases and fixed
historical-cultural positions” (1995, p. xv). Moreover, Cronon argues that the
concept of nature as wilderness is a myth, a hope, and a quasi-religious value:
…wilderness is not quite what it seems…it is quite 
profoundly a human creation --- indeed, the creation of very
particular human cultures at very particular moments in
human history… we too easily imagine that what we behold 
is Nature when in fact we see the reflection of our own
unexamined longings and desires. (Cronon, 1996, p. 7)
Soulé and Lease and the other authors in the anthology and Cronon have invited
the criticism of various authors including Samuel P. Hays (1996), Michael P.
Cohen (1996), Thomas R. Dunlap (1996) and George Sessions (1995). Some
authors (Griffin, 1988a, 1988b, 1990) claim that one of the views opposed to
deconstructive postmodernism is constructive postmodernism. Although I doubt
whether it is appropriate to name “constructive postmodernism” as one branch 
of postmodernism, this point will be argued in later chapters. Now let us return
to the so-caled “constructive postmodernism”.
According to Griffin (1988a, 1988b, 1988c), deconstructive
postmodernism is unable to ameliorate modern predicaments such as the
environmental crisis; furthermore, deconstructive postmodernism and its
implied relativism and nihilism aggravate the problem. Griffin (1988c) claims
that deconstructive postmodernism overcomes the modern worldview through
an “anti-worldview view”. “The ingredients necessary for a worldview, such as 
God, self, purpose, meaning, a real world, and truth as corespondence” (Grifin, 
1988c, p. x) are eliminated by deconstruction. This criticism could be
questioned because Griffin seems to confuse deconstruction of the
unchangeable, transcendental reality of ideas with that of conceptualisation of
ideas and with relativisation and nihilisation of the world. However, in Grifin’s 
view, what is needed is “constructive postmodernism”. It involves “a new unity 
of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions…Constructive 
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postmodern thought provides support for the ecology, peace, feminist and other
emancipatory movements of our time” (Grifin, 1988a, p. 2-3). This perspective
can be understood as containing numerous re-workings of nature, including re-
invention, re-construction, re-creation, re-description, re-contextualisation, re-
divinisatrion and re-enchantment. Paradoxically, constructive postmodernism
on this point seems to adopt the idea of its enemy, deconstructive
postmodernism, because the reworking implies dismantlement and dissection of
the old structures and the following building and composition of new ones.
According to Grifin’s view, what distinguishes constructive from 
deconstructive postmodernism may be the features of re-divinisation and re-
enchantment of nature.
However, it is not clear how best to use the term “constructive 
postmodernism”, because postmodernism is a term in a very broad sense which 
refers to a wide range of positions including deconstruction, nihilism, relativism,
anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism. In my understanding, what Griffin
considers as deconstructive postmodernism refers to relativism and nihilism;
while what he takes as constructive postmodernism is a certain kind neo-eco-
theology which integrates Whitehead’s process philosophy, ecological thinking, 
parapsychology and religion 4 . I disagree with Grifin’s definition of 
postmodernism. On this point, many prominent thinkers, such as Friedrich
Nietzsche, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, may give us more food for
postmodern thought.
4 Grifin’s constructive postmodernism in some respects can be understood as an assemblage of anti-
modern notions. He sees modern world in crisis and thus the modern world view needs to be
transcended. The problem of modernism can be overcome by constructive postmodernism. In Griffin’s 
view, the modern world view is characterised by individualism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy,
mechnisation, economism, nationalism, secularism, and militarism, while constructive postmodernism
is composed of various and divergent thoughts including “ecology, peace, feminist, and other 
emancipatory movements” and “premodern notions of a divine reality, cosmic meaning, and an 
enchanted nature”. Moreover, he claims that “through its [constructive postmodernism] return to
organicism and its acceptance of nonsensory perception, it opens itself to the recovery of truths and
values from various forms of premodern thought and practice that had been dogmatically rejected by
modernity” (Griffin, 1988c, p. xi). In some sense, this constructive postmodernism seems a farrago of
anti-modern ideas. The modern worldview, according to Griffin (1988a, 1998b, 1988c), contains the
notions of atheism, mechanism, materialism, militarism, environmental crisis and disenchantment and
thereby the countering ideas are the solution. These ideas, such as theism, organcism, spirit, peace,
ecology and enchantment, compose constructive postmodernism. Such pursuit of solution to the
modern problem seems a wishful thinking.
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For instance, Rorty (1993a) points out that the process of making
distinctions, redescribing and recontextualising consists of two parts: to
“criticise” present practices by “exposing” and “demystifying” them and to 
“suggest” alternative ones. In sum, deconstruction can be understood as
denoting an on-going process of continuous re-examining, questioning,
dissolving, decomposing, re-inventing and re-composing. Therefore, the notion
of deconstruction refers to the ideas of dismantlement and dissection of the old
structures and the subsequent building and composition of new ones. Yet this
will not be explored in-depth in this paragraph. The aim here is only to
introduce the variety of “postmodern” approaches to nature.
The above constructive postmodern view is, to some extent, in tune with
the view of Oelschlaeger (1991) who understands postmodernism in terms of
“cosmic synergism” and some other authors who do not label themselves as 
postmodernists, yet view things in a similar light, such as Patrick Curry (2003,
2007), who argues for “eco-pluralism” (or can be termed “ecological pluralism 
or “pluralist ecocentrism”). There is a tendency in these views, which is an 
attempt to pursue the sacredness or divinity of nature. Yet, this pursuit could be
at the risk of reifying and substantiating nature. Furthermore, what is worth
consideration is whether the divinity of nature (whatever that means) is a
necessary condition for human beings to value and conserve nature. Some
ecocentrists and deep ecologists concern themselves with the idea that if nature
is not taken as divine, or if there is no intrinsic value in nature, then nature could
be taken as an object at human disposal from an anthropocentric perspective.
However, I shall put forward a possible alternative to ecocentrism and
anthropocentrism.
All in all, the above discussion shows abundant meanings of the concepts
of nature across numerous studies in the past. They can provide food for thought
with respect to education. In this view, the exploration of nature is taken as
fundamental for developing educational thought and practice.
However, these two types of enquiry --- education-based and nature-as-
key-concept-based enquiries --- cannot be exclusively separated. The
understanding of nature underpins educational ideas and practices, whether or
24
not it be taken as an explicit object to learn about. Educational philosophical
enquiry into the concept of nature can be articulated as the investigation of the
meaning of nature and its educational implication and also the investigation of
the nature of education. In this respect, Bonnett (2003, 2004, 2007) has provided
insights into the metaphysical meaning of nature and education. After
examining the notion of nature and its related environmental issue, Bonnett
(2003, 2007) identifies the features of nature as a self-arising and
epistemological mystery. These features of nature suggest that, ontologically,
there is always difference between human and nature and, epistemologically,
there is always something in and about nature beyond human understanding.
Here we may find an interesting parallel between the concept of nature in the
Western context and the concept of Dao in an Eastern background.
Overall, the overview of the enquiries inspires me to propose five themes
consisting of polarities as the anchors for exploration. They can be understood as five
kinds of dialectic of the interrogation of nature. The five themes with polarities are as
follows:
1) Should “nature” be understood as becoming or being? Which conception 
could be more educationally meaningful? What might be offered by these
two views?
2) What kind of conception of the telos (purpose) of nature could be helpful for
a meaningful learning? Should the telos be taken as immanent or
transcendent? Divine or non-divine?
3) What kind of human attitude towards nature could bring more and richer
meaning to education? A disenchanted or enchanted view?
4) What kind of human/nature relationship could be helpful for conceiving
more and richer meaning for learning? An anthropocentric or what I will
term an anthropo-non-centric view?
5) The above discussions lead us to explore different pedagogical approaches
to nature. What kind of pedagogical approach to nature would be significant
and desirable? A disengaged or engaged approach?
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The exploration of the meaning of nature guided by the five themes will reveal that
some of the underpinning ideas about nature, humans and their relationship might
tend to impoverish the meaning of education and deepen the pitfalls in the present
curriculum and educational practices. These notions will be summed up as
“anonymising view”. In addition, it wil also reveal some of the underpinning ideas to 
be helpful for conceiving more and richer meanings of nature for education. These
ideas wil be refered to as “authoring view”. The exploration of Chapters 3 to 7 is a
process of unpicking the notions of anonymising and authoring views.
Chapter 3 focuses on the metaphysical assumption of nature. This thesis argues
that there are two basic metaphysical positions through history: philosophy of being
and philosophy of becoming. Both positions can be traced back to ancient Greek
philosophers including Heraclitus, Parmenides, and atomists. This chapter will argue
that philosophy of being has greater and more explicit influence on current
educational ideas and practices than philosophy of becoming. Philosophy of being in
this sense can be understood as one of the factors resulting in the pitfalls in current
curriculum. In contrast, philosophy of becoming may offer a different, more dynamic
and interesting view for understanding nature, humanity and education and thereby
help to improve current educational practices.
Chapter 4 explores the meaning of nature regarding the telos (purpose) of nature.
The telos of nature is related to divinity which has been one of the most important
enquiries into nature in human history. The debates on the notion of physico-theology
mark out two important and different conceptions of telos of nature: nature with
immanent divine telos and nature with transcendental divine telos. These debates have
important origins in ancient Greek philosophers including Plato and Aristotle and
Enlightenment thinkers, especially Hume and Kant. I will discuss the debate and
demonstrate how these concepts of divine nature influence our views of humanity,
knowledge, and our world. However, evolutionary biology brings us the third
conception of telos of nature: nature with immanent non-divine telos. This thesis
points out that three kinds of telos of nature can be conceived and that different
conceptions of telos assume different metaphysical positions. In my view, nature with
divine telos is grounded on philosophy of being and results in a deterministic view of
education, while nature with non-divine immanent telos is in tune with philosophy of
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becoming. This conception of telos of nature can yield more benefits for developing a
freer and meaningful education than the conception of divine telos.
Chapter 5 aims at revealing the meaning of nature in respect of epistemology.
Nature has been recognised as disenchanted or enchanted in history through different
perspectives. However, an understanding of nature as enchanted or disenchanted
entails not only knowledge of nature itself but also the means of acquiring knowledge
of nature. The idea of disenchantment has aroused innumerable discussions and
criticisms. It can be understood in terms of Weber’s (1948) “intelectualisation” and 
“rationalisation”, Habermas’ (1971) “technical interest” and “instrumental 
knowledge” and Husserl’s (1970) “naïve naturalistic atitude”, whereas the idea of 
enchantment is often explained in terms of divinisation. However, what interests me
most is the attitude or ethos involved. This thesis demonstrates that, on the one hand,
modernist scientists and thinkers, such as Galileo, in early modern times make
significant contributions to the formation of disenchantment or disenchanted ethos.
On the other, Romantics, such as Rousseau and Wordsworth, have significant
influence on the understanding of enchantment and an enchanted ethos. The
demonstration will reveal that a disenchanted view is inappropriately overemphasised
in mainstream educational discourses and thereby results in an oversimplifying
curriculum. Hence to pay more heed to an enchanted view in curriculum may help to
improve the unbalanced situation and direct us towards a meaningful, interesting and
desirable education.
Chapters 3 to 5 are the elaboration of the fundamental philosophical position of
this thesis. On this ground, Chapter 6 extends the concern to the human/nature
relationship, Chapter 7 to the learning approach. Chapter 6 explains a main
perspective concerning the human/nature relationship --- anthropocentrism.
Anthropocentrism has been criticised as one of the central factors of environmental
crisis and many countervailing views have been proposed as solutions. However,
these views may ignore the inextricable and dialectical interrelationships between the
conceptions of nature and humanity. Drawing on the idea of deconstruction of Derrida
(1969, 2002) and Agamben (2002), I suggest an anthropo-non-centrism as a new
perspective towards the understanding of the human/nature relationship. This
anthropo-non-centrism reveals the interdependence and intertwinement of the
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understanding of humanity and nature and thereby inspires different and novel
meanings for education.
Chapter 7 focuses on the approach to learning. According to the previous
exploration, I propose two learning approaches: disengaged and engaged. In some
sense, they are similar to but not exactly identified with the surface and deep learning
approaches in the field of learning theory (Marton & Säljö, 1984). The disengaged
approach to learning stresses the collective and disembodied parts of experience
which have been taken for granted in learning, while the engaged one emphasises the
personal and individualistic parts of lived experience. In my view, the engaged
approach to learning is more beneficial than the disengaged one for producing richer
and more meanings in the lifeworld. Drawing on Husserl (1913/1931, 1970) and
Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1962/2003, 2004), the idea of lifeworld can be understood not
only as a collection of ordinary life experience common for all but also an assemblage
of unique, private and personal lived experience each unique to one individual, but
with shared elements (Hung & Stables, 2008). The interpretation of the lifeworld as
private lived experiences is crucial for understanding how inexhaustible meanings can
emerge from our own lived experience. Chapter 7 will argue that an engaged
approach to learning is an appropriate means for exploring our lifeworld as a source
of meaning.
After exploration through the five themes, the views tending to result in
impoverishment of meaning are generaly caled “anonymising orientation”, while the 
views beneficial for the generation of meaning are referred to as “authoring 
orientation”. Chapter 8 wil remark on how the authoring-oriented view can improve
the understanding of the concept of nature and enrich the meaning of education and
life in general as well as overcome the pitfalls of our present curriculum in particular.
The educational implications of the authoring-oriented view will be discussed in three
respects: meaning of education in general, education about and for nature and nature
in a particular system of education (the Taiwanese curriculum).
The meaning of the authoring view of education will be articulated with regard
to metaphysics, epistemology, educational anthropology and ethics. This thesis takes
the metaphysical position of a philosophy of becoming and a constructive view of
knowledge. On this ground, the human image can be depicted as primarily an author,
28
who also plays the roles of an inventor, an adventurer, an agent and a poet. This
anthropological view leads to an ethics of responsibility since every individual is an
irreplaceable authentic author who cannot escape from her responsibility for herself
and the world. The understanding of the meaning of the authoring-view of education
is helpful for reflecting on education about and for nature. How can an education
about and for nature be developed? Three aspects will be considered: nature as the
object to be learned about, nature as the surroundings to be learned within, and nature
as a guide to be learned from. The above concluding remarks are helpful for
envisaging a prospect of a more meaningful educational practice. Based on the
authoring view, I will return to the Taiwanese curriculum and make suggestions for
overriding its shortcomings of homogenisation and disembodiment.
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2
Nature in Current Educational Practice:
The Taiwanese Curriculum
This chapter aims to show that the concept of “nature” in curent educational 
discourse has been over-simplified. The Taiwanese curriculum will be proposed as an
example for analysis and examination to demonstrate the over-simplification as
“homogenisation” and “disembodiment”. 
As mentioned, the concept of nature is significantly related to the extent of the
meaningfulness of education since it is often referred to, implicitly or explicitly, when
many assumptions are made about humanity, nature, science, deity, etc. Thus it should
be taken seriously as an important issue for education. None the less, it seems difficult
to find general educational literature focusing explicitly on the concept of nature. The
concept “nature” is often implicit in assumptions about human nature or natural law or 
natural environment without being used explicitly. To some degree, assumptions
about human nature and nature have been taken for granted. This point shows that it is
important to investigate the meaning of nature in general discourse because this
investigation can help to uncover the taken-for-granted conceptions of nature assumed
in educational practices.
There might be another reason that the concept of nature attracts increasing
attention. It could be related to anxiety about the escalating environmental crisis. The
environmental crisis reminds educational thinkers and practitioners of the importance
of our own “natural” environment and the related education. Certainly, in the late 20th
century, issues related to natural environment and environmental problems have been
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highlighted in the educational field. There are some prominent examples: many
international and national organisations aiming at the promotion of environmental
education have been set up in the past decades and they call for and undertake
numerous actions or strategies for implementing environmental education in all levels
of education; moreover, various related new pedagogic fields appear, such as
environmental education (EE), education for sustainable development (ESD) or
education for sustainability (ES). The emergence of these organisations, these
educational fields and the related discourses in some sense shows an increasing public
environmental concern. For example, many frameworks have been proposed to
“inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of 
the human environment” such as The Stockholm Declaration (UNESCO, 1972),
Tbilisi Declaration (UNESCO-UNEP, 1977), and so on. The concept of nature seems
to be taken for granted as a synonym of natural environment by these frameworks.
However, this assumption may diminish and lessen the meaning which nature could
bring to our learning because “nature” does not necessarily refer to the natural 
environment.
If we recall how we use this term in our ordinary language, we may surprisingly
find that there are many ways of understanding and usages in relation to nature. For
example, it may refer to natural law, the wild, the essential property of a thing, the
disposition or temperament of a person, human nature, the quality opposite to the
artificial and so on. There are many more ways of using this term. Thus we may
understand why Raymond Wiliams (1980, p.67) remarks that “nature” is one of the 
most complex words in the language. In addition, he admited that, “I’ve previously 
attempted to analyse some comparable ideas, critically and historically. Among them
were culture, society, individual, class, art, and tragedy. But I’d beter say at the outset 
that, difficult as all those ideas are, the idea of nature makes them seem comparatively
simple” (Wiliams, 1980, p.67). When nature is merely taken as a synonym of natural 
environment, its meaning becomes poor because the ways of conception and
experience of nature are limited, and so therefore is the education related to nature, on
such an understanding. If the concept of nature has been more fully and sufficiently
explored then it will be found that it is not merely equivalent to “environment” or 
“wilderness”. Thus when nature is understood as a synonym of environment, no more 
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and no less, its rich and abundant meaning could be lessened and impoverished; in
this case learning about nature should not be taken as EE, ESD, ES or SE.
One problem can be detected from the tendency to take education related to
nature as environment-related educational fields such as SE, EE, ESD or ES.
Basically, the establishment of these disciplinary fields relies much on the knowledge
of scientists and experts in natural science. In the expert-dependent educational
perspective, nature tends to be taken for granted as a physical, external and substantial
natural world and as an instrument for providing kinds of resource for human
exploitation and well-being. This might cause a myth that education about nature
(natural environment) is mainly the task of science education and thereby the possible
contribution of other fields such as art, humanities or physical education could be
underestimated or limited. Jensen and Schnack (2006) admit that there is a strong
tendency of scientism in environmental education; the focus of environmental
education has often been to give pupils substantial knowledge about environmental
problems without addressing the social values implied in “seeing” the problems. This 
point will be supported by the analysis of the Taiwanese Grade 1-9 Curriculum
Guidelines (G1-9 CG) (Ministry of Education, MOE, 2006) in the following section.
2.1 The Taiwanese Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines as “Glocal”
Practice
Here I take the Taiwanese Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines (Ministry of Education,
MOE, 2006) as an example for analysis to demonstrate the limitedness of the meaning
of nature in the current educational practices. I will argue that this limitedness can be
understood as resonance of a general trend in present education rather than a result of
a peculiar culture or tradition. Thus the analysis of the Taiwanese curriculum
guidelines leads this thesis also to explore the meaning of nature in the “Western” 
context.
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The development and implementation of the Taiwanese curriculum guidelines
can be understood in some respects as closely related to global changes of economic
and socio-political conditions including globalisation and democratisation (Kennedy,
2008; Law, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Lee, 2004). The Taiwanese curriculum guidelines
are the product of following the international curriculum reform movement in respect
of historical background and substantial content. The current Taiwanese curriculum
guidelines can thus be understood as a local response to globalisation, or a “glocal”
practice in education. In order to clarify this point, I first give a brief introduction of
the background of the development of the Taiwanese curriculum.
2.1.1 Background of the Taiwanese Curriculum: Overview of Taiwan’s
History and Cultural Context
Taiwan’s recorded history can be traced back to the 16th century. In the 16th century,
on the way of sailing to Japan, Portuguese had a glance of Taiwan and caled it “Ilha 
Formosa”, meaning “Beautiful Island”(Su, 1986). The earliest inhabitants were
Malayo-Polynesian peoples who are referred to as “aborigines”or “indigenous
peoples”(Su, 2007). During the past 400 years, many immigrants have moved to
Taiwan, most of them from the southern provinces of China. Meanwhile, Europeans,
Chinese and Japanese established their dominion over this island at different times.
Before the end of World War II, Taiwan had been governed by Dutch (1662-1661),
Spanish (1626-1642), Zheng Cheng-gong (1661-1683), Ching (1683-1895), and
Japanese (1895-1945) (Mao, 1997, 2008; Su, 1986; Su, 2007). Since 1945, Taiwan
has been governed by the Republic of China government --- mainly led by Chiang
Kai-shek’s party --- Koumintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party).
The historical-political background has been deeply embedded in the
development of the Taiwanese curriculum, in a very complicated and complex way.
In the year 1947, two years after Taiwan was taken over by the KMT government, a
massacre (the 2.28 Operation) slaughtering protesters against government and
innocent civilians was conducted by the government and resulted in a forty-year rule
of martial law. Since then, the educational system has been regarded as an important
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state apparatus by the ruling party KMT to maintain its one-party authoritarian regime.
All levels and all kinds of education were put under severe control and surveillance
until the 1980s. The design of curriculum and publication of textbooks was under the
control of government. Most authors (Hwang & Chang, 2003; Doong, 2008; Tsai,
2002) agree that the mid-1980s can be taken as an important time, since then the
Taiwanese curriculum was about to change.
Before the mid-1980s, the aim of the Taiwanese curriculum was to fortify
KMT’s ruling authority by indoctrinating pupils with Chinese tradition and culture.
KMT and its leader Chiang Kai-shek claim that their fundamental ideology inherits
Chinese orthodoxies which Chinese communists intend to destroy. Thus Chinese
traditional doctrine in this sense is not only used to provide legitimisation of KMT’s
ideology and ruling authority but also as a thinking apparatus confronting communism
and the other sets of beliefs that could possibly challenge KMT’s ruling authority ---
in the name of protecting Chinese tradition. Education in this period of time was
“Chinese-ised” to a great extent; curriculum was thereby heavily “Chinese
nationalised”(Tsai, 2002). Curriculum was designed to foster patriotism, loyalty and
obedience to government (or the particular political party and its leader). In order to
achieve this goal, the edition and compilation of textbooks must strictly observe the
official Curriculum Standards, which were firstly issued in 1929 in mainland China
and had undergone several revisions until 1993 (Lee, 2008; Shoon, 2000). The
rationale of the Curriculum Standards aimed to shape primary school pupils to be
“energetic children and good citizens”(MOE, 1993) while for secondary school
pupils“optimistic youngsters and good citizens”(MOE, 1995).5 The first objective of
the curriculum standards for primary education is to enable pupils to be “diligent,
hard-working, conscientious, obedient to the law, allegiant to family, hometown, state
and the world”(MOE, 1993). While in secondary education, the primary objective is
to enable students to be “nationalistic, patriotic, allegiant to family, hometown and
state”(MOE, 1995). Yet the term“hometown”in the curriculum does not refer to the
island Taiwan but mainland China --- a country where many Taiwanese have never
5 The previous curriculum standards for primary education and secondary education were separately
mandated. The earliest edition of Curriculum Standards for primary education was issued in 1929,
while for secondary education in 1922. The curriculum standards for primary education had been
revised for 11 times while for secondary education 18 times until the new curriculum guidelines were
issued. The quotations of the rationales of the standards are cited from the latest editions.
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stepped on. In brief, the Taiwanese curriculum can be characterised by
authoritarianism and mono-cultural Chinese-isation from the 1950s to the mid-1980s.
Since the 1980s, as many authors (Law, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Held, McGrew,
Goldblatt & Perraton, 1998; Waters, 1995) have pointed out, globalisation started to
become a prevalent phenomenon all over the world.“The international flow of capital,
goods, services, information, and people, aided by developments in information and
communication technology, has accelerated and intensified throughout the world”
(Law, 2004b, p. 500). The“Western”ideas of democracy and liberty sneaked in with
Taiwan’s economic development. Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, and his son
succeeded as the new president. However, the new successor showed some and slow
tolerance to “Western”values. Discussions on public issues were allowed as long as
they did not challenge the authority of government. The martial law was finally lifted
in 1987, one year before Chiang died. The regulations of inspecting the press and
controlling the mass media were denounced in 1988, the law of prohibiting the
formation of political parties in 1989. In 1996, Taiwanese people could vote for a
president for the first time. The changing economic-socio-political conditions during
these two decades opened up a space for debates over educational and curriculum
reform.
In the early 1990s, a wide range of social activists demanded educational reform,
asking for deregulation of the Taiwanese heavily-bound educational system: for
example, the joint entrance examination, the textbook policy, and the state’s control
over curriculum (Doong, 2008). What is more important is that the political
authoritarianism in the disguise of protection of Chinese orthodoxies in curriculum
has been challenged. Some authors interpret this challenge as a tension between
Chinese-isation and Taiwan-isation (Tsai, 2002; Law, 2002), localisation and
internationalisation (Hwang & Chang, 2003), or between nationalisation and
localisation, sinoisation and indigenisation (Mao, 1997, 2008). In my view, the crucial
tension exists between centralisation and decentralisation, monologism and
heteroglossia. The educational systems before the mid-1980s were under severe
centralised control; moreover, the curriculum only presented the very limited
“Chinese-ised”view. Many narratives were excluded from the centralised and
“monolingual”field of curriculum. For example, the 2.28 Operation was strictly
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forbidden to public discussion; the Dutch, or Spanish or Japanese rulers were
described as cruel invaders without mentioning their great contribution to education
and development in many other respects. The indigenous people’s stories were rarely
told; they were described as barbarians (hunting for man) in textbooks, waiting to be
“civilised”by Chinese culture. Moreover, Mandarin was approved as the only legal
and official language in schools, and pupils would be punished for speaking dialectics.
Many restrictions and regulations were set in the curriculum standards in order to
maintain the ruling authority. The previous curriculum standards were highly
centralised and mono-cultural (Chinese). Overall, various social movements arose in
the early 1990s, asking for deregulation, democratisation and liberalisation. They
challenged the monopoly-authority and its underpinning centralised and Chinese-ised
ideology and caused the following curriculum reform.
The most impressive achievement of the curriculum reform in the 1990s is the
development of the new curriculum guidelines: Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines.
After years of study, these curriculum guidelines were mandated and implemented in
2001. These new curriculum guidelines are very different from the previous
curriculum standards in many aspects. For instance, the curriculum standards set a
very strict limit for teachers and textbook publishers to plan the curricula and design
the textbooks, thus the contents of school textbooks were under highly severe control.
The new curriculum guidelines only propose the minimal requirements as the
references for teachers, textbook designers and editors. Compared with the standards,
these new curriculum guidelines are characterised by the features of decentralisation,
deregulation, democratisation and liberalisation. In some sense, the development of
the new curriculum guidelines can be seen as an achievement of integrating the
“Western”, modern values into the process of Taiwan-isation (or indigenisation),
translating globalisation into local (Taiwanese not Chinese) context.
According to many authors, (Law 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Mao, 1997, 2008),
globalisation, democratisation and educational reform are indivisible parts of socio-
political change in Taiwan from the late 1980s to 2000. Some supportive evidence can
be found in the G1-9 CG (MOE, 2006). The rationale of the G1-9 CG (MOE, 2006)
aims to achieve pupils’national citizenship and international vision by improving
pupils’understanding in humanism, practical competence, democracy, localisation
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and internationalisation, and lifelong learning. Although the concepts of humanism,
democracy, localisation, and internationalisation are not given clear definition,
apparently the inclusion of these concepts into the curriculum reveals a concern for
“non-Chinese”worldview implied in the curricular development. The notions of
localisation (Taiwan-isation) and internationalisation which were invisible in the
previous curriculum standards are emphasised in this new curriculum. Moreover, the
idea of individual learning or education with respect to individual difference appears
in the new curriculum guidelines, challenging the authoritarian approach to learning
which is highly valued in the previous curriculum standards (MOE, 2006). Some
authors, such as Mao (2008), take the previous curriculum standards as “Chinese-
centric”, while the current curriculum guidelines “Taiwan-centric”. In my
understanding, this view could over-emphasise the effect of Taiwan-isation of the new
curriculum since the new curriculum does not remove any learning content related to
Chinese language, tradition and culture. It merely opens up a possible space to invite
the excluded narratives to come in. The curriculum reform in Taiwan moves towards
a direction which is more inclusive, tolerant, diverse, democratic and consonant with
the globalised trend --- although there is much space to be filled. Thus the new
curriculum, in my view, is distinguished from the previous standards by the features
of decentralisation and deregulation, which are responses to globalisation comprising
multiple economic, political, social influences and cultural ideas.
2.1.2 The Taiwanese G1-9 CG as Local Response to Globalisation
The previous examination of the background of the Taiwanese curriculum shows that
the development of the guidelines can be understood as a local response to
globalisation. Therefore, I take the Taiwanese curriculum guidelines as an object for
revealing the view of nature implied in the general current educational thinking and
practices. Three reasons are provided as follows:
First of all, the educational reform in Taiwan is not a peculiar phenomenon of
parochialism; but rather, it is a phenomenon of “glocalisation” in some sense. For 
example, it is described in the preface of the Taiwanese curriculum guidelines that the
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aims of the curriculum include the fostering of the local identification, patriotism and
global citizenship (MOE, 2006) The Taiwanese curriculum guidelines exemplify an
attempt to integrate the trends of globalisation and localisation.
The second reason is related to a broader context. The current Taiwanese
educational institutionalisation and the schooling systems are basically adopted from
the Western tradition. The ancient Chinese educational system for classical study, for
example, Shu Yuan, has been in decline for more than a century. The explicit
educational systems and the underpinning views about educational institutionalisation
are largely taken from the West.
Thirdly, it can be found that the perspective of forms of knowledge,
epistemology, disciplines and curriculum in the new Taiwanese curriculum guidelines
is, to a high extent, Western. As mentioned, the development of the new curriculum
integrates “Western”values into its rationale. The “Western”influence can also be
found in the content of objectives and competence indicators of the curriculum. For
example, the parts related to environmental education and the issue of nature embrace
elements of contemporary environmental thinking (viz. Western environmental
philosophy and ethics). (More details will be discussed in the following section.) In
addition, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the study of Weller (2006) shows that the view of
nature in current Taiwanese society has been heavily westernised under the influence
of globalisation. Furthermore, the distinguishing part of the new curriculum
guidelines from the previous standards is the addition of the core competence and the
competence indicators. According to Shong (2000), the process of the research and
development of the Taiwanese curriculum has taken the Australian curriculum as an
important reference, especially with respect to core competences and competence
indicator. At the beginning stage of the curriculum reform in the early 1990s, a
Commission on Educational Reform (CER) was organised (Doong, 2008). CER held
several forums to collect experts’and public opinions about educational and
curriculum reform. In the first forum held on 31st August 1995 and the second forum
on 18th December 1995, the Australian experience was presented as a model (Shong,
2000). On 28th June 1996, CER held a seminar whose theme was “Towards New
Education in the New Millennium: the Australian Key Competence”and the Prospect
of the Taiwanese Educational Reform”. From 1996 to 2001, the new curriculum
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guidelines were under discussion and development. There is no detailed record of the
process of the development; however, the new curriculum came out in 2001 with 10
core competences as substantial benchmarks for designing textbooks, and making
assessments. According to the above, I may conclude that the new Taiwanese
curriculum is an achievement of local educational reform greatly influenced by many
global elements and is thus of international as well as national interest. I thus take the
curriculum guidelines in Taiwan as a staring point to commence the exploration of the
meanings of nature, which will put the main focus on the Western tradition.
2.2 Nature in the Taiwanese Curriculum
As mentioned, the Grade 1-9 Curriculum has been mandated and implemented since
2001. There are many distinguishing features of the Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines
to make the curriculum guidelines different from the previous curriculum standards.
In general, teachers can have more freedom to decide the material and pedagogic
methods according to the G1-9 CG than under the previous curriculum standards.
According to the G1-9 CG, seven main or core learning areas are the required
subjects including Language Education, Health and Physical Education, Social
Studies, Arts and Humanities, Mathematics, Science and Technology, and Integrative
Activities (MOE, 2006). Moreover, there are six additional subjects including
Information Education, Environmental Education, Gender Equity Education, Human
Rights Education, Career Education and Home Economics Education. These non-
required subjects are not taught as an independent subject as the required subjects are.
According to the guidelines, the way of teaching of the additional subjects in schools
is to integrate their concepts, knowledge and skills into the main required subjects.
Now let us examine the G1-9CG to show how the concept of nature is used,
understood and interpreted. First of all, after a survey of the curriculum, we may find
scant references to the term “nature” in the whole Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines
except the Science and Technology Education (STE) and Environmental Education
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(EE). STE and EE are the two areas having more references to the term “nature” more 
often than the other areas; they take “nature” as a prominent issue. Thus STECG and 
EECG will be more fully examined in the following sections.
The other learning areas have very few references to “nature” and its meaning is 
very limitedly understood in the Taiwanese curriculum. Next let us have an overview
of the G1-9CG except the STECG and EECG. It will reveal the scantiness and
limitedness of the concept of nature used in this curriculum.
The Language Education curriculum guidelines (LECG) aim at explaining the
contents and purposes including the required knowledge, skills and understanding
from the perspective of language and literary learning. The term “natural” is used 
once in the folowing description: “Learn to converse with people naturaly (in order
to have good manners)” (Competence indicator 1-2-5-3, MOE, 2006).
The term “nature” or its relative “natural” appears twice in the Mathematics 
Curriculum Guidelines (MCG) in a very interesting way. The rationale of MCG
presents three features of mathematics as the reasons for taking mathematical
education as an important part of fundamental education. The three features as reasons
are worth exploration:
1) Mathematics is one of the most important human possessions.
Mathematics is acknowledged as the foundation of science, technology
and thoughts and the criterion and the driving force of civilisation…
2) Mathematics is a form of language.
Mathematics is like a native language; it can be found in many aspects
of human life. Mathematics is the purest and the most precise form of
language and rationality. From the perspective of mathematical
history, mathematics is the most natural language used to know nature.
3) Mathematics is an extension of human talent.” 
The instincts of trial-and–error, devising strategy and problem-solving
and the institutional conceptions of form and number develop into
mathematical thinking. (MOE, 2006, translated by the author)
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The above understanding of the features of mathematics in relation to the meanings of
human “possession”, “talent”, “instinct” and “intuition” seems to be inconsistent and 
contentious, in my opinion. On the one hand, the view of mathematics as a human
possession (or an asset) suggests mathematics as a reified object; on the other,
mathematics is taken as a development of inborn human talent --- perhaps indicating
the way our brains work. However, this section does not aim to solve the contentious
ambiguity; it will be more fully discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to the discussion of
the disenchanted view of nature. Yet what needs more notice here is the second point
which takes mathematics as the most “natural” language used to know “nature”. Some 
points need ilumination: firstly, the term “the most natural” seems to suggest “the 
best”, implying a value judgement. “Nature” could be understood as the source or the 
criterion of value. The point related to the value of nature will be more fully argued in
Chapter 6. Secondly, according to the MCG, the best tool for human beings to
understand the nature is to use the natural and inborn human talent, mathematical
ability. The ideas of “goodness”, “rationality”, “human” and “nature” are assumed as 
interrelated; what concerns me is that there is no further argument or justification of
this assumption in MCG. It seems careless for the MCG to make this claim. Yet the
MCG has already been implemented. In my view, this belief in mathematics, human
rationality and mathematical nature seems naïve. In Husserl’s (1970) terms, this 
atitude could be understood as the “naïve naturalistic atitude”. In chief, “naïve 
naturalistic atitude” can be defined as the belief that nature and natural science can be 
fully mathematically understood by human rationality since pure mathematics is
fundamentaly “pure science of ideas” and “science of possible objects in general as 
objects determined by ideas” (Husserl, 1970, p. 310). This point wil be elaborated in 
the last section of this chapter and Chapter 5; however, we may find conceptions of
nature as mathematical realm, human intellect as mathematical mind in MCG. In
addition, this attitude is related to the anthropocentric view of human/nature
relationship, which will be fully discussed in Chapter 6.
The term “nature” is used only twice in the rationale of the Social Studies 
curriculum guidelines (SSCG) (MOE, 2006). According to the rationale, “The scope 
of social studies composes the interrelations between human beings, society, man-
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made environment and natural environment” (MOE, 2006). It is apparent that the term 
“natural” is used as an adjective to describe “nature” as a natural environment, a 
physical environment. In this sense, “nature” is natural environment. 
A very similar situation can be found in the Arts Education curriculum
guidelines (AECG). The term “natural” also appears two times in the AECG but its
meaning is somewhat different from that in SSCG (MOE, 2006). The term “nature” or 
“natural” is basicaly used to describe “the quality or property opposite to that of the 
‘artificial’ or ‘man-made’”. It is thus used to denote features of the “natural object” 
distinguishing from “artworks”. However, the meaning of “natural” in this context 
might be diferent from that in “natural” environment. But it is difficult to explore the 
meaning of nature from such meagre references --- two in 9176 --- the total number of
the words of the AECG.
The term “nature” appears only once in the Health and Physical Education 
curriculum guidelines (HPECG). HPECG points out the HPE aims to establish human
well-being which consists of three aspects: individual physical growth and
development, the interaction between individual and society and the interrelation
between humans and nature (MOE, 2006). However, there is no further and clear
definition and explication of the concept of nature. For example, the competence
indicator 7-1-5 in the folowing part of HPECG aims to enable pupils to “learn the 
notion that humans are parts of nature; actively care about environment in order to
protect human health” (MOE, 2006). Here we may find that the conceptof nature is
narrowly taken as physical environment which is an instrument of human well-being
or health. Again, there is no explanation of how and why nature as a physical
environment can enhance human well-being.
Overall, the Taiwanese curriculum guidelines except EECG and STECG refer
very little to the term nature. Even when this term is used, it is taken almost as a
synonym of natural environment without questioning and examining its meaning. If
the concept of nature is taken in such a thoughtless and careless way in the curriculum,
it is likely that educators will ignore its implications for education and teach about this
concept in an impoverished sense.
However, the fields related to EE and SE pay more heed to the concept of nature.
Thus the EECG and STECG in the Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines can provide us
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with more understanding about how “nature” is presented and taught in the present 
curriculum. The following discussion will focus on the EECG and STECG to reveal
more about nature in current educational practice.
2.2.1 Nature in EECG
The EECG (Environmental Education Curriculum Guidelines) is composed of
five parts: a) rationale, b) learning objectives, c) competence indicators, d)
suggestions for integrating EE with the core learning subjects and e) the contents of
learning objectives. The rationale gives a definition of the background and the
importance of EE. The learning objectives define the main learning targets including
knowledge, skills and understanding. The fourth part provides the principles for
integrating learning across the curiculum. The last part: “main contents of the 
learning objectives”, explains the content in detail involved in the knowledge, skils 
and understanding of the learning objectives.
The “learning objectives” and the “main contents of the learning subjects” 
provide the materials for revealing the implied views of nature. According to the
Grade 1-9 Curriculum Guidelines, there are five types of learning objectives. The
learning objectives of environmental education can be explained accordingly:
1) environmental awareness and environmental sensitivity: the ability
to be aware of and sensitive to the various environmental
degradations, pollutions and beauty of the natural and artificial
environments through the training of sensory and perceptual
abilities to observe, classify, rank, locate in space, measure, infer,
predict, analyse and interpret.
2) conceptual knowledge about environment: the knowledge of
ecological science, environmental problems (e.g., greenhouse effect,
landslides, river pollution, nuclear pollution, air pollution, energy
problems and so forth), and the influences on social culture
(including the concepts of sustainable development and biodiversity),
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and environmental lifestyle and actions (such as conservation of
energy, recycling, simple lifestyle, green design, green consumption,
non-nuclear policy and so forth).
3) environmental value system and attitudes: the positive environmental
attitudes of appreciation of nature and its system, of being critical on
the environmental issues, of appreciation and inclusion of different
cultures, of caring minorities and future generations.
4) environmental action skills: the abilities to identify and study the
environmental problems, to collect information, to solve the
problems, to make assessment, analysis and to put into action.
5) environmental active experience: the ability to integrate the learning
into daily and (neighbouring) community life and thereby incite the
belongingness and participation of communities. (MOE, 2006,
translated by the author)6
Three problems can be found from the EECG: mis-juxtaposition of the concepts of
different categories, the arbitrary combination of irrelevant ideas and the ambiguous
assumption of environmental ethics.
The first problem “mis-juxtaposition” can be found in type 1), 2) and 3). In 
learning objective 1), it is not very appropriate to understand the “sensational and 
perceptual abilities” as the abilities to “observe, classify, rank, locate in space, 
measure, infer, predict, analyse and interpret”. Moreover, even if the ability to make 
good observation can be understood as making good use of part of the perception, it is
untenable to interpret the ability to “infer, predict, analyse and interpret” as parts of 
sensory-perceptual functioning. It is more plausible to take these abilities as parts of
rationality, even if that is “rationalisaion”. This problem might be related to the 
cultural and linguistic tradition; in some respects, the usage of ordinary language in
Chinese is freer and less precise and rigid than the European languages. Yet the
concepts of rationality, sensation and affectivity should be defined in a more rigorous
and unequivocal way in curriculum. These concepts included in curriculum could
6 The learning objectives cited here are translated by the author for there is no English translation of the
Grade 1-9 curriculum guidelines. The other citations of the curriculum guidelines such as the
competence indicators are also translated by the author.
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very possibly be taught to pupils as a matter of course without examination and
clarification.
The second problem of “the arbitrary combination of irelevant ideas” can be 
found in type 1), 3), 4) and 5). First of all, it may be dubious that the second learning
objective of EE takes the concept of biodiversity as a socio-cultural idea resulting
from ecological science and environmental problems. Secondly, in learning objective
3), it is difficult to understand how to relate the appreciation of nature to that of
different cultures, minorities and future generations. The similar arbitrariness can be
found in the objective 5) which introduces the concepts of (neighbouring) community,
belongingness and participation of community life as the objectives; however, the
EECG does not fully justify why the (neighbouring) community should be taken as an
important part for environmental education although it could be, in my presumption,
related to the idea of bio-regionalism in contemporary environmentalism. Whether the
(neighbouring) community can be beneficial to EE or not, whether it is underpinned
by bio-regionalism or not, the quest needs to be justified. The EECG should invite
educators and learners to think about why and how the (neighbouring) community can
or cannot play an important role in improving environmental education rather than
just take it for granted. In addition, what needs more exploration is the importance and
influence of the other kinds of groups such as society, nation or state for improving
EE. It is difficult to understand why the other concepts of groups are absent in the
guidelines. Learning objective 4) shows a high extent of arbitrariness or irrelevance.
The action skills as the learning objective 4) are skills in general rather than particular
action skills exclusively belonging to the field of EE. It is not sufficient to list these
action skills in this part. They should be presented as action skills across the
curriculum.
These problems may cause difficulties in teaching EE. With respect to the
concept of nature, the terms “nature” and “natural” are explicitly used in the learning 
objectives of the EECG only two times: in the first and the third learning objectives.
In the first case (learning objective 1), the term “natural” is used as an adjective to 
describe the environment in contrast to the artificial environment. Viewed in this light,
“natural environment” is used to refer to the non-built physical environment. In the
second case (learning objective 3), “nature” is used in a vague way. As mentioned by 
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the EECG, environmental value systems and values include “the positive 
environmental atitudes of appreciation of nature and its system”. It is dificult to 
outline a definite meaning of nature. We can now refer to the fifth part of the “main 
contents” related to the third type of learning objective. The EECG points out that the
main contents of “the positive environmental atitudes of appreciation of nature and 
its system” can be explained as the folowing view of environmental ethics:
Environmental ethics: anthropocentric ethics, biocentric ethics and
ecocentric ethics: including the understanding of the interrelationship
and the interdependence between humans and the environment and
respecting the values of various life forms and the ethical relationship
between humans and different life forms. (MOE, 2006, translated by
the author)
There is no specific term “nature” or “natural” used in the above paragraph; however, 
“nature” or “natural” seems to be assumed to refer to the physical surounding world 
and non-human beings. With regard to the human/nature relationship, the EECG
presents three positions of environmental ethics without further explanation. This
presentation is somewhat confusing because it does not explicitly and clearly assert
the purpose of the presentation and its relationship with teaching. This is the third
problem of the EECG: an “ambiguousperspective about environmental ethics”.
There have been debates over different positions of environmental ethics. If the
purpose of the EECG is to inform educators and practitioners that there are various, or
at least three theories of environmental ethics and these views can be introduced to
pupils, the inclusion of the three positions in the EECG might be plausible but it needs
more introduction and elucidation. If these views, i.e., anthropocentric ethics,
biocentric ethics and ecocentric ethics, are taken as different stages of a continuous
progress of an ethical view, then it is a very naïve educational assumption and far
from critical thinking, let alone education for critical thinking.7 Overall, the inclusion
7 A similar view about the “paradigm”of environmental ethics can be found from R. F. Nash’s work:
The Rights of Nature: History of Environmental Ethics (1989). Nash argues for the evolution of ethics.
In his view, the agents of morality increase with time, ranging from human beings to universe. He
claims that even rocks have rights. Many philosophers point out that there are meta-ethical problems
with this view. There is no convincing reason to adopt this view as the “only”perspective of
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of the three views of environmental ethics in the EECG seems ambiguous and
arbitrary. The value of learning about the meaning of nature and the human/nature
relationship according to the guidelines is open to question on a number of fronts.
Overall, it can be found from the scant references to nature in the EECG that
“nature” is basicaly understood as “natural environment” or a general physical world 
composed of plants, animal and physical objects. The human/nature relationship is
mentioned without in-depth explication. In my view, it could be more dangerous to
teach human/nature relationship without reflection than not to teach it since the
human/nature relationship could be taken for granted. The meaning of nature and the
approaches to learning about it tend to be simplified without further examination and
reflection on the following two aspects: firstly, nature is taken as a physical world;
secondly, the learning process is uncritical. The tendency towards over-simplification
can also be found in the STECG, as will be revealed in the next section.
2.2.2 Nature in STECG
A simplified view of nature can be found in the STECG. The STECG is composed of
five parts: a) rationale, b) learning objectives, c) competence indicators, d)
suggestions for integrating STECG with the core learning subjects and e) principles of
implementation (MOE, 2006). Let us examine the contents of the STECG to reveal its
view of nature.
The rationale proposes the fundamental concepts of nature, science and
technology. As stated by the first sentence of the rationale in the STECG, “Science is 
the outcome of the observation of nature and the study of the various phenomena
within nature; technology is the outcome of the manipulation of nature to improve
human life… We believe that al changes take place according to causal 
laws…Learning about and making use of natural phenomena and the implied natural 
laws result in various human inventions…Learning about and making good use of
environmental ethics in the curriculum guidelines. Environmental ethics is presented in the Taiwanese
curriculum in a very straightforward and uncritical way. I am worried that the attitude towards nature
that pupils learn from the curriculum could be passive and careless.
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science and technology can benefit human life in the present and future. Nature,
science and technology are inseparable” (MOE, 2006, translated by the author).
The above rationale stresses the connection between nature, science and
technology yet, still, without clarifying the meaning and questioning the relationships
of these concepts. There are very straightforward assumptions that nature is taken as a
resource for offering materials to improve human life and that natural science and
technology seem to be only the knowledge and tools to understand and exploit nature,
no more and no less.
As in other parts of the Taiwanese curiculum, the term “nature” and the 
derivative terms including “natural environment” and “natural phenomena” in the 
STECG are used to denote the physical world, physical objects and the phenomena in
the world. According to the STECG, the scientific and technological learning ability
can be classified into eight types8. If we take a careful examination of learning ability,
we may find learning abilities consisting of observation, classification, organisation,
comparison, induction, reasoning and dissemination (MOE, 2006). These activities
can be understood as the typical Baconian scientific methods for acquiring knowledge
of natural science. For example, as described in the STECG, the procedure skill of
stage 1 includes the following abilities:
Observation
Competence indicator 1-1-1-1
Be able to observe the features of objects by means of sensation.
Competence indicator 1-1-1-2




Be able to classify objects according to their features.
8 The eight types of scientific and technological learning ability consist of (1) procedural skill, (2)
scientific knowledge, (3) essence of science, (4) development of technology, (5) scientific attitudes, (6)








Be able to identify an event through observing a series of
phenomena.
Competence indicator 1-1-3-2




Be aware of the causal relationship between phenomena.
Competence indicator 1-1-4-2
Be aware of the similar effect from the similar situation.
Dissemination
Competence indicator 1-1-5-1
Be able to describe the result of observation in appropriate terms.
(MOE, 2006, translated by the author)
The explication of the procedural skill is very similar to what Francis Bacon proposed
as scientific methods in his Novum Organum (1620; Bacon, 2004) which had great
influence on the following development of modern science and research methods.
However, I do not mean to reject the Baconian method as an approach to nature; what
I question is whether the Baconian method should dominate the STECG. It seems to
denote that there is no other approach to nature. In my view, this preconception might
result in a narrow way of learning about nature. The simplification of nature can be
understood with respect not merely to the process of learning about nature but also to
the understanding of nature.
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Then STECG points out that scientific knowledge denotes knowledge about
nature and the consisting components including natural phenomena, plants, animals,
matters (or materials) and natural environments. Atomistic notions are assumed in the
epistemology of the STECG:
Competence indicator 2-4-4-4
Learn about the properties of objects including particles as the
components of objects and the notion of different objects consisting in
different composition of particles or atoms. (MOE, 2006, translated by
the author)
In addition to the notion of atomism, another notion implied in the view of nature is
“mechanism”, a doctrine that everything in the world can be explained by physical 
causes. The mechanistic view of nature can be found from the following descriptions
in the STECG:
Competence indicator 2-1-3-1
Learn about the changes of natural phenomena and their causes.
Competence indicator 2-1-3-2
Learn about the knowledge that the motions or vibration of objects
cause from the force and there are various forms of force through
making toys.
Competence indicator 2-3-4-4
Learn about the interrelation between the air, earth and water.
Competence indicator 2-4-6-1
Learn about the relationship between forces and movements of object
and the conversion of energy. (MOE, 2006, translated by the author)
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The assumptions of an atomistic and mechanistic view of nature can be understood as
“substance metaphysics”.  The substance metaphysics assumes that the world is 1) 
independently real, 2) unchanging and predictable in crucial aspects, and 3) made of
“stuf” (Stables, 2007, pp. 55-56). However, these assumptions are dubious; they
oversimplify the meaning of nature.
The competence indicators grounded on substance metaphysics can be found in
the guidelines. The view of nature in the guidelines is mainly grounded on substance
metaphysics. “Nature” is taken as a synonym for “natural world”, the appropriate 
object for the study of natural science. As stated by the STECG: “Science is the
outcome of the observation of nature and the study of the various phenomena within
nature; technology is the outcome of the manipulation of nature to improve human
life” (MOE, 2006, translated by the author). Nature is taken as a physical environment,
an assembly of resources at human disposal; science and technology are the means for
humans to make use of nature as much as possible.
2.3 The Pitfalls of Oversimplifying Nature in Curriculum
Overall, the examination the Taiwanese curriculum reveals that the meaning of nature
in the present curriculum is quite limited. Nature is taught as a mere physical world
within which all beings are composed of atoms and the composition can be fully
explained by mechanics. This limited view of nature can be identified as two kinds of
oversimplifications: homogenisation and disembodiment of nature.
The view is homogenised insofar as the composition of the parts of nature and
the composition are homogenous. The quality and feature of components of every
being in the natural world are uniform; there are rules of compositions in the natural
world. As stated by the STECG,
Competence indicator 3-4-0-6:
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Achieve the belief that there is a general regulation underpinning the
changes of the world. (MOE, 2006, translated by the author)
The homogenised view of nature can be found from the competence indicators listed
above: the beings in the world are homogeneously reduced as the objects composed of
uniform units (e.g., particles, atoms, and so for forth); moreover, the process of the
composition is understood as complying with a general and homogeneous rule.
It is too simple to understand our physical world as equivalent to nature. If we
consider human recorded history carefully, we may find that there have been a
number of different views of nature in history, science and art. And the discourses
about nature are still emerging; even in the field of natural science, the new physics or
the so-called postmodern science such as relativity theory, quantum theory and
thermodynamics. These are suggesting that nature cannot be explained fully by
homogenisation, atomism and mechanism. This overturns many Baconian or modern
scientific assumptions (Bohm, 1980, 1988, 1990; Heisenberg, 1999; Hilgevoord &
Uffink, 2006; Nielson, 1931; Prigogine & Stengers, 1985). Moreover, contemporary
science reveals that mechanism and atomism partly, not exclusively, explain the world.
This point will be developed in the later chapters. Overall, in order to have
meaningful learning experience about nature, the curriculum should present more
views or stories underpinned by different views of nature. None the less, it is hard to
find other perspectives about nature in the existing curriculum guidelines.
I will argue in the second part that the dominant view of nature in the Grade 1-9
Curriculum Guidelines is highly related to the view of nature assumed by modern
science. However, there are various understandings of nature through history other
than the modernist view. It seems not very plausible to preclude the other views. The
most important reason is that the limited view of nature taught in curriculum might
confine the materials provided to pupils and thereby set the limits of pupils’ learning 
experience about nature. The limitation could decrease the potential diversity and
complexity of the meanings in their learning. However, educational activities should
broaden but not diminish the possibilities of achieving meaning because living is a
process of meaning-constructing-and-experiencing, as Merleau-Ponty (2003/1962, p.
xxi) reminds us with the folowing words: “Because we are in the world, we are 
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condemned to meaning…” If the possibilities of accessing meaning are decreased, life 
is impoverished to some extent. Educational activities should aim for meaningful, but
not impoverished, living. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider what kind of concept
of nature has been ignored in our present curriculum; this reconsideration may help to
keep us away from the trap of over-simplification and homogenisation. For us as
educators, the task ahead is to examine and elaborate what has and has not been
taught about nature in our curriculum, to identify existing inadequacies and to seek
what kinds of concept of nature should be brought into learning to enrich education
and life.
The second over-simplification of nature implied in the curriculum is related to
the learning process or the pedagogical methods. It is what this thesis defines as the
“disembodied view” or “disembodiment”. Disembodiment denotes the following
features: impersonality, neutrality, objectivity, universality, emotionlessness and
disengagement. According to the STECG (MOE, 2006), the procedural skills, one of
the eight types of science and technology learning ability, include the skills of making
observation, comparison, analysis, organisation, relation, induction, reasoning and
dissemination. If the explication of these skills is considered carefully, it can be found
that the only skill related to the bodily function is the observation skil: “Observation 
skill: Competence indicator 1-1-1-1: Be able to observe the features of objects by
means of sensation.” (MOE, 2006, translated by the author). By contrast, the other 
skills can be understood as the various abilities of reasoning or rational thinking. A
tendency towards disembodiment can be found among these scientific skills.
The disembodiment of skills denotes the process of educating pupils to be
indifferent and objective observers by keeping their distance from what they learn
about, keeping a scientific attitude, e.g., impartial, neutral and non-emotional attitudes,
towards the “objects” that are to be learned and arranged in these learning “subjects”. 
However, impartiality and neutrality are one side of the scientific attitude;
indifference, emotionlessness and apathy are another. In this sense, this learning
process, on the one hand, encourages pupils to develop the ability to grasp
commonality and generality, but, on the other hand, it discourages the development of
personal and private meaning and values as part of education. Two important ideas
are related to disembodiment: “anonymity” and “disengagement”. “Anonymity” 
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denotes the ignorance of the personal and particular characteristics by stressing the
common, collective and general parts of human experience of nature and ignores the
particular elements in individual experience; while “disengagement” denotes the 
notion of taking objects and the world as a certain reality or realities irrelevant, distant
and external to human beings. Following this, paradoxically, the more pupils learn
about nature the farther they remain separated from nature. The more scientific skills
pupils acquire the more abstract the world appears to them. This is the learning
process making and keeping the distance between the learner and her learning object,
between the lifeworld and the scientific (or theoretical) world, between one’s lived 
experience and knowledge. This could be understood as a “disengaged” learning 
approach, favouring the indifferent and detached attitude towards the learning subject
matter. This point related to learning approach will be elaborated in Chapter 7.
Accordingly, the disembodied view of nature is very likely to define nature as
an external and indifferent world which could be learned properly only through
scientific disciplines which are common, universal and general to all human
experience. This feature of disembodiment can be understood in Husserl’s (1970) 
term of “naturalistic atitude”.9
The “naïve naturalistic atitude” is taken by Husserl (1970) as one the cruxes of
the crisis of sciences and humanities --- the crisis of witheredness of human culture,
reason and spirit and the related unreasonable behaviours, such as violence. The most
important point is that this attitude assumes scientific knowledge as the Truth and
scientific method as the only instrument for attaining and discovering the Truth. On
9 There may be diferent and contrasting meanings of the term “natural atitude” when Husserl uses it 
in different contexts. According to David Carr (1970), Husserl uses “natural atitude” in the Ideas
pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. First book: general
introduction to a pure phenomenology (1913/1931) to denote the “theoretical atitude”. In the first case, 
“natural atitude” is a synonym of “theoretical atitude”, contrasting with the “pre-theoretical atitude”. 
In the view of Carr, this “natural atitude” can be understood as a sort of “naïve realism” or a 
popularised version of “objectivism” which is what he criticises in the later workThe Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl, 1970). None the less, in the latter
work Husserl sometimes uses the term “natural atitude” to describe the “pretheoretical atitude of 
naïve lifeworld”, or the “natural primordial atitude of original natural life”. In the second case, this 
term is used to describe the pretheoretical character of lifeworld in order to criticise the scientism
generally assumed in natural science. It is confusing to use the same term to express two different
meanings. Therefore, in order to prevent the confusion, this thesis uses the term “naïve naturalistic 
atitude” to describe the presuppositions assumed in the modern science, which is also the objective 
under Husserl’s critique in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The
discussions related to “naturalistic atitude” and “lifeworld” wil be continued in this section, Chapter 5 
and Chapter 7. Hereafter The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology will be
referred to as Crisis.
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this view, knowledge that can meet the requirements of disembodiment, objectivity,
universality, neutrality, objectivity, detachment, and disengagement can be dubbed
“knowledge”. None the less, many authors including Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), 
Husserl (1970) and M. Midgley (2003) point out that science taken as the only
instrument to discover the Truth is actually a myth.
However, to regard science as a myth does not mean to underestimate science --
- that is what scientists do to myth ---but rather to reveal the insufficiency or one-
sidedness of human learning if science is seen as the only Truth. Although there are
many critiques of science, the naïve naturalistic attitude and its implied
oversimplification of “disembodiment” is stil prevalent in our curent curiculum and 
educational discourses. Drawing on D. Carr10 (1970, p. xxxviiii), the disembodiment
in learning to some extent encourages pupils to learn the “non-relative truth about the
world”. The more we learn about scientific atitudes, knowledge and skils, the more 
disembodied we become. According to the STECG, the reliability of the scientific is
grounded on the precise record of the “facts as they are…and the repeatable 
experiments” (competence indicator 3-4-0-8, MOE, 2006). Viewed in this light,
nature is, as claimed by the curriculum guidelines, a physical world composed of
objects which can be comprehended by the disembodied scientific skills, through the
disembodied process of learning.
However, disembodiment can impoverish the meaning of learning by narrowing
down the meaning of individual lived experience– or in Husserl’s term, “lifeworld”11
(Husserl, 1970). Disembodiment results in the ignorance of the embodied, subjective
and emotional parts of human experience, which are taken as trivial and ordinary. Yet
the experience of the ordinary life and trivialities may hold the potential for
confronting the flaw of disembodiment. The lifeworld can be generally understood as
the lived experience of ordinary everyday life. If so, the learning in this curriculum
10 This Professor David Carr is the phenomenologist as wel as the translator of Husserl’s The crisis of
European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (Evanston, Northwestern University Press), not
the educational philosopher.
11 The term lifeworld is generally used in humanities and social sciences. However, many authors point
out that, through Husserl, the term lifeworld enters in the field of philosophy. There may be various
interpretations of the concept of lifeworld. However, this thesis takes the lifeworld as synonym of the
lived experience. A paper by Hung and Stables (2008) argues that it is an individual and idiosyncratic
world of lived experience but not a daily life world common and general for all. The understanding of
lifeworld as a personal lifeworld composed of lived experience, in my view, is grounded on the
Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Husserl’s lifeworld.
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seems to be a process of disassociating the pupil and his or her lifeworld because the
aim of the curriculum is to teach pupils the scientific knowledge, skills and attitudes --
- which have already assumed the naïve naturalistic attitude.
This leads us to think about the meaning of education: if educational activity
intends to make the individual’s life more creative, interesting and meaningful --- in a
word, vivid --- the disembodiment of learning may lead the learner into the opposite
direction. The lived experience or the lifeworld is alienated from the individual as a
learner because one’s lived experience is no more lived authenticaly and one’s 
lifeworld is no more lived through. The vividness of one’s own experience fades away 
with the disembodiment of the learning process. Therefore, a more worthwhile
learning process of nature should incorporate rather than remain apart from the lived
experience, viz. the lifeworld. Then, we are invited to ponder upon the following
question: how can we bring the vividness back to the educational process? This will
be discussed in the next part.
In closing, the discussion of this chapter has already argued that the current
curriculum might cause meaning-impoverishment, and that the impoverishment of
meaning results from the over-simplifications of what and how to learn about the
concept of nature. Therefore the next step may be to think about how to overcome the
pitfalls of oversimplification and enrich the meaning of education and life by adopting
a meaningful conception of nature in curriculum; but there are many steps along the
way. What will happen in the next chapter? Revealing something of the rich range of
meanings of nature is the business of the next Part.
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PART II
What Kinds of Conception of Nature
Could be Educationally Meaningful?
…from nature as the primitive condition before human society; 
through the sense of an original innocence from which there has been
a fall and a curse, requiring redemption; through the special sense of a
quality of birth, as in the Latin root; through again the sense of the
forms and moulds of nature which can yet, paradoxically, be destroyed
by the natural force of thunder; to that simple and persistent form of
the personified goddess, Nature herself.
(Raymond Williams, 1980, p. 72)
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Introduction of Part II
What kind of view of nature could help to improve and enrich education? What kind
of concepts of nature could be taught? There have been numerous discussions on the
concept of nature in general literature. The review of the past literature in Chapter 1
reveals that the meaning of the concept of nature is complex, complicated, and
significant. It is interwoven with human understanding of reality, the world, deity,
knowledge, and both human and non-human beings. Some of the views could be
traced back to ancient times, such as nature as becoming, and animistic view of nature;
among these ancient views, some are incorporated in modern thought, for example,
the atomistic view is accepted and deepened by the modern scientists. In addition,
some views of nature may be the responses or reactions to contemporary issues, or
more specifically, environmental crisis. For example, deep ecologist view, social
ecologist view, social constructionist view, relativist view, and conservationist view
can be understood as the theoretical responses to environmental problems from
various perspectives. The idea of nature is becoming increasingly contentious and
complex rather than clear and distinct. However, the aim of this part is not to solve the
debates and decide one perfect definition, but rather to present various views of nature,
that might enrich the present impoverished curriculum.
Overall, the previous discussion in Chapter 1 shows that there have been a lot of
views of nature and different views are still emerging. It is apparent from the above
that there are numerous conceptions of nature that can be utilised for enriching
education and life. I summarise the meanings of nature from the previous discussion
in the following: a) nature as reality, b) nature as world, c) nature as deity, d) nature as
(natural) environment, e) nature as (natural) phenomena, f) nature as criterion of value,
g) nature as a characteristic or characteristics distinguishing one from the others, h)
nature as the sum of qualities opposite to the man-made, and i) nature as nonhuman
beings. However, these meanings do not appear independently. For example, the
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concept of nature involved in the human/nature relationship may refer to nature as
(natural) environment, nature as nonhuman beings, and nature as human nature.
Thematic exploration may help us to gain an in-depth understanding of the concept of
nature and its implications for education. Five themes are thus drawn out:
1) Should “nature” be understood as becoming or being? What might be 
offered by these two views? Which conception could be more educationally
meaningful?
2) What kind of conception of the telos (purpose) of nature could be helpful for
meaningful learning? Should the telos be taken as immanent or transcendent?
Divine or non-divine?
3) What kind of human attitude towards nature could bring more and richer
meaning to education? A disenchanted or enchanted view?
4) What kind of human/nature relationship could be helpful for conceiving
more and richer meaning for learning? An anthropocentric or what I will
term an anthropo-non-centric view?
5) The above discussions lead us to explore different pedagogical approaches
to nature. What kind of pedagogical approach to nature would be significant
and desirable? A disengaged or engaged approach?
These themes will invite us to ponder upon the following kinds of question: Should
we regard nature as becoming or being? What difference do the two conceptions bring
to education? Which polarity could be more educationally meaningful?
It will be argued that these themes are recurrent in different historical times with
different shades of meaning; furthermore, their implications cannot be separated
distinctively. Now let us have a brief introduction of the five themes.
The first theme originates from metaphysical interrogation of nature: what is
nature? What is the composition of nature? What is the origin of nature? How does
nature exist? Can nature be divisible? Is there any beginning or end of nature? These
questions seem to occupy the ancient thinkers’ mind but they never expire. They 
appear in various metamorphoses. For example, what is the reality of a quantum?
Many authors (Copleston, 1966a; Corbeil, 2003) have pointed out that, among the
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numerous metaphysical interpretations, the polarities of “becoming” and “being” are 
the most inspiring and influential ideas not only for philosophy but also for education.
These two ideas have been put under discussion since ancient times; however, they
are still underpinning the philosophical assumptions of education.
It will be argued that, on the one hand, the idea of nature as being seems more
apparent than as becoming in the fields of traditional philosophy and educational
ideas. It is incorporated in substance metaphysics, which has taken the reign of the
mainstream of metaphysical history and thereby contributed to a large extent to the
formation of the over-simplification of our curriculum. On the other hand, the ancient
idea of nature as becoming, which is inspiring in many ways, has been relatively
overlooked in mainstream intellectual history. Yet the ardent concern for the issue of
nature and the stunning findings of natural sciences in recent decades illuminate the
significance of process thinking and the consonant idea of nature as becoming.
Metaphysical investigation of nature brings us to pursue the finality of nature,
and thereby brings us to the teleological enquiry and our second theme: Does nature
have a telos (purpose)? Should we regard the telos (purpose) of nature as immanent or
transcendent? Divine or non-divine? What difference will it make if these different
views of nature with different telos are brought into education? The changing of
conceptions of the telos (purpose) of nature cross different thoughts, to a large extent,
could be understood as influenced by development of natural science, for example,
the Scientific Revolution and evolutionary biology. Following this, we may find that
there is a transformation of the relationships between deity, nature and human beings.
What change will this transformation point toward in education?
The other themes are in connection with the understanding of the human/nature
relationship. The third theme is related to teleology: the religious meaning influences
human actions and attitudes towards nature, and vice versa. Nature could be
worshiped, respected, appreciated, disregarded or exploited dependent upon different
views of the human/nature relationship. However, the reflections bring us to our third
theme with religious and aesthetic concern: Is nature disenchanted or enchanted,
rational or affective? Should nature be treated indifferently or with feelings? Which
way will be more beneficial for education and improving our over-simplified
curriculum?
60
The fourth theme explores the meaning of nature from two standpoints:
anthropocentric and anthropo-non-centric. Should the human/nature relationship be
conceived from the perspective of anthropocentrism or anthropo-non-centrism? Here I
propose the pair of polarities of anthropocentrism and anthropo-non-centrism to
replace the commonly-used contrast between anthropocentrism and non-
anthropocentrism, or anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. With regard to
environmental discourses, the term “ecocentrism” is usualy taken as a polarity of 
anthropocentrism. None the less, in my view, it might be misleading to take
ecocentrism as the opposite pole of anthropocentrism because it could limit our
understanding of anthropocentrism and the possibilities to overcome the shortcoming
caused by the anthropocentrism. The idea of anthropo-non-centrism will be defined as
a view which acknowledges every humanbeing as a pivot for one’s lifeworld without 
taking the whole humanity as the only centre of meaning in and for the world; this
view will be argued to hold potential for illuminating the pitfalls of the current
curriculum and pointing towards the way out.
The final theme is about the learning approach to nature: disengaged and
engaged approaches. This theme will lead us to elucidate the relationships between
the disengaged approach to learning, the collective and anonymous experience and
disembodiment on the one hand and, the interrelationships between the engaged
approach, body-subject and lifeworld on the other. The elucidation may help us to
explore further: What kind of learning process may inspire more and richer meaning
for education? A disengaged or engaged approach? The collectively anonymous
approach or the individually peculiar approach? A disembodied or embodied
approach? It will be argued that the engaged construction is more personally and
idiosyncratically meaningful while the disengaged construction is more collectively
embedded, viz., culturally or socially dependent. The difference between the engaged
and disengaged construction of nature will be made explicit by the discussions of
nature as another pair of polarities: space and place. The exploration anchored by the
final theme will demonstrate how the disengaged orientation of learning is one
important cause of the pitfalls of our curriculum: disembodiment, and therefore the
engaged approach may help us to extricate our learning from the pitfalls.
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All in all, the idea of nature is an anchor for the exploration of abundant and
fecund meanings of living and learning. Peter Coates has stated that “nature, like us, 
has a history” (1998, p.2). The preliminary overview may suggest that there maynot
be only one history or story of nature but many. Every approach or interpretation to
nature can be understood as a story of nature. For example, Newtonian nature,
Einstein’s nature, Wordsworth’s nature, and Lao Tzu’s nature are al diferent stories. 
Each of them implies unique insights of the scientist or the poet. The stories and the
meanings of nature are still increasing if we attend. They can be taken as sources for
us to enrich our currently meaning-impoverished curriculum. Overall, the five themes
which are identified above are used to anchor the numerous, various, and complex
conceptions of nature. Each theme and its implying polarities will illuminate the
significance of human conceptualisation of nature as an on-going dynamic and
dialectic process. The following chapters will manifest the heterogeneous and plural
views of nature and the abundance of meaning to be had in different ways of




This chapter aims at exploring the meaning and educational implications of nature by
focusing on the metaphysical theme of nature as becoming or being. In this chapter,
we are led by the following enquiries: Should we regard nature as becoming or being?
What difference do the two conceptions bring to education? What educational
meanings could these polarities inspire?
Metaphysical discussions on nature have continued since ancient times. These
terms ‘nature”, “world”, “cosmos” and “universe” were used interchangeably in the
ancient times, so that their meanings are not easy to separate completely (R. G.
Collingwood, 1945; F. J. Collingwood, 1960; Copleston, 1966a). Exploration of the
ancient view of nature is involved with and inseparable from the view of cosmos,
world or universe. The following questions were of greatest concern to the ancient
philosophers: Where does the world come from? What is the origin of nature and
everything within nature? What is the reality of the world? “Of what is the world 
ultimately composed?” (Copleston, 1966a, p. 78) In brief, the attempt of the ancient
thinkers is to find the final explanation or explanations of nature, world or universe.
What is more important for educators is that there are always metaphysical
underpinnings of our educational questions, ideas, practices and curriculum. Different
metaphysical assumptions may orient us towards different educational questions,
theories and practices. For example, educational perennialists, such as Robert
Hutchins and Mortimer Adler (1984), claim that curricula should be designed on the
basis of common and universal human nature. The elucidation of metaphysical ideas
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can help us to make explicit the influences and changes brought to education. The
clarification of metaphysical ideas related to nature could shed light on our
understanding of the views of nature in the present curriculum.
There might be two metaphysical notions which are the most influential for
educational ideas and practices: philosophy of being and philosophy of becoming, or
philosophy of stasis and philosophy of flux. These two doctrines can be traced back to
ancient times (Copleston, 1966a; Corbeil, 2003). The ancient leading figure concerned
with the idea of nature as becoming might be taken as Heraclitus; while the figures
aiming at the idea of nature as being include Parmenides and the atomists (Copleston,
1966a). The division of the philosophy of becoming and being actually indicates two
different kinds of metaphysics: process metaphysics and substance metaphysics. This
thesis does not make rigorously clear-cut distinctions between philosophy of
becoming and process metaphysics, philosophy of being and substance metaphysics.
Thus philosophy of becoming is taken a synonym of process metaphysics, and the
philosophy of being as substance metaphysics, but the categories overlap.
However, it has been mentioned in Chapter 2 that substance metaphysics
dominates not only in the field of philosophy.12 As mentioned above, the partiality
towards the dominant view may limit human learning, understanding and imagination.
Part 1 has pointed out that the over-simplifications of our present curricula are highly
related to substance thinking because the over-simplifications (homogenisation and
disembodiment) are interwoven with atomism, mechanism, determinism,
rationalisation, standardisation, collectivism and depersonalisation. Substance
metaphysics is one of the underpinnings of these thoughts. The relationships
interwoven between these thoughts and oversimplification of the current curriculum
will be unpicked in Chapters 3 to 7. Hence, the following exploration will reveal that
the ancient philosophical ideas might point towards some solutions of the current
educational problems. Ancient philosophies of becoming and being are the first source
to explore in this chapter.
12 Substance metaphysics has powerfully dominated the history of ideas even when many contemporary
philosophers argue for a non-substance view. There are a number of authors who argue for the stance
of substance metaphysics when facing the critiques of process philosophy. See E. J. Nelson (1947) A
defense of substance. The Philosophical Review 56(5), pp. 491-509. And A. J. Reck (1958) Substance,
process and nature. The Journal of Philosophy 55(18), pp. 762-772.
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3.1 Nature as Becoming
This section aims at exploring Heraclitus’ idea of nature and its possible educational 
implications. We may find that in Heraclitus’ view, everything is in flux and he is
often regarded as the instigator of philosophy of becoming.
Heraclitus is admitted as a philosopher of ambiguity, or in the terms of a third-
century B.C. satirist Timon of Philus, “riddler” (Kirk & Raven, 1957), or in the words 
of Aristotle, “The Obscure” (Copleston, 1966a; Haris, 1994; Little, 1969).13 His
philosophy is understood by many authors, including Plato and Aristotle, as a
representative of a philosophy of flux or becoming or process (Collingwood, 1960;
Copleston, 1966a; Corbeil, 2003; Kirk, 1951; Laguna, 1921; Stables, 2007). The idea
of becoming distinguishes his view from his contemporaries and other premodern
thinkers’ views. It also inspires us to reconceive and reflect on our present education 
which is highly influenced by modern thinking. Heraclitus’ view is understood as
consonant with contemporary process philosophy; here I do not make sharp
distinction between Heraclitus’ philosophy of becoming and process philosophy on 
the metaphysical level.
Furthermore, Heraclitus could be understood as a forerunner of postmodernism;
his philosophy anticipates some trends of deconstructive postmodern thinking. On this
point, he might give us some clues towards improving (perhaps in a continuous
process) the state of our present curricula. This point will be argued later. Now let us
investigate Heraclitus’s idea in more depth.
Heraclitus is well-known for the sayings: “Al things are in a state of flux,” and 
“You cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon 
you” (Copleston, 1966a, p. 39). Plato and Aristotle both remark that Heraclitus’ 
doctrine affirms change as the reality of al things: “Al things are in motion, nothing 
13 It is interesting to read the commentary of H. Cherniss (1951, p. 330) about Heraclitus’ writing: 
“…the book of Heraclitus, though writen in prose, consisted of a series of apophthegms unconnected
by any obviously logical transitions and expressed in an elaborate oracular style. …Such writing is 
dificult to interpret objectively but easy to quote for one’s own purpose, particularly if one selects 
phrases that sound significant and quotes them without their context”. 
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steadfastly is” (Copleston, 1966a, p. 39). In chief, from Heraclitus’s perspective, 
nature can be understood as changing, flowing and becoming. Even mountains move
and rocks can be metamorphous. Some words from his fragments may support this
view:
It is in changing that things find repose. (Harris, 1994, 23/DK84a)14
The sun is…not only new each day, but forever continualy new.
(Harris, 1994, 36/DK6)
None the less, many authors point out that it would be a mistake to suppose that
Heraclitus admits nothing but change. In some respects, Heraclitus’ ideas seem 
contradictory because he admits that all things are flowing and all things are “One”. In 
the fragments, the following description can be found:
People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself
agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the bending back, as in the
case of the bow and the lyre. (Harris, 1994, 11/DK51)
Listening not to me but to the Logos, it is wise to acknowledge that all
things are one. (Harris, 1994, 118/DK50)
A doctrine mixed with pantheism and holism is implied in Heraclitus’ ideas. To settle
the contradiction in the fragments: on the one hand, all things are in motion; they are
continuously renewed, changing and varying. On the other hand, they are one; they
are “the same”, “the unitary” and “the uniform”. If the things are one, they are the 
same, they are unvarying, i.e., they are not changing. Heraclitus attempts to propose
the idea of God to solve the problem. First, Heraclitus suggests that nature or universe
is God and vice versa:
The wise is one and only. It is…to be caled by the name of Zeus. 
14 The former figure 23 in 23/ 84a means the number in the edition of W. Harris. The latter figure
DK83a, however, represents the number in the Diels-Kranz’s numbering system, the most commonly-
referred edition of Ancient Greek fragments. Another well-known English version of the fragments in




None the less, the god is not only one god, a universal Reason, one universal Truth
and Reality because the idea of one, singular “the”Truth may stifle the tension and
the becoming of the world:
This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made;
but it was ever, is now and ever shall be an ever-living. (Burnet, 1912,
DK30)
This paradox of “one” and “many” brings about another idea as the referent of deity: 
the idea of fire which can be perceived as a dialectics of opposites. For Heraclitus,
reality is one and the one only exists in the tension or war or strife of the opposites
(Coplestona, 1966a). As Heraclitus states:
And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep,
young and old; the former are shifted and become the latter, and the
latter in turn are shifted and become the former. (Burnet, 1912, DK88)
Two points might be found from the above fragments. On the one hand, Heraclitus
posits changing or becoming as the reality of the world by claiming that “You cannot 
steptwice into the same river; for fresh waters are flowing upon you” (DK12); on the 
other hand, he asserts that the unity of the one exists only in the tension of the
opposites.
Some authors are skeptical about whether Heraclitus’ ideas can be understood as 
the philosophy of flux (Kirk, 1951). For example, Kirk (1951, p.35) claims that the
idea of change is not an idea which Heraclitus particularly stressed. Some (Kirk, 1951;
Reinhardt, 1942, cited in Kirk, 1951) deny the idea of becoming in the river-analogy
argument.15 Some (Cherniss, 1951; Kirk, 1951) object that the idea of becoming
15 According to Reinhardt (1942; cited in Kirk, 1951), Heraclitus did not make a specific analogy
between a river and any other thing but only described the general features of a river.
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originates from Heraclitus.16 There is a view that Heraclitus is similar to all the other
pre-Socratic philosophers, who are interested in finding the ultimate Reality or, in the
terms used by Copleston (1966a), “Urstoff” (the primary element) of nature: Thales 
takes water as the first element; for Anaximander, the four elements including earth,
water, air and fire are the basic constituents of nature; for Heraclitus, fire.17 None the
less, Copleston (1966a; Kirk, 1951) points out that Heraclitus does not simply find
something different from his predecessors. It seems to me that the idea of fire, for
Heraclitus, should not be understood as a universal Reality as his contemporaries
pursue, but rather as an activity or a dynamic process. The idea of fire understood as
process foreshadows a deconstructive postmodern view of nature and humanity
adumbrating a process philosophy of education. As mentioned earlier, postmodernism
is a term in a very broad sense referring to a very wide range of notions consisting of
deconstruction, nihilism, relativism, anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism.
However, in this thesis, deconstructive postmodernism includes dismantlement and
dissection of the old structures and the subsequent building and composition of new
ones. Postmodern deconstruction as an on-going process is to a large extent consonant
with Heraclitus’ idea of becoming as fire. This point wil be argued more fuly. 
Before delving into more educational implications, let us explain the idea of fire
not as a universal reality but rather as a process. Popper’s acute and interesting 
interpretation of Heraclitus’ idea of fire is worth reading: 
16 The notion that “al things are in constant change”, a concept often taken as a key to understand
Heraclitus’ thought, as suggested by some authors such as E. Weerts (1931, cited in Kirk, 1951) and 
Cherniss (1951), might not be first articulated by Heraclitus but by the Eleatic Melissus. For example,
the Milesian philosophers including Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes all derive the world from
one single element. This single element is taken, by Thales, as water, by Anaximander, as infinity and
by Anaximenes, as air. All things change in the world according to the “rearrangement” of the 
particular element. The change of things in the world seems to be a “universal recurring periodicaly”. 
From the view of Anaximander, the change in the world is a repeated process of segregation and
reabsorbing; Anaximenes elaborates upon this notion into the “mechanism of condensation-rarefaction” 
(Cherniss, 1951).
17 Regarding the idea of fire, Popper (1963a, 1963b) and Kirk (1960, 1961) had different opinions.
According to Popper (1963b, p. 144), there is no stability in the world of Heraclitus: “Al things are in 
motion al the time, even though…this escapes our senses”. Everything is changing in some respects. 
Some changes are unclear, but they are. By contrast, Kirk (1960) argues that many things in the world
are not changing all the time in human common sense; they may change some of the time. Thus Kirk
(1960, p. 334) claims that Heraclitus’ fire is “the world-order as a whole” and the world-order is Logos.
In chief, Popper holds the view that Heraclitus’ change is “in every single physical object”, while Kirk 
asserts “constant change in the world as a whole, with some things having temporary periods of 
stability” (Kirk, 1960, p. 337). Though not disagreeing totaly with Kirk, on this point, I agree more 
with Popper. There seems to be a danger of totalisation implied in Kirk’s interpretation when the 
constant change and the Logos are both found from the world as a “whole”.
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…there are no solid bodies. Things are not really things, they are
processes, they are in flux. They are like fire, like a flame which,
though it may have a definite shape, is a process, a stream of matter, a
river. All things are flames: fire is the very building material of our
world... (Popper, 1963b, 144)
One very important feature distinguishing Heraclitus’ fire from the other Urstoff of his
predecessors or contemporaries is that the idea of fire is “al things that are, but it is 
these things in a constant state of tension, of strife, of mutual consuming, of kindling
and of going out” (Copleston, 1966a, p. 41). As Heraclitus states, “Fire is want and 
surfeit” (Burnet, 1912, DK65). Fire designates the state of continuous devouring and 
dissipating. It is an ever-lasting process of dialectical interaction between opposites,
between obliteration and trace-leaving, between destroying and construction. In this
light, Heraclitus’ idea of fire reminds us of postmodern thinker Jacques Derida’s idea 
of “deconstruction”. 
According to Derrida, deconstruction could be understood as a radical act of
reading texts but not just as a literary theory of interpretation since every thing could
be taken as a signal, sign or text (Bingham, 2008; Hoy, 1979; Nealon, 1992; Zuckert,
1991). There is no decidable or definitive meaning of any sign or text because the
meaning of a sign or word is always in relation to the others (senders or receivers of
signals) and is context-dependent. The relation of the usage of a sign is not fixed and
changes all the time thus meaning is changing, or we may say, becoming. As such,
deconstruction is a process which intervenes and questions the established meaning,
exposes and breaks the limits and opens up new possibilities. This is a process without
particular termination. Therefore, Derrida states, “Deconstruction cannot limit 
itself…deconstruction wil provide itself the means with which to intervene in the 
field of oppositions that it criticises…” (Margins, 329; cited in Nealon, 1992, p. 1269)
Comparing Heraclitus’ idea of fire and Derida’s deconstruction, we wil find an 
interesting consonance between them. As Heraclitus states,
Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives
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the death of earth, earth that of water. (Burnet, 1912, DK76)
There is exchange of al things for fire and of fire for al things… 
(Harris,1994, 28/DK90 )
It can be found from the above that fire can be exchanged for all things, because, in a
broad sense, all things can be burned down and disappear. Yet the disappearance of
the things which have been burned is not absolute --- they are not nullified to zero. To
speak in more precise terms, they are metamorphosed and turn into other beings by
the fire. In one sense, they are dead because they are not what they were; in another
sense, they are regenerated into what they were not. The same happens with “eating”: 
we become “made up” what we eat and of what (and who) we love. The early blob-
like amoeba moves about, envelops and absorbs any food which it “encounters”. 
Snakes do much about the same, more purposively. Mouse disappears. Snake
becomes “made of” mouse; mouse is reincarnated (resurrected) as “snake”. This 
process resulting in the fire is an on-going dialectic between the opposites, between
what is and what is not. The following fragments can give us more clues:
It is one and the same thing to be living and dead, awake or asleep,
young or old. The former aspect in each case becomes the latter, and
the latter becomes the former, by sudden unexpected reversal. (Harris,
1994, 113/DK88)
We may find that fire as a dynamic process is a pivot for the dialectic of the opposites,
i.e. the dialectic of deconstruction and (re)construction. During the on-going process,
every thing in nature is becoming, e.g., being born, growing, decaying, dying and
renewing. What needs notice is that the dialectic can be understood as a process of
varying but not the mere, nor the exact repetition of routine. The meaning of the
dialectic can be revealed from the well-known Heraclitus’ fragment: “You cannot step
twice into the same river; for fresh waters are flowing upon you” (Burnet, 1912, 
DK12). 18 The other translations actually, may make explicit the meaning of
18 Another English translation of the water-fragment very similar to the Burnet’s version, mentioned 
above, is the translation in Copleston’s work: “You cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh 
waters are ever flowing in upon you” (1966a, p. 39). 
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heterogeneity of the process. For example, W. Haris’ (1994, 20) translation is as 
folows: “They do not step into the same rivers. It is other and still other waters that
are flowing”. While Kirk (1951, p. 36) translates the fragment into the folowing 
sentence: “Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and different waters
flow”. If we go back to the Greek text, the crucial words are “ἕτερα καὶἕτερα” (Kirk, 
1951, p. 36), which mean “diferent and diferent” or “other and other”. Viewed in 
this light, Heraclitus’ thoughts can be understood as a philosophy of continuous 
becoming implying the notion of revealing differences, which is interestingly in tune
with deconstructive postmodern thinking.
As mentioned, the notion of deconstruction refers to the ideas of dismantlement
and dissection of the old structures and the subsequent building and composition of
new ones. Thus, deconstructive postmodern thinking may not only convey to “reveal” 
diferences in the passive sense but also to “make” diferences in the active sense. 
This will be discussed in Chapter 5. The dynamic activity of revealing and making
diferences is a process of creating. Here we may find that Heraclitus’ philosophy 
does not have direct relation with education, yet his ideas of process of making
difference may encourage a creative learning and learning for more creativity and
invention.
The terms “create” and “invent” used here are regarded as synonyms. Although 
the term “creation” is often used to refer to created beings and world from nothing by 
“God”; the being of the created is brought out ex nihilo. However, here we do not
interpret this term from a theological perspective but put the emphasis on the respect
of human ability to bring out something from nothing: the ability of imagination. Thus
“create” and “invent” are regarded as synonyms. “Creation” and “invention” denote
the outcome or result; while “creativity” refers to the quality or state of being creative 
or inventive.
What is highly significant for deriving educational implications from Heraclitus’ 
philosophy is to find the relationships implicit in the ideas of becoming as fire,
difference, and creativity. The concept of creativity has been under a large number of
investigations ranging across different fields, from psychology to aesthetics. However,
here we are focusing on its philosophical meaning rather than the scientific
explanation of the psychological procedures of the process of creation. On this ground,
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the folowing authors’ views can be referred to: 
According to Vincent Tomas (1958, p.4), “To create is to originate. And it 
follows from this that prior to creation the creator does not foresee what will result
from it”. Jan Aler (1964, p. 83) defines creativity as “the capacity to produce 
something new”. E. Paul Torance (cited in Götz, 1981, p. 297) describes creativity as 
“the process of becoming sensitive to problems, deficiencies, gaps in knowledge,
missing elements, disharmonies, and so on; identifying the difficulties; searching for
solutions, making guesses, or formulating hypotheses and possibly modifying and
retesting them; and finally communicating the results”. 
We can find two concordant features between deconstruction and creation. The
first one can be found is “originality”.  Deconstruction and creation both emphasise 
enfolding, problematisation, interrogation, questioning of established beliefs and
practices by creating differences --- something new. The feature of originality can be
perceived from the process of producing differences for the process and the result
could not be bounded within any established prescription or restriction. Even if some
certain goal may be anticipated before or during the process of creating differences,
the result would not be definitively secured. What is more important is that there is no
exact and precise termination. The second concordance which can thus be revealed
between deconstruction and creation is “unpredictability”. The feature of 
unpredictability reveals that the process and the result of deconstruction and creation
cannot be strictly regulated and foreseen with precision.
All in all, nature from Heraclitus’ perspective could be articulated as a process 
of becoming and a dialectics of opposites. What is most significant to us is that nature
is not merely a world composed of innumerable Urstoffs but rather an on-going
process, during which differences continuously emerge and evolve. On this ground,
we may conclude that, first of al, Heraclitus’ idea of flux or becoming is a 
breakthrough in the tradition of the pre-Socratic Milesian ideas of nature. The
Milesian nature is basically a world composed of a particular element and fixed and
repeated movements. In contrast, the nature that Heraclitus presents is a world full of
various changes and becoming between opposites --- a “dialectical” world. 
Furthermore, Heraclitus’ philosophy of becoming might inviteus to ponder
upon philosophy of education from different perspectives. Karl Popper (1963a, p. 386)
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has pointed out that Heraclitus’ philosophy can be articulated as the folowing 
questions: “How is change possible? How can a thing change without losing its
identity --- in which case it would be no longer that thing which has changed?” 
Following this, we may propose some questions of philosophy of education related to
Heraclitus’ philosophy: If the world and al the things are permanently becoming and 
changing, then the subject and the object of knowledge are constantly changing. How
can learning occur in the flow? How can the learning subject maintain or establish his
or her identity? How can a society or a culture be recognised as one if everything is
changing? How can people make choices in a continuously changing world?
Furthermore, according to Heraclitus’ water fragment, the world is diferent from how 
it appears. How different can the world and everything be? How different can people
be and learn to be? And can education itself be “diferent” conceptualy?
In some sense, Heraclitus’ view seems “unnatural”. The world that we 
experience everyday seems stable and static to some extent. The natural landscapes,
mountains, fields and plants seem to keep their appearances. Even animals do not
move all the time. If physiological growth is a certain part of change of animals, it
cannot be obviously perceived in our experience. Overall, natural environments and
living beings seem to change in such a very slow way that it is hardly perceived. Thus
Heraclitus’ view seems inappropriate to be taken as a reference for orienting education.
However, as a sympathiser of Heraclitus, I agree that human beings do not
experience the world “as” drasticaly changing. Yet our experience of the world may
be analysed, interpreted and conceptualised from different perspectives. From a
macroscopic view, the world that we experience is quite steady and stable. But if we
take a microscopic perspective, everything is continuously changing. For example, on
the level of molecules, successive chemical reactions keep occurring in the cells of
organisms. They are continuously producing and multiplying themselves by dividing,
decaying, and being recycled. To take a view on the social aspect, every individual
can be analogised as a cell. Thus the change of a group or society may take time to
effect. Yet viewed on the individual aspect, every living person is undertaking a lot of
changes such as making decision and acting. A lot of differences on the microscopic
level will consummate with change on the macroscopic level. Viewed in this light,
Heraclitus’ view is insightful for being atentive and sensitive to tiny changes which 
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have big consequences.
Mashalidis, furthermore, proposes five points related to education, which are
inspired by Heraclitus: (1) educators need a holistic and integrated cosmological
vision of reality as a basis for conceptualizing curriculum, ideas, theories and
practices; (2) Heraclitus’ idea fosters an understanding of the complex relations
between different aspects of knowledge; (3) the educational process must be grounded
on a broad, inclusive and dynamic epistemological and metaphysical worldview; (4)
the doctrine of opposites contains an implicit notion of creativity; (5) Heraclitus
provides a rationale for examining the organic process of school change and renewal
(Mashalidis, 2003, pp. 28-32).
Drawing on Heraclitus’ and Popper’s ideas, Mashalidis (2003, p. 28) describes 
that “there are no unchanging things and that the apparent stability of things, or even
of the entire universe, can be explained as a set of law-like, measured processes in
perceptively visible or imperceptibly invisible flux”. According to Mashalidis, there is 
nothing unchanging in the context of Heraclitus, thus there is no stable reality of
things for us to know. In this case, knowledge about nature is a set or sets of ideas
related to a law-like or, in looser terms, regularity-like, dynamic process. Our
descriptions have to be more like a four-dimensional “movie”, not like a “snapshot”. 
Then, one point that may be very significant to education but ignored here is how
human beings with their changing human nature grasp the regularity-like knowledge
through the flux. This answer, in my opinion, can be found from phenomenology,
which will be explored in the third part. Here we may find that a picture concerning
education adumbrated by an ancient philosopher may be painted by contemporaries.
All in all, Heraclitus may not propose a complete and coherent philosophy of
education, yet what he left us are very rich, potential and precious ideas. Firstly, we
may find that the philosophy of becoming seems to be relatively overlooked in
comparison with the philosophy of being. Secondly, this ignorance might last for
centuries until late 19th century, the time of the advents of evolutionary biology,
postmodern philosophy and postmodern sciences (or new physics). These
‘post’modern developments encourage us to take the ancient Heraclitus’ insightful 
ideas seriously again and invite us to rethink their significance for our present
education.
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3.2 Nature as Being
In addition to the notion of becoming, another influential legacy of ancient
philosophers is the philosophy of being. The following discussion of this section will
elaborate the view of nature as being in ancient thought and its implications for
education nowadays. The doctrines of Parmenides and the ancient atomists are taken
as the targets for investigation.
In contrast with Heraclitus’ idea that althings are becoming, Parmenides asserts
that “being is” and “becoming is ilusory”. Parmenides is wel-known as a philosopher
of “being” or “what is” or “one” (Barnes, 1979; Colingwood, 1960; Copleston, 
1966a). Parmenides differentiates thought from its objects, sensation from its objects.
This differentiation, as pointed out by many authors (Copleston, 1966a; Rees, 1954),
is adopted by Plato, probably in part19, and becomes influential for the later history of
philosophy and educational thought. In general, two points in Parmenides’ thoughts 
need notice: one is the idea of One or “what is”; the other is the distinction between 
“the way of ‘what is’” and “the way of ‘what is not’”. 
Parmenides in his fragments enunciates that what he aims to pursue is truth, and
truth is. However, for human beings, there are two paths of learning: one is directed to
truth; the other is directed to illusion. Here we may find a prototype of
epistemological dualism: truth vs. illusion. Moreover, the proto-epistemological
dualism is grounded on a deeper proto-metaphysical dualism: being vs. not being (or
non-being). As Parmenides (Burnet, 1920) states:
--- the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely,
that It is, and that that it is impossible for it not to be, is the way of
19 Rees (1954)agrees that there is a direct relation between Plato’s distinction of knowledge and 
opinion and Parmenides’ diferentiation of thought and sensation; however, Copleston (1966) is
doubtful about this view but he does not deny that Parmenides might have some influence on Plato’s 
thought.
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belief, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not, and
that it must need not be, --- that, I tell thee, is a path that none can
learn of at all.
The “truth”, “what is”, the “being” or the “one”, according to Parmenides, implies
four characteristics: it is “uncreated and indestructible”, “complete” (or “indivisible”), 
“immovable” and “without end” (Burnet, 1920). Viewed from the educational aspect, 
Parmenides seems to suggest that the most valuable knowledge, that is worth learning
and teaching, is the absolute, universal and objective “Truth” that is complete, 
immovable and indestructible.
What are the characteristics of the what is or Truth? For the “what is”, there is 
neither origin nor end; it is ingenerate and imperishable (Schick, 1965). Copleston
gives a very clear explanation on this point that “if something comes into being, it 
must arise either out of being or out of not-being. If it arises out of being, then there is
no real arising, no coming-to-be; for if it comes out of being, it already is. If, however,
it arises out of not-being, then not-being must be already something, in order for being
to be able to arise out of it” (1966a, p. 50). 
Next, “what is” is “complete”; It cannot be more or less; what is is, and cannot
be divided by nothing or it cannot be what is is. It is an indivisible whole. Therefore,
the completeness is related to its immovability. The “immovable” of what is
designates motionless and unchanging. What is cannot be added or divided by
something other than itself; it cannot be influenced by any other things ---- there is no
other being except what is and what is has already been and wil be, in Parmenides’ 
notion. In this sense, all changes and movements are impossible. The discussion
above seems to suggest Platonic idealism in approaching the what is as the most
absolute and abstract idea. However, the following interpretation shows that
Parmenides’ view might be equaly validly construed as the opposite: materialism.
Since what is is endless or infinite temporarily, “having neither beginning nor 
end” (Copleston, 1966a, p.50), itis infinite spatially and temporarily. Many
commentators agree on this point that the being or what is is a “finite, spherical, 
motionless corporeal plenum” (Burnet, 1920; Copleston, 1966a; Schick, 1965)
because the incorporeal is unknown and cannot be described (Kirk & Raven, 1957).
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Accordingly, what is is material. As Parmenides states in the fragments:
It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And
thus it remaineth constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the
bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. Wherefore it is not
permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if
it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. (Burnet, 1920)
Viewed in this light, what is must be material, thus Burnet (1920) calls Parmenides
“the father of materialism” rather than “the father of idealism”. None the less, 
Parmenides’ doctrine about the above features of what is and his differentiation
between the path of what is or truth and the path of what is not or not-being may
contain the germs of idealism, materialism, atomism and dualism.
Many authors are in accord on the point that Parmenides’ insistence on the 
unchangeability of the what is is adopted by Plato and turns into an everlasting,
immortal and objective idea (Copleston, 1966a; Rees, 1954). Viewed in this light,
Parmenides could be caled “the father of idealism”. However, if judgedby the
content of doctrine, Parmenides is indeed a materialist. His notion of what is as
indestructible and indivisible material is actually found in the doctrine of the
materialistic atomists like Empedocles and Democritus. Thus the atomists are
Parmenides’ true descendants or in Copleston’s words, his “legitimate children” 
(1966a, p. 52). The possibilities of idealism and materialism implied in Parmenides’ 
thought can be found and thereby a dualism is suggested.
Ontological and epistemological dualisms are both implied in Parmenides’ 
thought. The ontological dualism is related to the distinction of idealism and
materialism/realism, while the epistemological dualism is connected to the ways of
truth and of illusion. The former focuses on the reality of the world, or “what to 
know”, the later on the way of learning and knowing or “how to know”. Parmenides 
himself declares a materialistic monism but, paradoxically, his argument may imply
the opposite. Viewed in this light, dualist thought, traditionally taken as the legacy of
Plato, may be traced back to the pre-Socratics.
There might be dificulty in education if we take Parmenides’ dualist path: first 
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of all, it may be too simple to divide knowledge or learning into the two polarised
types: absolute truth and complete falsehood or illusion. However, there are various
kinds of knowledge, e.g. cognitive, functional, emotional, communicative, and so
forth. Can all kinds of knowledge be simply classified as truth and illusion? It is
obvious that the clear-cut “absolute” categorisation is not suitable for some 
knowledge such as knowledge in relation to ethics and aesthetics.
Moreover, the either/or perspective of knowledge assumes the absoluteness,
objectivity and universality of truth and the standardisation of learning. Who and
where can people learn the absolute truth (the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth)? An ethical or political danger could be produced by this view: determinism,
totalisation and authoritarianism. Belief in “One” or “Truth” easily turns into trust of a 
particular person who could bring us to the “One” or Truth”. It is probable that this 
person turns into an unchallengeable authority, such as an infallible pope, priest,
shaman. This danger of authoritarianism implied in the pursuit of “One” or “Truth” 
can be found in both Western and non-Western cultures. In ancient China, the emperor,
as the political supreme authority, is also named “son of god”, symbolising the 
incarnation of “One”. Moreover, Confucius, founder of Confucianism which is the
most influential ethical and philosophical system in Chinese cultural traditions, is
dubbed as “the Greatest Teacher”. Confucianism has dominated the intelectual 
tradition for more than two thousand years and has been the only officially
acknowledged and endorsed doctrine for learning and imperial examinations during
that period of time. However, the instances above show that despotism may be led by
authoritarianism which could be legitimised by the ideology of totalisation. When
people enforce the Truth that they believe, totalisation is implied because the other
ways of thinking are ruled out. Moreover, when the enforcement of the so-called
“Truth” is taken as a certain “vocation”, that Truth must be known by al because it is 
good, it is easy for believers to adopt coercive means. And here comes the threat of
totalitarianism.
The belief in “One” or “Truth” or “what is” in education implies the notions of 
normalisation and standardisation which are expressed as the requirements, criteria
and regulations in order make “objective” assessment and evaluation of pupils and 
educators. None the less, to assess people is, indeed, to mark, compare, rank and
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arrange people. Implied in this view is the assumption of the idea of being which
takes the world and human nature as stable, fixed and homogeneous so that they are
commensurable and comparable. On this view, we may find a reciprocity between
Parmenides’ and the atomists’ philosophies. 
The dualist notions of Parmenides are therefore consonant with those of ancient
atomists, such as Leucippus and Democritus. Although Democritus could be Socrates’ 
contemporary, here his ideas are taken into discussions of the pre-Socratics. Owing to
the relationship between Parmenides and the ancient atomist doctrines, Leucippus’ 
and Democritus’ philosophy is included in the discussion.20 We may find that
Parmenides and the atomists have different contributions to the philosophy of being or
substance metaphysics. Parmenides initiates dualism while the atomists initiate
mechanism.
According to Aristotle and Cicero, Leucippus is considered as the inventor and
Democritus as the elaborator of atomism (Kirk & Raven, 1957). 21 From the
perspective of Copleston (1966a), atomism is seen as a logical development of
Empedocles’ atempts to reconcile Parmenides’ immovable being and non-being
through a “thorough-going mechanism”. According to Popper (1963b), atomism 
synthesizes Heraclitus’ theory of change and Parmenides’ notion of the indivisible 
unit --- the one. If this is the case, why is atomism taken as a part of philosophy of
being? The answer could be that atomists including Leucippus and Democritus
explain the world and nature in terms of mechanical materialism. According to the
limited extant records (Berryman, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Burnet, 1920; Copleston,
1966a), the world is composed of physical atoms or particles that are uncuttable,
20 There are different views about the origin of atomism. Some authors, such as Burnet (1920) and
Zeler (Benn, 1911), take atomism as “antithetical doctrines” from the Eleatic Scholars, such as 
Parmenides. In this view, atomism is in some respects in conflict with the view of Parmenides. Some
authors such as Benn (1911) and Copleston (1966a) consider atomism affiliated with the natural
philosophy of Miletus and Elea. In this sense, atomism could be understood as derivative of the pre-
Socratic predecessors. Some authors group atomism as one branch of Pythagorean, such as Bury (1916).
However, the genealogical study of the origin of atomism is not the aim of the thesis. But what cannot
be denied is that atomism is inevitably related to the doctrines of Parmenides, be it agreeable or
oppositional. On the problem related to the relation between atomism and its predecessors, we agree
with the view of Copleston (1966a) and Popper (1963a, 1963b) that Heraclitus and Parmenides prepare
for atomism in different aspects because the connection between them is significant for the formation
of atomist view of nature.
21 The works of Leucippus and Democritus do not survive in the original. The existence of Leucippus
has been called in question. The most instructive reports of Leucippus and Democritus are those by
Aristotle, and most of them refer to Democritus or both together (Berryman, 2004a, 2004b, 2005;
Burnet, 1920).
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unbreakable or indivisible; the changes in the world are caused by the rearrangement
of clusters of atoms. “The atoms difer from each other, not in matter, but only in
arangement and shape: al ‘qualitative’ diferences in objects (which are 
conglomerates of atoms), therefore, are dependent on quantitative and local
diferences alone” (Kirk & Raven, 1957, p. 408). 
Although the atomists’doctrine may, as mentioned, be influenced by
Parmenides, there are differences between them. As stated by the author Theophrastus
in the third-century B.C., Parmenides “made the Al one, immovable, uncreated and 
finite, and did not even permit us to search for what is not” (cited in Burnet, 1920). By 
contrast, the ancient atomist Leucippus “assumed innumerable and ever-moving
elements, namely, the atoms. And he made their forms infinite in number, since there
was no reason why they should be of one kind rather than another, and because he
saw that there was unceasing becoming and change in things” (cited in Burnet, 1920). 
What is interesting is that he held the view that
…what is is no more real than what is not, and that both are alike
causes of the things that come into being; for he (Leucippus) laid down
that the substance of the atoms was compact and full, and he called
them what is, while they move in the void which he called what is not,
but affirmed to be just as real as what is. (Theophrastus, cited in
Burnet, 1920)
The atomist world is accordingly composed of what is ---atoms--- and what is not ---
void. Kirk and Raven (1957, p. 408) point out that the idea of “void” cannot be 
understood as “space” because the atomists “had no conception of bodies occupying
space; and for them the void only exists where atoms are, that is, it forms the gaps
between them”. In the view of the ancient atomists, the world is materialistic. The 
idea of nature as being is accomplished by adopting and transforming Parmenides’ 
immovable one into innumerable many (atoms); however, be it one or many, they are
all homogeneous. As mentioned, there are no qualitative differences between the
atoms, only quantitative differences between the clusters of atoms. On this ground, a
homogenised materialistic epistemology and mind-body view can be found in the
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ancient atomist accounts. Firstly, the mind is taken by the atomists as the
concentration of mind- or soul-atoms and secondly, thought is a process similar to
sensation. As reported by the 1st century B.C. author Aetius and the 3rd century B.C.
author Theophrastus, the early Greek atomists “say that perception and thought arise 
when images enter from outside…”, for example, “the visual image does arise directly 
in the pupil, but the air between the eye and the object of sight is contracted and
stamped by the object seen and the seer…” (cited in Kirk & Raven, 1957, p.421). In 
sum, the atomist explanation of the sensation is that the senses are the effects of
different shapes and sizes of atoms (Kirk & Raven, 1957, p.423).
It can be found that the view of nature presented by the ancient philosophers of
being --- Parmenides and the atomists --- encourages conceptions of mechanism,
homogenisation and determinism. Nature in the view of the atomists is composed of
innumerable and indivisible material atoms or particles. According to Aetius,
Leucippus states that “nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by 
necessity” (cited in Kirk & Raven 1957, p. 413). The notion that everything and every
movement are pre-decided for a particular reason obviously implies the notions of
teleology, determinism, causality and mechanism. According to these notions, the
truth of all beings and their movements in nature are regulated and decided by deity.
This might hint at “teleology”: al existences and movements in the world are destined 
to occur in an inescapably necessary and particular way. The philosophy of being
might be radicalised as extreme determinism or fatalism, whereby there is no free will
or freedom at all in nature. The relationship between philosophy of being and
teleology will be discussed in the next chapter.
A threat to education could result from the reification of the idea of not-being or
negativity. There is no possibility to escape the omnipotent and omnipresent “being” 
because there is only “being” and no “not-being”. In the doctrines of Parmenides two 
ways towards knowledge can be found: one towards truth, the other towards illusion.
This epistemological dualism does not imply the ontological reality of illusion or not-
being because not-being could not be for Parmenides. The odd dualist thinking in the
atomists may lead towards materialistic monism. However, the coercion of this view
implies an all-embracing absolutism, totalism or totalitarianism. The existence of the
void is admitted by the atomists, but it is understood as something substantial, some
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kind of real stuff, named the void. Furthermore, the idea of monism is clearly shown
from Parmenides’ notion of the One.However, it seems to be contentious to group the
idea of atom in the class of monism. According to the atomist doctrine, atoms are
innumerable in quantity and “al atoms are exactly alike in substance” (Burnet, 1920). 
In other words, these many atoms are all similar to each other; they are homogeneous.
From the view of the ancient atomists, “if there were a plurality, things would have to 
be of just the same nature as the one” (cited in Kirk & Raven, 1957, p. 304, p. 405). 
The absolute “one” and the absolute “many” seem to be extremely opposite but 
qualitatively equivalent. Thus, atomism in this sense strongly shows the tendency of
totalitarianism and terrorism by its potential implications of homogenisation,
determinism and collectivism. This view could contribute to the predicaments of our
present curricula.
The point related to education drawn from the philosophy of being (and
atomism) may be the fixed, mechanical and predictable approach to educational ideas
and practices on the basis of a mechanical and static perspective on nature, knowledge,
humanity, and society. The argument is as follows. Since the idea of being is regarded
as atom as substance, every atom is homogeneous in quality and thus is pre-
determined, commensurable, comparable, predictable and, finally, controllable.
Nature, society and the members of nature and society are composed by the
homogeneous atoms; therefore, the collectivities have the features of atoms: stable,
static, predictable and controllable. Viewed in this light, there are particular and
normative aims, objectives, structures and means of education and curricula for
learning under the guidance of “One” or “Truth”. 
On this ground, we may conceive a possible picture of educational practices: a
set or sets of educational norms should be devised for application and implementation
according to the proper route; every person has a particular and fixed social role or
status and should be appropriately educated for performing her duty well. This
educational picture could be found in many traditional societies, e.g. ancient China
mentioned above and ancient Greek city-states (or polis). The fixed reality of
humanity may give legitimacy to the fixed social role and duty and to a static
hierarchical society lacking social fluidity. In some respects, totalitarianism can find
support in philosophy of being: Parmenides’ idea of “one” or “what is” justifies the 
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authority from the macro perspective; atomists’ concept of “many” perhaps supports 
the submissiveness of every being from the micro perspective.
3.3 Summary
All in all, the ancient views of nature or of reality have been very influential on
intellectual and educational ideas and practices in the past. The philosophies of
becoming and being, implicitly or explicitly, are still underpinning our educational
thinking. What difference could these two conceptions bring to education?
On the one hand, the philosophy of being has been argued to be highly related to
the notion of homogenisation and thereby results in the dangers of determinism,
totalisation, authoritarianism and collectivism. In this light, philosophy of being in
this thesis is understood in a restricted sense as substance metaphysics rather than in
the sense of Whitehead’s philosophy or Prigogine’s thought.22 This point shows that
the philosophy of being could be a stimulus for the pitfalls of our present curricula.
The explorations in the following chapters will demonstrate that the philosophy of
being is beneficial for establishing a view of nature with divine telos, and a
disenchanted view of nature, which might help to fortify the oversimplifications of
our current curricula. This concept of nature as being plays a very important role on
the stage of intellectual thought and therefore has a great influence on education. In
some sense, it seems that human intellectual activity is, as Nietzsche stated, a
movement driven by the will to truth. From this perspective, a fixed, static and
predictable “Truth” could be possibly approached by measurable and mechanical 
22 From the perspective of process philosopher Whitehead (1979), the basic metaphysical category, in
his term, the actual occasion, is not substance but a process of becoming. Substance and becoming can
be understood as different types of being (Levi, 1958). Moreover, according to thermodynamic scientist
Prigogine, “Being and Becoming are not to be opposed one to the other: they express two related
aspects of reality” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1985, p. 310). Moreover, “[w]e are living in a dangerous
world that inspires no blind confidence, but perhaps the…feeling of…hope…”(Prigogine & Stengers,
1985, p. 313). In their view, “substance” and “process” are opposite realities; the ontological positions
of substances metaphysics and process philosophy are distinctively different. This thesis uses
philosophy of being to refer to substance metaphysics while philosophy of becoming relates to process
philosophy.
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procedures. Concerning metaphysics, the view of nature as being, on the one hand,
implies the ideas of harmony and order; on the other hand, it may bring about the
ideas of stillness and death. Regarding epistemology, this view suggests that this
world is “One” and “Truth”. Thus knowledge of the world can be accessed and 
discovered by a proper and corect way. “Correct” and “standard” knowledge can be 
learned by “proper” arangement. On the cultural and sociopolitical level, this view 
assumes the idea of fixed human reality and social conditions and could lead to the
traps of homogenisation, determinism, authoritarianism, totalisation and collectivism.
Thus understood, philosophy of being is deeply influential on our present educational
predicament.
On the other hand, the discussions above reveal that philosophy of becoming
may be insightful for improving our present educational predicament. This view has
potential for conceiving continuously changing metaphysical reality, unpredictable
social changes and capricious human nature and nature itself. What is more interesting
is that it anticipates contemporary postmodern notions. It is beneficial for educators to
conceive the learning process as a dynamics of challenging the established
orthodoxies by creating differences. Yet this view seems to suggest risky learning;
what and how people learn cannot be cannot be definitively ascertained because there
is no absolute standard and norm. The view of becoming seems risky. None the less, it
could be full of possibility. In Heraclitus’s view, nature is becoming; everything in and 
by nature keeps changing and becomes “diferent and diferent”. It seems a chalenge 
to take this view as a motto of education because there is no definite order, rule,
regulation and law to obey.
The investigation above illuminates the difference which the two conceptions of
nature could make. Now we are brought back to our questions: Should we regard
nature as becoming or being? Which polarity could be more educationally meaningful?
The ancient philosophies of becoming and being propose very different
metaphysical outlines of nature and human beings for envisaging educational ideas
and practices. In my view, Parmenides and the atomists’ philosophy of being denotes 
the possibility of supporting a static, measurable and standard learning model
entailing dangers of determinism, collectivism, totalisation and homogenisation. A
reliable, stable and secure approach to learning might be brought about. Yet this view
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could impoverish the dynamic meanings in living and learning. It is not a desirable
life or education. Such a meaning-impoverished life or education is not desirable.
Rather, living and learning might be seen as a journey towards the unknown, as
essentialy adventurous. “Knowing nothing; explore everything” might be its 
motivating motto. Completely safe learning and living is an illusion and easily to be
taken as a pretext for dictatorship, security, certainty, ossifying orthodoxy. In contrast,
Heraclitus’ philosophy of becoming implies the possibility of conceiving a dynamic
learning process that may allow more space for heterogeneity by taking the risk of
insecurity and adventure. The most significantly educational point on this view is that
learning and living is always a risky adventure.
On this ground, we may conclude with a reply to the question above: Heraclitus’ 
approach to nature as becoming might bring more potential to improve the current
unbalanced curriculum and thereby bring more abundant meanings for our lives,
educational ideas and practices than a view of nature as being which has been heavily






This chapter aims to explore the meanings of nature and the educational implications
which are anchored by the theme of the telos of nature. Following the metaphysical
exploration of reality of nature, some questions have always been asked: What is the
telos (purpose) of nature? What is nature all about? What can the telos (purpose) of
nature bring to our life and education? The study of the purpose of nature has a long
history. Many conceptions of the telos (purpose) of nature have been conceived; then,
what kind of the conception might be most helpful for education?
For ancient people, the existence of living-beings within nature seems to be one
of the convincing proofs that is used to demonstrate the existence of a divine creator
or a purposeful creation (Glacken, 1967). Hence in ancient times, the idea of telos is
taken as a divine purpose which is bestowed by a deity or deities. Since nature is
regarded as a living world --- everything in nature is taken as alive --- thus the telos
can be understood as immanent animus or souls. In addition, the telos is conferred by
deity or deities and so is divine.
There are two features of the ancient study of divine telos. First, the study of
teleology is inseparable from theology because the discussion of ancient teleology
focuses on the supernatural creator deity presumed to have created nature for “his” 
purpose. Secondly, the study of ancient teleology is inextricable from that of animism.
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The combination of both studies forms the basic content of physico-theology. As
Morito points out, teleology and animism are the most important ideas of the view of
nature in ancient Greece. A similar perspective can be found in Glacken’s thought. 
Glacken (1967) points out that the most important ideas for understanding nature are
those of order and purpose in the universe and on earth. Many authors agree that an
animistic view of nature with divine telos could be taken as representative of the
ancient view about natural purpose. Plato and Aristotle, undoubtedly, as two of the
most prominent and influential ancient Greek philosophers, argue for a physico-
theological nature. Their views were hugely influential on the subsequent natural
theology and natural philosophy of the Middle Ages. This chapter will focus on their
conceptions of telos in nature.
The ancient conception of a telos of nature has been critically challenged in
modern times. The term “modern times” here is used in the broad sense to describe 
the post-medieval times, loosely referring to the period from the end of the 15th
century to the early 20th century. However, many ancient and medieval ideas about
nature have been put under rigorous examination during the Scientific Revolution,
including the notions of teleology and animism. One of the aims of the Scientific
Revolution was to pursue the truth of nature by developing scientific methods and
tools. The scientific methods and tools are used to secure standardisation of the
process of acquiring knowledge and the outcome. This process is to establish
“Science” as a rigorous and autonomous discipline with strict criteria of scientific 
method and knowledge. The ancient, animistic and teleological view of nature seems
unqualified to meet the requirements of “Science”. One of the tasks of the Scientific 
Revolution is thus to take a more “scientific” view to replace the “unscientific” 
animistic view. This scientific view tends to be essentially mechanistic.
During this process of turning the animistic nature into a mechanistic one, a
number of thinkers such as Galileo, Bacon, Hume and Kant make prominent
contributions. This process can be divided into two steps: the rejection of physico-
theology and the development of scientific criteria. The first step is discussed in this
chapter; the second in Chapter 5.23 The rejection of physico-theology is significant for
23 Both steps indeed in a broad sense can be included under the theme of “disenchantment vs. 
enchantment”. However, this thesis wil argue for a more specific definition for the theme 
“disenchantment vs. enchantment”, which is understood from a secular perspective.
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shaping different understanding of the meaning of telos of nature: a divine and
transcendent telos of nature. The Enlightenment philosophers Hume and Kant both
propose important arguments against physico-theology. Their successful rejection of
the idea of purposeful nature is beneficial for the establishment of a mechanistic view
of nature. Hume’s and Kant’s arguments wil be explored.
The concept of nature with immanent telos reappears due to the advent of
evolutionary biology. However, the meaning of the telos of nature in modern biology
is different from that in ancient times and the Scientific Revolution. It is an immanent
non-divine telos. The concept of nature implied with non-divine telos points towards a
new teleology which reveals a perspective of an end (or ends) immanent in material
and organic nature. This view will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.
Three main conceptions of telos in nature will be explicated in the following
paragraphs. What educational implications can we infer from these three conceptions:
nature with divine telos, nature without divine telos, or nature with non-divine telos?
What kind of conception might be most helpful for education? The educational
implications will be explored in two points. The first is related to human/nature/deity
relationships. It will be demonstrated that the view of nature with divine telos leads
towards a hierarchical view of beings; while the view of nature with non-divine telos
holds more potential for an egalitarian relationship between human beings and nature.
This point will be extended in Chapter 6. The second point is about determinism. It
will be argued that the transcendental-divine and immanent-divine concepts of telos of
nature may lead to the danger of determinism; however, the concept of immanent non-
divine telos might imply more possibilities to extricate ourselves from this bane. This
difference may be due to their different metaphysical assumptions which are grounded
separately on the philosophies of being and of becoming.
4.1 Nature with Immanent Divine Telos: Physico-theological View of
Nature
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This section aims to make explicit the senses of the ancient view of nature in relation
to the idea of telos. In general, there is a conspicuous feature of the ancient view of
nature, which is a “nature with divine telos” or “nature with divine purpose”. The 
speculations on nature and on God are often inseparable in ancient times. Plato and
Aristotle, undoubtedly, are two of the most prominent and influential philosophers
among the ancient thinkers. Their views of nature are taken as the foci.
4.1.1 Plato’s view 
Let us now take Plato as the starting point of our exploration of the view of nature
with purpose. As many authors have mentioned, ancient Greek cosmology and
theology are inseparable (Collingwood, 1945; Collingwood, 1960; Copleston, 1966a).
Plato’s view of nature is mainly about the story of the formation of cosmos and can be 
found basically in Timaeus. As one of Plato’s late dialogues, it has been taken by 
many authors as one of Plato’s works implying the most significant notions on nature
or cosmology (Collingwood, 1945; Glacken, 1967; Lee, 1965; Morito, 2002; Soper,
1995). In this story of the formation of the universe, a maker or a god as the intelligent
origin of all things, named Demiurge, appears. In order to explore Plato’s view of 
nature, let us put the main focus on the Timaeus. Plato’s perspective of nature in this 
dialogue can be understood as a nature with immanent divine purpose or telos.
Three main points about Palto’s view of natural teleology can be identified from
Timaeus: 1) As the world-creator or the artisan-deity, Demiurge bestows telos on
nature; 2) a dualist world scheme is proposed as the bridge between nature and human
nature and 3) nature is an animistic world which is full of telos as well as souls. The
three points, on the on hand, distinguishe Plato’s view from the pre-Socratics’; on the 
other hand, they demonstrate the transforming connection between both.
First of all, in Timaeus (Plato, 1965), the centre of the discussion is put on the
creation of the cosmos and the world-creator: Demiurge. However, what needs to be
noticed is that the “creation” is diferent from the Christian creation denoting creation 
ex nihilo, out of nothing. Demiurge is more like an intelligent and skilful designer; he
can create order and beauty out of rough material. What is more, he can control nature.
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Plato describes the god with different titles such as father, maker, craftsman,
artisan deity and the world-creator. The world is not merely a simple reproduction but
rather the work of the deliberate and careful activity of an intelligent and good artisan
deity (Glacken, 1967; Lee, 1965; Plato, 1965). As mentioned, Demiurge as the world-
creator and the artisan-deity is no God in the Judeo-Christian context. Demiurge’s 
making is different from the creation of Judeo-Christian God --- or in the terms of
Copleston (1966a), the Creator-God (Collingwood, 1945). The Judeo-Christian
religion takes the world is a “creation out of nothing” (creatio ex nihilo) by God. In
contrast, the ancient Greek deity cannot “create out of nothing” (ex nihilo nihil).24
Demiurge combines and processes the elements of world which has existed.
Furthermore, the work or creation of Demiurge is modeled from the ideal; his work
made upon the natural world is only temporal and changeable. As Plato (1965, p. 40)
states, “the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternaly unchanging and uses it as 
his patern for the form and function of his product…” It can be found that Demiurge 
himself is not totaly identified as the “eternaly unchanging”, although he may 
partake of the eternal good.
It can be found that Plato’s description about Demiurge is ambiguous; according 
to many authors, at least three interpretations have been proposed to elucidate the
meaning of Demiurge: demiurge as a personal deity, or as a symbol of intelligent
causation or as a doublet of world soul (Robinson, 1967). However, this thesis does
not intend to solve this ambiguity; what matters for present purposes is that, whether
Demiurge is a personal deity or a symbol or a doublet of world soul, he is the one who
brings souls into the world, the one “who, imitating an unchanging and eternal model, 
imposes mathematical order on a preexistent chaos to generate the ordered cosmos
(Kosmos)” (Zeyl, 2005). In other words, the disordered chaos is bestowed with telos
which regulates and normalises the direction of the movements of all beings in nature
and thereby begets an orderly world.
Secondly, a dualist world scheme is proposed as the bridge between nature and
human nature. The physical world in Plato’s view is changeable, corporeal, visible 
and tangible, and contains four material elements (water, air, fire and earth). Demiurge
24 George Boas (1936) pointed out one of assumptions of the Greek philosophy is “ex nihilo nihil”. As 
written by Aristotle in De Caelo, “For it is possible for one body to be generated out of another…but it 
is impossible for a body to be generated from no other pre-existing corporeal quantity”.
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places and arranges the four elements in accordance with proper proportions. The
proper proportions can be understood as forms or ideas or telos. A two-world scheme
or dualist metaphysics can be found here. As Timaeus says,
We must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which
always is and never becomes from that which is always becoming but
never is. The one is apprehensible by intelligence with the aid of
reason, being eternally the same, the other is object of opinion and
irrational sensation, coming to be, but never fuly real……As for the 
world --- cal it that or cosmos or any other name acceptable to it…for 
it is visible, tangible, and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the
senses, and, as we saw, sensible things are objects of opinion and
sensation and therefore change and come into being. [Timaeus, 28]
（Plato, 1965, p.40）
According to this two-world schema, or dualist metaphysics, the physical world is
fashioned by the artisan-deity into “a single complete whole, consisting of parts that 
are whole” (Plato, 1965, p.44). The artisan deity brings forth theworld and all
creatures by arranging and composing four elementary constituents, viz. earth, water,
fire and air according to various proper proportions. The difference in proportions
denote to forms or ideas. According to Plato, the god found that the physical and
visible world was “in a state not of rest but of inharmonious and disorderly motion” 
(Plato, 1965, p.42). Demiurge “reduced it to order from disorder” because he judged 
that “order was in every way beter” (Plato, 1965, p.42). There is an ideal world of
intelligence, order and harmony for the physical world to model. The dualist idea can
be clearly found in Plato’s famous cave alegory in the Republic. There is an
interesting parallel between the Republic and the Timaeus: in the Republic an
isomorphism between three parts of soul and three classes of city-state can be found
and so can one in the Timaeus between the structure of world-soul and the structure of
rational soul (Betegh, 2004). Plato (1955), through Socrates’ mouth, presents a story 
about a group of cave prisoners and two worlds: one is an underground chamber like a
cave; the other is the upper world outside the cave and is open to the sunlight. In the
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best-known sense, the cave represents the visible world where everything is
changeable, shifting and mortal; the world under the daylight represents the ideal
world that is underpinning the physical world and consisting of ideas, e.g. the real,
eternal and immortal models.
Thirdly, there is an animistic characteristic implied in Plato’s view of nature.
The cosmos is thought of as a living being and “ensouled” with “reason and harmony”, 
as stated in Timaeus: “when the father [Demiurge] who had begoten it perceived that 
the universe was alive and in motion, a shrine for the eternal gods,…” (Plato, 1965, p.
50) In sum, the physical world is taken as a living and motive whole which is
bestowed but not identified with eternal inteligence: “The nature of the Living Being 
was eternal, and it was not possible to bestow this attribute fully on the created
universe…” (Plato, 1965, p. 50) The animistic world can also be explained by the idea 
of the soul of the world.
Accordingly, the things of the visible world are modelled upon the forms of the
invisible world. The artisan deity fits “the structure of the soul” and the corporeal 
world. “[T]he soul was woven right through from the center to the outermost heaven, 
which it enveloped from the outside and, revolving on itself, provided a divine source
of unending and rational life for al time” (Timaeus, 37; Plato, 1965, p.49). The visible
world is made and endowed with the invisible soul, and thus the soul of the world
pervades its entire body. Viewed in light, the “soul” animates as wel as permeates 
through the whole world and every living creature within. As Plato states in the
conclusion of Timaeus:
For our world has now received its full complement of living creatures,
mortal and immortal; it is a visible living creature, it contains all
creatures that are visible and is itself an image of the intelligible; and
it has thus become a visible god, supreme in greatness and excellence,
beauty and perfection, a single, uniquely created heaven. (Plato, 1965,
pp. 121-122)
Overall, some educational implications might be drawn from the above discussions.
First of all, according to Plato, the physical world is imperfect and incomplete on the
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grounds of the dualist ontology and animistic natural physics. The physical world is a
living whole as well as an imperfect and changeable whole. The maintenance of its
order and orgnisation relies on Demiurge’s modeling the ideal world. Demiurge 
bestows telos on these worldly beings and the telos turns into an immanent cause
directing the movements of the beings. In this view, education could be understood as
an activity with a pre-determined goal --- something perfect, good or true and
unchangeable. This goal has already embedded in education per se; it regulates what
and how educators should teach and pupils should learn. In this sense, education is a
mission-like task or even a mission itself. Curriculum, in this view, is apparently a
course which has been taken for progress. However, this view of education seems
very coercive while no other possibility could be considered. This view could possibly
lead to the traps of determinism and coercion.
Moreover, a problem concerning “imperfection” is implied in this view: since 
every thing is determined by its telos, so is imperfection. Then, how can education be
undertaken for completion? How can an insufficiency which is essentially destined
imperfect and incomplete turn into something perfect and complete? If all human and
nonhuman beings in nature develop according to their immanent telos, as Timaeus
suggests, then there should not be any evil in this world. In my understanding, this
problem is an internal flaw of dualism.
According to Plato, evil as the disruption of the original order results from body
--- the material part of being. However, this answer seems not completely plausible.
On the one hand, Plato describes the physical material world as shadow of the real
ideal world, thus the evil such as lack of proportion or disruption of order should be a
shadow as well. Is the shadow of evil an image of a real idea of evil in the ideal world
or an illusion? Both answers are confusing. This confusion illuminates the difficulty
of this kind of dualism.
Plato’s dualist metaphysics has dificulty in explaining the evil in the physical 
world: if this physical world is not “real”, evil in the world is not real. If every thing 
in this material world is merely phenomenal, so is the evil. It is difficult to explain the
source of evil in this two-world scheme. The dualist view might result in a
discriminative and hierarchical perspective on education.
In Plato’s cosmology, diferent degrees of importance are bestowed on the two
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worlds: higher status bestowed to the world of eternal forms and lower status to the
world of transitional mater. Plato’s dualist philosophy is thus understood as the 
founder of objective idealism (Copleston, 1966a). The discrimination of two worlds
(and two kinds of reality) is a factor in the formation of substance metaphysics
through history. The conceiving of the everlasting and changeless being is shifted
from the pre-Socratic notion of atom or element to Plato’s idea, from mater to form. 
In this respect, we may find that philosophy of being rather than philosophy of
becoming is more consonant with Plato’s view. In Plato’s mind, the real, such as the 
ideal or ideas or forms, are “beings” that wil never change; while the unreal, the
physical and the tangible are “becoming” that wil never exist. As Plato states, “We 
must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which always is and never
becomes from that which is always becoming but never is” (Plato, 1965, p. 40).
Plato’s dualist and objective idealist view implies a correspondence between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal worlds which legitimises rating beings according to
their “ideality” or “rationality”. A hierarchical view can be found in Plato’s 
perspective on social systems and educational institutions: in the Republic, Plato
(1955) explicates an ideal educational system which educates, institutionalises and
hierarchises every member of the society according to one’s “nature”. Moreover, 
rationality or ideality as a criterion for ranking the “value” or importance of beings 
easily leads to self-superiority of human beings, i.e., strong anthropocentrism or
humanism.
However, in spite of the potential dangers for education implied in Plato’s 
thoughts, he still gives us great inspirations for re-examining the meaning of
education. The lack of perfection in the physical world reveals that all beings are
innately embedded with a telos which drives human beings in pursuit of the immanent
purpose. If the purpose is interpreted as an internal drive of process for “beterment” 
or “the more desirable” rather than as substantial essence of perfection and goodness, 
then Plato’s philosophy of nature might is beneficial for education.  As Copleston 
(1966a) points out, the aim of Plato in Timaeus in the folowing: “we should 
remember that we ‘are only human’, and so should accept ‘the likely story and look 
for nothing further’ --- words which might imply that it is just human frailty which
renders true natural science impossible” (Copleston, 1966a; Plato, 1965). Therefore, 
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one important lesson that may be suggested from Timaeus is the impossibility of
perfect physical science since it is impossible for the physical world to be revealed in
its completeness and perfection. More importantly, since perfect physical science is
impossible, a perfect learning of physical science is beyond human ability. In some
sense, the recognition of human frailty, weakness and limitedness is significant for
education; it may imply an ethics of conservativeness and modesty when envisaging
the vast and great “Truth”. Paradoxicaly, this ethical atitude seems to wane when 
Plato’s another two important ideas of dualism and anthropocentrism enter the 
mainstream of the subsequent philosophical history, within which the primary status is
given to human beings. This view is related to the second point and its implication for
anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism will be explored in Chapter 6.
Plato’s view of nature can be found to be morein tune with philosophy of being
than philosophy of becoming. As previously argued, philosophy of being can result in
static and hierarchical view of social and educational systems. Viewed in this light,
Plato’s view of nature can run the same risk of totalisation for education. None the
less, it may shed light on the frailty of humanity and a perfect telos that is always
worth pursuing. In this sense, Plato’s view might encourage an education continuously 
striving for betterment, truths and ideals but neither “the Truth” nor “the Ideal”. 
However, there may not be such end in this visible and tangible world although we are
not certain if there is an invisible and intangible world.
4.1.2 Aristotle’s view 
The aim of this section is to discuss Aristotle’s idea of telos of nature and its
educational implications. Aristotle’s view of nature is inspiring for broadening our 
conception of nature and education because his approaches to nature are varied,
diverse, and ambivalent. His idea of nature can be divided into two parts: ontological
nature and biological nature, or metaphysical nature and empirical nature. Most of his
antecedents are concerned about the meaning of the former rather than the latter. On
this respect, Aristotle’s natural study is unique. There is both continuity and rupture
between Aristotle’s view and his antecedents’. 
95
We may find that Aristotle’s view of nature is very rich for us to reconsider and 
reconceive our present educational theories and practices as dialectical. His lifelong
interest in the study of nature contains various and diverse subject matters and thereby
makes him regarded as the originator of the scientific study of life (Bodnar, 2006;
Lennox, 2006). The following exploration will demonstrate ambiguity implied in his
view of nature: nature for Aristotle is animistic and mechanistic, becoming and being.
Compared with the previous Greek natural philosophers, Aristotle’s natural studies 
include natural philosophy and natural science. The subjects related to Aristotle’s 
natural studies may involve not only the ideas interesting his antecedents, such as
cosmology, physics, cosmogony, but also those commencing frontiers of study, like
biology and zoology. Accordingly, the objects of Aristotle’s natural studies may be 
classified into two kinds: ontological nature and biological nature.
Ontological nature consists in the abstract and formal ideas that his antecedents
expound upon, while biological nature denotes the concrete and real objects that could
be known through sense operations, such as observation. The scope of the former may
be the traditional natural philosophy whereas the latter may be animal studies. We can
find from the scope of Aristotle’s natural study that the view of nature has been 
broadened and thereby more meanings of nature may be conferred. The succeeding
discussion wil further ilustrate the dichotomisation of Aristotle’s natural study.
First of al, Aristotle’s idea of ontological nature, continuing the ancient Greek 
philosophers’ metaphysical interest in pursuing the reality of nature, is basically
concerned with the meaning of motion and change in and of nature. This idea is
chiefly expounded in the Physics thus it can be a proper starting point of the
discussion of Aristotle’s ontological nature (Bodnar, 2006; Collingwood, 1960;
Copleston, 1966a). In general, nature is taken as “the totality of objects which are 
material and subject to movement” (Copleston, 1966a, p.320). In the Physics,
Aristotle considers the meanings of nature and identifies various meanings referred by
the single word “nature” (Aristotle, 2004; Colingwood, 1960): (1) origin or birth; (2) 
that out of which things grow: seed; (3) the source of movement or change in natural
objects; (4) the primitive matter out of which things are made; (5) the essence or form
of natural things; (6) essence or form in general; (7) the essence of things which have
a source of movement in themselves. However, the seven senses of nature can be
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further understood, as the variations of the four causes: the material cause, efficient
cause, formal cause and the final cause. Aristotle [Physics, II, 2] explains the four
causes as follows:
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which
persists, is caled ‘cause’, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the
bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the
essence, and its genera, are caled ‘causes’ (e.g. of the octave the
relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the
man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and
generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what
is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is 
done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about… The same is true also 
of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the
action of something else as means towards the end… Al these things 
are ‘for the sake of’ the end, though they difer from one another in 
that some are activities, others instruments. (Aristotle, Physics II, 2)
In Aristotle’s view, the existence of al objects can be explained by the four causes.
The four causes are proposed to explain why and how nature, all objects within nature
and their motions come into being. Motion or change is, as Aristotle defined, a part of
the nature of things. As he stated, “we physicists…must take for granted that the
things that exist by nature are either al or some of them, in motion” (Physics, I, 2);
furthermore, “motion is an atribute of a thing just when it is fuly real in this way, and 
neither before nor after” (Physics, III, 1). Motion is the passage of matter into form,
from potentiality into actuality. Aristotle’s theory of four causes can be understood as 
an explanation of the being of becoming and the becoming of being. On this point, we
may find that Aristotle’s philosophy can ambivalently help as well as fail to conceive
and develop a dynamical and flexible education. On the one hand, his thoughts could
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do benefits for such kind of education is because his thoughts hold potential for
developing an educational view from the philosophy of becoming, which highlights
the significance of changes and unpredictability in lives and education and thereby is
desirable for us. On the other, Aristotle’s philosophy could be helpless for developing 
this kind of education because his thought assumes that formal cause as a necessary
and definitive purpose is immanent in every particular being. Thus every being
changes to actualise its form, yet this goal has already been decided. We may find that
the danger of determinism could result from Aristotle’s thoughts as wel as Plato’s. 
However, Aristotle’s ideas of form and mater, by comparison with Plato’s, 
might stil be more helpful for education. In Plato’s philosophy, the real substance is 
the idea in the transcendent world of forms; while in Aristotle’s philosophy, the
substance is the very individual thing, incorporating form and matter together,
existing in the physical world. Nature as the physical world for Plato might be an
illusion; for Aristotle, it is real and therefore more highly valued. In comparison with
Plato’s idealism, Aristotle suggests that truth or reality can be found in each particular 
object. The value of every particular thing may bring educators and pupils to
recognise the importance of every thing in nature as an object to be learned; in some
respects, every thing can be taken as a subject matter for learning. This point might be
in tune with the following discussion that Aristotle is an excellent empirical scientist
and makes the best use of all senses. Furthermore, it may also remind us of the
significance of experience in education and this point may be helpful in terms of
addressing the emphasis on disembodied learning of our present curricula.
The second aspect of Aristotle’s view of nature related to his animal studies is 
defined by this thesis as the view of biological nature. Aristotle’s empirical study of 
biological nature can be taken as an intellectual pursuit different from the premodern
philosophers. There are two implications of Aristotle’s study of biological nature: 
animal study as an empirical science and the relationship between biological nature
and ontological nature.
In relation to the first point, Aristotle’s study of animals embodies the atitude 
and mentality of empirical studies, which will come to be fully developed in the
modern sciences. There are more than 500 species of animals including shellfish,
insects, birds, reptiles and quadrupeds that have been investigated and written about
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carefully by Aristotle (Clutton-Brock, 1995). Aristotle’s animal studies initiate a new
perspective on, and attitude towards the scope and the composition of nature, which is
different from his antecedents. Furthermore, the attitude towards animals in modern
times is deeply influenced by Aristotle’s doctrine of biological nature according to the
hierarchical scale of nature with human beings25 at the top, the active living beings
below human beings and the inactive plants at the bottom. All the living beings are
made for the sake of humans in Aristotle’s view, and litle has altered in this view
through history (Clutton-Brock, 1995; Copleston, 1966a). This is closely related to the
anthropocentric view of the human/nature relationship, which will be more fully
discussed in Chapter 6. However, when we are invited to examine the human/nature
relationship and the issues related to ethics, values, and their educational implications,
Aristotle remains one of the important sources for reference.
In the second place, Aristotle may hint the importance of the roles played by
both reason and experience in obtaining knowledge although soul or reason is
understood as an intermediate between ontological nature and biological nature. I thus
make a brief summary of Aristotle’s theory of soul before discussing his idea of 
biological nature.26 According to Aristotle, the soul is “the vital principle in living 
things…as form or act to the body” (Copleston, 1966a, p. 327). Soul is the form of 
body and body is the mater of soul. In this sense, the soul can be understood as “a 
system of functions which characterised a living being” (Rees, 1954, p. 107). There is 
a scale of nature corresponding to different levels of soul according to different stages
of biological function. The lowest level of soul is the “nutritive or vegetative soul”, 
exercising the faculties of nutrition such as assimilation and reproduction. The
vegetative soul aims at the preservation of life and is possessed by all living beings
including vegetation, animals and human beings. The next level of soul is the
sensitive soul, exercising the faculties of movements. Vegetation does not possess the
sensitive soul. The highest level of soul, only possessed by human beings, is the
immortal reason or intellect (Copleston, 1966a). Overall, it can be found that the
25 If expressed in more specific terms, the existents at the top of the hierarchy should be “man” rather 
than “human beings” because Aristotle takes “man” superior to “woman”. However, the question 
concerning gender equity is not the focus of this thesis thus it is suspended.
26 The entirety of Aristotle’s theory of soul could be divided into two stages: in the first and earlier 
stage, Aristotle locates the soul in the heart, which is as something physical; in the second and later
stage, the soul is understood as the form (Rees, 1954). The view of the soul in later stage is more
mature and coherent with the entire Aristotle’s philosophy thus it is chief idea adopted in this thesis.
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notion of soul provides a psychological pilar for Aristotle’s hierarchical view of 
biological nature; the other pillar is animal study.
In summary, some features can be drawn from Aristotle’s view of nature that 
reveal an ambivalence:
Firstly, the feature of prioritising the idea of form over that of matter or the
universal existent over the individual existent in Plato’s philosophy has been reversed 
in Aristotle’s philosophy. Every individual and particular thing, organic or inorganic, 
is in some respects the embodiment of four causes. Aristotle’s view of nature can be 
understood as a materialist pluralism: nature consists of various particular beings
which embody their innate forms or actualise their potentialities.
Secondly, Aristotle’s view of nature includes the features of philosophy ofbeing
and becoming. On the one hand, Aristotle admits the existence of substance. On the
other hand, he recognises the change or motion immanent in every being due to the
process of actualisation of potentiality. None the less, Aristotle’s notion of change
may not be equivalent to Heraclitus’ idea of flux. In my view, the emergent diference 
may be alowed in Heraclitus’s idea of changing while change or motion in Aristotle’s 
view is as a necessity, predetermined by the innate form of every object. His idea of
becoming may be subservient to the idea of being. Therefore, Aristotle’s nature is a 
mechanistic world.
The third point seems in conflict with the second one: nature in Aristotle’s view 
can be understood as an animistic world. The world of nature for both Plato and
Aristotle is a living world: a world characterized by motion with purposefulness.
However, there is nuanced difference. As mentioned, Aristotle may put more stress on
the change or process of movement of nature and the material factor of each
individual existence in nature. Nature from Plato’s perspective could be understood as 
the collection of images which are projected the transcendental mathematical ideas
while for Aristotle, as the collection of various substances in motion according to the
inherent four causes.
The fourth point worth noticing is that Aristotle’s ontological hierarchy of 
nature implies a moral hierarchy. According to this view, nonhuman beings, the beings
which lack reason or the so-called highest soul, are not eligible to have moral rights.
They are by definition to exist for the sake of humankind. This view may have great
100
influence on contemporary environmental ethics.
The last point is related to the method of knowing and learning about nature. In
Plato’s view, reason may be the only reliable means of learning the truth of nature. By
contrast, in Aristotle’s philosophy, sense-perception can be taken as one of the sources
of knowledge. However, the acceptance of sense-perception knowledge by Aristotle
does not alter the priority of knowledge through reason.
4.1.3. The shift from immanent divine telos to transcendent divine telos
The exploration above has displayed the view of nature with immanent divine telos.
According to many authors, the view of nature of the Middle Ages can be
fundamentally regarded as premodern (Collingwood, 1945; Glacken, 1967; Morito,
2002). The ancient animistic and dualistic view was followed by many medieval
church fathers and philosophers.
One significant change might be related to the concept of deity. The concept of
the artisan-deity was replaced by the idea of Christian God. This change, as
mentioned, designates the diference between Plato’s artisan deity, who does not 
create the material he uses, and the Christian divine who uses the matter he creates.
Generally, the premodern view of nature underpins the medieval view of nature.
However, the meaning of nature/deity/humans relationship is somewhat different
between the premodern view and Christianity: yet chiefly the Middle Ages view of
nature is grounded on the premodern view.
For example, one of most important church fathers, St. Augustine, disagreed
about the “literal comparison of God’s creativity with man’s artisanship” (Glacken, 
1967). In his doctrine of two worlds --- the city of god and the city of man --- can be
found the great influence of Plato’s two-world scheme. St. Augustine adapts Plato’s 
view in Timaeus in his writing and points out that the creator is superior to whatever
he has created; moreover, he distinguishes the actual order in nature and human
evaluation of it (Glacken, 1967, p. 198). There is a hierarchy in the actual order in
nature: living beings are ranked higher than non-living beings; sentient beings higher
than non-sentient beings; intelligent beings higher than merely sentient beings
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(Glacken, 1967, pp. 198-199). Here it is to some extent consonant with Aristotle’s 
view although St. Augustine fundamentaly folows Plato’s path.  
After hundreds of years of neglect in the Western world while remaining an
important figure in Arab philosophy, Aristotle regained his respect in the High Middle
Ages (Copleston, 1966a, 19966b). St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the most prominent
philosophers and theologians in the scholastic tradition, accepted and modified
Aristotle’s philosophy. In his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers five ways of proving
the existence of God. The five proofs can be understood as the reformulation of
Aristotle’s theory of four causes and teleological view of nature. In general, Aquinas 
adopts the premodern artisan analogy to prove the existence of god: the more the
richness, variety and multiplicity is observed in nature, the more the perfection of the
creator is approached (Glacken, 1967, p. 230). Yet we have to bear in mind that god as
the supreme is beyond any challenge in the Middle Ages; nature, in the view of
Christian philosophers, is a “handmaiden” of god (Glacken, 1967, p. 218). 
All in all, in spite of the differences between the premodern deity and medieval
god and between the premodern physical world created ex nihilo nihil by the artisan-
deity and medieval world created ex nihilo by god, the medieval view of nature can be
regarded as the heir of the premodern view. The ancient and medieval ideas of
teleology and divinity inherent in nature would be disrupted drastically in the modern
times, which could be understood as the challenge of disenchantment of the Scientific
Revolution. The related points will be fully argued in Chapter 5.
4.2 Nature with Transcendent Divine Telos: Anti-physico-theological
View of Nature
The meaning of the concept of nature in ancient times underwent a change in Early
Modern times: from a concept of nature with immanent divine purpose to that with
transcendent divine purpose. This conceptual transformation results from the
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refutation of physico-theology and the dedivinisation of the idea of nature. Both are
related to the process of “disenchantment” which wil be more fuly discussed in 
Chapter 5. In relation to the refutations of the physico-theological view, Hume and
Kant contribute important ideas.27 Their philosophies of nature in relation to the
notions of mechanism, dualism and teleology of nature are greatly influential (Aiken,
1948; Glacken, 1967). Therefore, Hume’s and Kant’s views are focused on in the
following sections. It will be argued that Hume and Kant, as the representatives of
modern Enlightenment thinkers, refine the mechanistic and dualistic view of nature.
One of their means is the refutation of physico-theology. We may find that their views
change the relationship between deity, nature and humans. On this view, the status of
both deity and humans was elevated while that of nature was lowered.
4.2.1 Hume’s rejection of physico-theological nature
Concerning theology, Hume is tremendously significant as one of the first
philosophers giving rational arguments for religious beliefs, which can be called
“rational” theology or “natural” theology. In Kant’s view, Hume’s atempt is not 
satisfactorily successful thus Hume’s theological approach might be more
appropriately caled “skeptical theology”. This point wil be discussed in the next 
section. However, one important contribution for establishing rational theology that
Hume made is the rejection of the physico-theological view and the related distinction
between the fields of religion and nature. Since Hume, the borderline between natural
science and theology has been clearly drawn. This results in the differentiation of
science education from religion education and enhances the discipline of natural
science as an academic subject because theology and science are taken as separate
disciplinary realms. The religious influence or intervention in science which were
usual in Middle Ages could be lessened. In order to prevent the very possible great
controversy resulting from his book Hume accepted his friends’ advice not to publish 
27 Not all the Enlightenment thinkers object to physico-teleology, such as Leibniz. However, as
mentioned, many authors’ views of nature may be complex and difficult to classify in one particular 
group. In this thesis, the ideas of “enchantment” and “disenchantment”, that imply different atitudes 
towards nature, are taken as the criteria to determine the foci of the discussions.
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the work concerning physico-theology: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
(Fieser, 2006; Glacken, 1967).
This posthumous publication is regarded as “the most important contribution to
the subject of philosophical theology” (Aiken, 1948 p. xi; Glacken, 1967, p.502) and 
actually can be understood as one of the most significant contributions to defy the
teleological view of nature. 28 The fundamental argument of the teleological
philosophy is to make an analogy between the supreme being, or god, or the final
cause and humans because of the sophisticated likeness between nature or universe
and the man-made artefact, e.g. a watch. The previous section has mentioned that the
early modern scientists’ disenchantment includes the replacement of animism by 
mechanism. The process of the replacement is gradually achieved on many levels. Yet
Hume’s work is crucial for his contribution to rational theology, as mentioned. The 
following exploration might help us to consider the diference between Hume’s ideas 
of nature, humans and deity and his antecedents’ and the educational implications. 
Let us first examine how Hume discusses teleology. According to Hume (1948,
p. 37), this argument can be abbreviated as “Like efects prove like causes”. It is 
obvious that this view is very similar to the premodern artisan-analogy. As Hume
states in Cleanthes’ mouth, 
Look around the world, contemplate the whole and every part of it: you
will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an
infinite number of lesser machines…al these various machines, and 
even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an
accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever
contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout
all nature, resembles exactly, thought it much exceeds, the production
28 There are two fundamental views towards Hume’s stance in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
One view thinks that Philo (as Hume) strangely changes his viewpoint in Part XII as an exponent of
teleology. There are more commentators adopt this view, such as James Noxon (1964) and N. Kemp
Smith (1947). The other view defended by, for example, B. M. Laing and M. A. D. Litt (1937) and W
A. Parent (1976), rejects the turn of the stance of Philo (as Hume). In Parent’s view, what Hume
criticises is popular or vulgar religion but not truly pious theism. However, this debate does not
influence the discussion in this thesis. As B. M. Laing and M. A. D. Litt (1937, p.178) point out:
“…whatever Hume himself may have thought, his views, including the discussion in the Dialogues,
lead, when carefully examined, to skeptical results”. What concerns me is how Hume argues against
physico-theology.
104
of human contrivance --- of human design, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led
to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and
that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man,
though possessed of much larger faculties…. By this argument a 
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the
existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.
(Hume, 1948, p. 17)
The paragraph above clearly demonstrates the argumentation of the teleological view
of nature and religion. In summary, Hume’s refutation ofthe teleological view may be
divided into the following six points.
Firstly, Hume (1948) points out, in Philo’s mouth, that the physico-theological
argument is a “weak analogy… liable to error and uncertainty” (p.18) because it is 
inappropriate to make an immediate comparison between the man-made artefact and
universe. Hume states carefuly that, “Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose 
no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular
phenomenon…. And unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest
temerity to expect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that
which before fel under our observation” (Hume, 1948, p. 21). 
The statement reveals the thoughtlessness of the analogical reasoning and is
related to the second point: Hume’s empirical skepticism to the idea of causation. 
Hume argues that the idea of causation is flawed because it is based on a “projective 
eror”. Al the ideas, according to Hume’s epistemology, are derived from
correspondent and resembling impression. However, there is no impression
corresponding to the idea of causation. This lack of correspondence which is the
projective error exists in the idea of causation (Langsam, 1994). The idea of causation
is obviously dubious. Thus it is dubious to assume the existence of an artisan-deity as
the final cause of nature.
Thirdly, there is a fallacy implied in this analogical argument, which is to draw
the conclusion about the whole from parts. As Hume (1948, p. 22) criticises acutely,
the employment of a rule abstracted from any one part to another very remote part is
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an “ilusion” and “partiality”. In other words, the whole is not identical to the totality 
of the parts.
The fourth and also a very interesting point is that, according to Hume (1948, pp.
21-22), animals seem to be more proper origins for discovering the principle of the
whole nature than human contrivance. Yet animals are taken as living machines built
in nature. If the artisan-deity cannot be certainly found in animals, it should not be
found from human artefacts.
This notion is in relation to the fifth point which approves of the uncountable
and inconclusive possibilities of nature and the derivative principles. In this light, the
determination of the final cause as the “one and only telos”is to whittle down rather
than enrich the meanings of nature. As Hume states:
Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses infinite
number of springs and principles which incessantly discover
themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what
new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown
a situation as that of the formation of a universe, we cannot, without
the utmost temerity, pretend to determine. (Hume, 1948, p. 22)
The last point that Hume proposes in Part XI to refute the notion of natural deity is
quite similar to the view of J. S. Mill (1999): there is natural evil that, to human
reason, is neither necessary nor unavoidable. For example, there are natural
circumstances in which people are liable to suffer from illness or pains. Some natural
phenomena such as rain, heat and wind seem to be, on the one hand, necessary for
survival of all, but on the other hand, pernicious when they become defective or
excessive. In Hume’s mind, the so-called first cause is irrelevant to goodness or
malice, thus “the original Source of al things is entirely indiferent to al these 
principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than heat above cold, or to
drought above moisture, or to light above heavy” (Hume, 1948, p. 79). 
The discussions above reveal that Hume problematises physico-theology by
attacking its central argument: the analogical argument. It does not mean that Hume is
an atheist but only shows his intention that understanding or knowledge about nature
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cannot be appropriately used as evidence to prove the existence of god. As he states
that “…intelect and understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity, and that our 
most perfect worship consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude or love;
but in a mysterious self-annihilation or total extinction of al our faculties” (Hume, 
1948, p. 156). The descriptions above show that human faith in religion is not built on
the base of rational understanding. Then, what educational implications can we infer
from this Humean nature from which the immanent deity has been separated? On this
point, what Hume manifests to us might be the attitudes and means of understanding
nature from a rational perspective with the so-called intellectual faculties. It is, on the
one hand, a part of the process of establishing “Science” and a sort of 
“disenchantment”, which wil be focused more deeply in Chapter 5. On the other hand, 
nature is no longer a mysterious and occult kingdom but a big world-machine. This
view seems to inspire optimism about the human ability to know and use nature. We
may find that Hume partook in the sanguine ethos of the Enlightenment in the 18th
century. The Humean critique of natural religion or the natural deity is consonant with
the disenchantment of nature of the modern scientists. The fields of deity and nature
are clearly distinguished. The next section will demonstrate that, like Hume, Kant
makes significant contribution to the dedivinisation of nature.
4.2.2 Kant’s argument against physico-theological nature
On the ground of Hume’s view, Kant refined the refutation of physico-theology.
Kant’s critique of teleology can be divided into two parts: discussions about 
philosophy of inorganic nature and about organic nature. The second point inspires
the conception of nature with non-divine telos, and, more importantly, has many
implications for humanism or strong anthropocentrism. Viewed from an educational
perspective, Kant fosters the autonomy and discipline of natural sciences and the
implied idea of autonomous subjectivity, which, of course, have great impact on the
later philosophy of science, environmental ethics and related educational ideas and
practices. Moreover, Kant’s ideas are important because they provide a connection
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between the discussions of telos of nature and exploration related to the themes of
dis/enchantment and non/anthropocentrism in the following chapters.
In the first place, the Kantian critique of teleology of nature can be further
divided into two parts: the first part is related to Kant’s refutation of physio-theology,
the notion that takes natural deity as the ultimate end or cause of nature; the second
part is related to natural ends.
The approach that Kant (1950) takes to criticise physico-theology is not in total
agreement with Hume’s although they both object to the analogy argument. Kant 
agrees with Hume on the criticism of the analogical argument of divine designer or
natural deity; while he disagrees with Hume’s view and attitude towards natural
teleology. Kant agrees with Hume that it is not possible to know the supreme being
through analogy between nature and the artefact but on different grounds. According
to Kant, Hume mistakes the crux of physico-theology as “objective
anthropomorphism” and atacks this wrong target. Kant claims the problem of the 
physico-theology that should be criticised is “symbolic anthropomorphism” (1950, pp. 
104-107).
 “Objective anthropomorphism” means making substantial claims about the 
nature of the deity (Kant, 1950, p. 107). It is questionable because it gives concrete
description of properties of deity, such as benevolence and intelligence; actually, these
properties are all beyond human experience. On this point Hume and Kant are
consonant with each other. Hume argues “…since no question of fact can be proved 
otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not only of proof from
any other medium” (Hume, 1948, p. 47). A similar view can be found in Kant’s works: 
“For our understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of the connection of given
intuitions in one experience. Experience must therefore contain all the objects for our
concepts: but beyond it no concepts have any significance, as there is no intuition that
might offer them a foundation” (Kant, 1950, p 64). It is obvious that they both admit 
that human knowledge can only be accessed in the field of experience, including
knowledge about the natural deity. They both hold the view that the analogical
argument makes an inappropriate comparison between nature and the man-made
machine, between the divine artisan and the craftsman.
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None the less, in Kant’s mind, in order to circumvent this improper analogy, 
Hume substitutes skepticism for dogmatic anthropomorphism. The predicament of
dogmatism or skepticism could be avoided if the “objective anthropomorphism” could 
be replaced by a “symbolic anthropomorphism”, which “concerns language only and 
not the object itself” (Kant, 1950, pp. 105-106). For Kant, the deity is unknowable for
the deity is part of the noumenal world, but it does not mean that theism has to be
refused (Logan, 1998; McPherson, 1957). As Kant states, “Natural theology is such a 
concept at the boundary of human reason, being constrained to look beyond this
boundary to the Idea of a Supreme Being (and, for practical purposes, to that of an
inteligible world also),… it makes use of the reference of the world of sense to an 
independent reason as the cause of al its connections” (Kant, 1950, p. 109-110).
Moreover, Kant in the later work Critique of Judgment (1914, 1952) points out that
“physico-theology is the endeavour of reason to infer the supreme cause of nature and
its properties from the purposes of nature (which can only be empiricaly known)… 
Now I say that Physico-theology, however far it may be pursued, can disclose to us
nothing of a final purpose of creation; for it does not even extend to the question as to
this…the purposive reference therein is and must be always considered only as 
conditioned in nature…” (Kant, 1914). The natural deity can only be “thought” 
through the symbolic analogy but cannot be “known” through substantial analogy. 
Overall, the above discussions show that Kant agrees with Hume on the
disenchantment of nature while disagrees on the theistic commitment. Kantian
critique of the analogy argument is more abstract than Hume’s.
Kant’s and Hume’s critiques of physico-theology suggest a very important point
for natural philosophy and education: the concepts of nature or supernatural deity and
the implied telos are the results of human conceptualisation as well as the substance
for learning. The standpoint which Hume takes is even more radical than that of Kant.
Hume’s incredulity towards the supernatural is not only epistemological but also 
metaphysical; while Kant makes a more rigorous but less radical differentiation
between the fields of nature and of god, between religion and science, between
theology and epistemology, to prevent the danger of skepticism, nihilism and atheism.
However, their incredulity towards human knowledge of nature makes prominent the
role of subjectivity: any knowledge must be learned by means of conceptualisation
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which is an outcome of dealing with experience. In the view of Hume and Kant,
human beings cannot directly know or experience things per se. Things can be only
known through their appearances but not themselves. Viewed in this light, nature
itself cannot be known directly but through our conceptualisation. The subject as a
pivot for learning and knowing therefore turns inevitably important. It can be inferred
from this point that the subject plays an irreplaceable and important role in
constructing knowledge of nature. This point may be in tune with the humanism or
anthropocentrism which will be explored in the next two chapters.
Now, let us examine Kant’s view of teleology of and its relationship with 
organic nature. The following discussion will demonstrate the features of humanism
or strong anthropocentrism and a hierarchical view of beings. From Kant’s 
perspective, there are essential differences between living beings (or organisms) and
non-living (or non-organism) beings, and human beings and non-human beings.
Among all living-beings, human beings hold the primacy because they are the
ultimate end for the other beings in nature. The nonhuman living beings exist for the
ultimate sake of being humans, serving humans, directly or indirectly. These features
are still influential in our current ethical thinking and the related educational ideas and
practices.
The most significant points about organic nature and its purpose made by Kant
are in The Critique of Judgement (1952, 2000). In the second part The Critique of
Teleological Judgement, he proposes two maxims related to the understanding of
organic nature, which are as follows:
The first maxim of such reflection is the thesis: All production of
material things and their forms must be estimated as possible on mere
mechanical laws. (Kant, 1952, § 70, p. 563)
The second maxim is the antithesis: Some products of material nature
cannot be estimated as possible on mere mechanical laws (that is, for
estimating them quite a different law of causality is required, namely,
that of final causes). (Kant, 1952, § 70, p. 563).
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A conflict between the two maxims can be obviously found in Kant’s description 
thereby he calls the relationship between these two maxims as antinomy. For Kant
both mechanical principles and causal laws can be used to provide proper explanation
for inorganic or physical nature but not for the organic nature consisting of living and
growing things. Mechanism may be used to provide an explanation to some extent for
the organic nature because there is a material part in organism. However, the
understanding of organic nature consists in mechanism as well as teleology.
However, this “opposition” is not incompatible. In Kant’s (1952) view, organic 
nature, consisting of the so-called organised beings such as plants and animals, cannot
be analogised as a machine and cannot be explained mechanicaly. In Kant’s view, the
purposiveness is embodied in organism’s self-organising power, which distinguishes
organisms from inorganic nature. This difference between organism and non-
organisms will be given more comprehensive interpretation from the view of
evolutionary biology. However, without knowledge about Darwinian biology, Kant
stil has very inspiring and interesting thoughts on this aspect: “An organised being is, 
therefore, not a mere machine. For a machine has solely motive power, whereas an
organised being possesses inherent formative power…This, therefore, is a self-
propagating formative power, which cannot be explained by the capacity of
movement alone, that is to say, by mechanism” (Kant, 1952, § 65, p. 557). Two 
conditions can be found in Kant’s work to diferentiate organic nature from inorganic
nature, or the beings of biology from the objects of physics:
(1) a thing exists as a physical end if it is (though in a double sense)
both cause and effect of itself. (Kant, 1952, § 64, p. 555)
(2) an organised natural product is one in which every part is
reciprocally both end and means. (Kant, 1952, § 66, p. 558)
The two conditions above make organic beings different from inorganic things. The
difference marks out the natural end of organism or the organic natural end or
physical end (Kant, § 65, p.557). A physical thing such as a work of art can only meet
Condition (1). An organism meets both Conditions (1) and (2). For example, a plant
or an animal can reproduce a new plant or animal of the same species. In this sense,
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this plant or the animal is the cause and the effect of itself. Moreover, any part of the
plant or the animal can neither live nor be understood when it is separated from the
whole organism. As Kant states, “the preservation of one part is reciprocaly 
dependent on the preservation of the other parts” (Kant, 1952, § 64, p. 556). Al the 
parts and the whole of the organism are mutualy dependent. Kant’s distinction 
between living and non-living beings or organic and inorganic nature can be
understood from two perspectives: the ontological and the epistemological.
Ontologically, the end or purposiveness of organisms is different from that of
inorganic nature. Kant responds to Bluemenbach’s theory of epigensis: “to suppose 
that crude matter, obeying mechanical laws, was originally its own architect, that life
could have sprung up from the nature of what is void of life, and matter have
spontaneously adopted the form of a self-maintaining finality, he justly declares to be
contrary to reason” (Kant, 1952, § 81,p. 582). On this ground, Kant reveals the
hypothesis generation univoca29 in nature that argues for “the generation of something 
organic from something else that is also organic…” (Kant, 1952, § 80, p. 580n). This 
ontological difference is related to an epistemological difference.
Epistemologically, inorganic nature can be studied and made known by natural
science, which is based on mechanical causal laws. However, mechanical causal laws
can only provide incomplete explanation of the material part of the organic nature.
The immaterial part requires a teleological explanation. Here lies the possibility of
conciliation between the two maxims. This view may suggest that Kant approves of
physico-theology which posits the deity as the natural (or supernatural) end but here
his doctrine becomes self-refuting. Kant does not argue for physico-theology. Rather,
Kant attempts to explain the self-organisation of the organic nature rationally without
ascribing to supernatural power. However, the ultimate reason of self-organisation or
self-generating remains an enigma: how and for what reason does the inert and crude
matter turn into self-organising organisms? For Kant this might be the gap that cannot
be explained through natural science. Biology as a natural science can only describe
29 There are three other hypotheses: the first is the opposite notion of generatio univoca --- generation
aequivoca, meaning “the generation of an organised being from crude inorganic matter”; the second
and the third are related to generatio univivoca. They are the generatio homonyma and generatio
heteronyma. The former one means that the organism can only be produced by its like kind. The latter
one means that the organism can be produced by the organism in different forms of organisation.
According to Kant, this situation is not within the range of our human experience. (Kant, 1952, § 80, p.
580n)
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phenomena of organisms and find rational principles within the phenomenal world of
organic nature but not the reason of the emergence of life. In order to solve this
difficulty, Kant presents the idea of natural end which involves complex and
intertwining meanings. However, his idea of organic natural end may be unpicked on
two levels: the individual and the species.
The organism grows, develops, self-maintains, self-organises and self-preserves
according to its intrinsic end (Ginsborg, 2004, 2005; Quarfood, 2006). In this sense,
the organism is its own natural end. There is an obvious consonance between Kant’s 
view and Aristotle’s. 
On the species level, a natural end exists in the relationships of different species
of organisms. For example, the end of the fertility of soil is as the means to enable the
plants to spread; the end of the vegetable kingdom is to provide sustenance for the
herbivora; for the herbivora, their purpose to exist is for the sustenance of the
carnivora. And human beings30 are the “ultimate end of creation here upon earth” 
because they are “the one and only being upon it that is able to form a conception of 
ends and, from an aggregate of things purposively fashioned, to construct by the aid
of [their] reason a system of ends” (Kant, 1952, § 82, p. 583). Al in al, there is a 
dependent relationship within nature (including inorganic and organic nature)
embracing the mineral, vegetable, animal and human worlds. Moreover, the terms of
dependence can be reversed: the end of the existence of the herbivorous animals is to
prove the growth of the vegetable kingdom; the purpose of the carnivora is to prevent
the voracity of the herbivora; finally, the end of human existence is to ensure the
establishment of the equilibrium of nature “by pursuing [the carnivora] and reducing 
their numbers” (Kant, 1952, §82, p.583). This view seems to suggest that human 
beings could be taken as a means rather than as an end.
However, the point that human beings can be taken as a means is not truly what
Kant aims to mean. Actualy, what Kant atempts to highlight is the “immutable” 
priority of human status in the process of cognition of nature. We may not forget that
one of Kant’s categorical imperatives as wel as his great philosophical achievement
30 In the original text, the subject Kant wrote is“man”. The term“man”used in this description is liable
to result in biases and debates. Many feminists and ecofeminists have made a lot of critiques of Kant
view; however, whether Kant’s view is gender-biased or not is not the focus of this thesis, thus the
author replaces man with human beings.
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is that humanity can only be treated as an end in itself and never as a means. Here in
Kant’s view teleological judgement, aiming to deal with natural ends, “contains a 
principle introduced by judgement completely a priori as the basis of its reflection
upon nature” (Kant, 1952, § Introduction VII, p. 473). Overal, the teleological 
exploration of nature is a part of human cognitive faculties, thus any judgement about
natural ends inevitably assumes the laws a priori of human understanding and reason
(Butts, 1990; Ginsborg, 2005; Kant, 1952, § Introduction IX, p.475). Here we may
find in the doctrines of Kant the supremacy of human rationality which is one of the
features of Enlightenment modern thought and influential on present education. This
point is in tune with the previous discussion of the in organic nature.
It is interesting to find that Kant’s view of organic nature on the species level 
implies the traces of contemporary notions of ecological thinking and, perhaps
ironically, anthropocentric thought. Kant reveals the interrelationship between all
species of organism within nature. None the less, human beings, as cognitive subjects,
are prior to the other beings in the world. As Ginsborg (2005) points out: “our 
entitlement to ascribe objective purposiveness to natural beings, in particular to
organisms, derives from our more fundamental entitlement to regard nature as
(subjectively) purposive for our cognitive faculties”. Overal, if Kant’s view of nature 
can be understood as implying certain traces of ecological thinking, it can only be
recognised on the ground of anthropocentrism, which in turn assumes epistemological
dualism.
In sum, Kantian nature is rationalised and dedivinisied, or in another words,
disenchanted, as will be explored in Chapter 5. Nature can be known from Kant’s 
perspective by numerous ways: “…in respect of nature’s merely empirical laws, we 
must think in nature a possibility of an endless multiplicity of empirical laws, which
yet are contingent so far as our insight goes…” (Kant, 1952, § Introduction V, p. 468);
what is more: “Understanding, by the possibility of its supplying a priori laws for
nature, furnishes a proof of the fact that nature is recognised by us only as
phenomenon, and in so doing points to its having a supersensible substrate; but this
substrate it leaves quite undetermined” (Kant, 1952, § Introduction IX, p. 475). This 
reveals that nature, as a phenomenal world, is not known as a whole, all at once. It
manifests itself as we examine it through sciences piece by piece. Kant’s view 
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suggests numerous and meaningful possibilities to learn natural science. Yet the
limitation is: only the empirical scientific methods consisting of observation,
quantification, measurement, calculation and experimentation can achieve the
learning of (natural) science.
What is noticeable is that Hume and Kant’s refutation of teleological-theology
separates the fields of natural studies and of deity, or natural sciences from religion.
Due to the separation, the status of God is not diminished, rather, his authority as
creator is still firmly believed to exist beyond this mechanical nature. The rejection of
physico-theology reveals that there is no immanent purpose internal in nature but a
supernatural final cause as end --- God. We may find that there are different meanings
of the concept of telos. At least, two meanings can be found here: the immanent
purpose or purposiveness of an entity and the transcendent purpose as a final end
moving the entity towards an end. However, the complexity and plurality of the
meaning of “telos” gradualy acquired more and morenotice after the advent of new
sciences, especially biology.
4.3 Nature with Immanent Non-divine Telos
It can be shown from the above that the Humean and Kantian views epitomise the
dedivinised and disenchanted concept of modern thinkers. They demystify and
mechanise nature by refusing physico-theology and separating the field of deity from
that of nature. On the one hand, the concept of purpose immanent in nature is denied;
on the other, the belief in the creator as the final and transcendent cause of nature is
maintained. However, the opposition to the idea of teleological nature of the period
from the Scientific Revolution to the end of the 19th century was even called by the
biologist K. E. von Baer “teleophobia” (Alen, 1952). Yet living nature is also taken 
as a proof of the existence and wisdom of God as the final end. Interestingly, the
concepts of purpose implied in nature and a transcendent creator as final end have
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more recently been seriously challenged by the development of new sciences such as
evolutionary biology and physics.
Evolutionary biology, consisting of important concepts including natural
selection, struggle for existence, competition, adaption and chance (Mayr, 2001), on
the one hand, brings about significant challenge to the idea of God-Creator as the final
end of nature; on the other, it inspires the reconsideration and re-conceptualisation of
the non-divine purpose of nature.
In the first place, evolutionary biology is incompatible with creationism.
Evolutionary biology can be briefly introduced as follows. First, nature as it appears is
no creation by any supernatural deity but the result of evolution over time. Secondly,
“evolution” denotes the changeof the species over time by the processes of natural
selection, mutation and variation. Thirdly, the processes of natural selection, mutation
and variation do not occur by any predetermined end but by chance. In other words,
nature is the result of random changes (Mayr, 1992, 2001). Inferred from the above
are the denial of existence of the supernatural creator and the claim of common origin
of al forms of life. To Darwin’s contemporaries, this conclusion is quite unpalatable 
because it suggests that human beings’ ancestors had been apes (Mayr, 2001). 
However, this point has already been accepted by modern people and may be greatly
helpful for conceiving a “non-anthropocentric” approach to environmental philosophy 
since it manifests an intimate relation between human beings and nonhuman beings.
This point will be discussed in Chapter 6. What interests us this point is that the belief
in God-creator as a final end of nature has been discredited because of evolutionary
theory.
In the second place, interestingly, a conception of secular teleology is affirmed
because of the same reason --- evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology, revealing
a certain order and direction of the development of organic nature, has earned a lot of
philosophers’ atention to re-examine and reconsider its implications for teleology
since the 20th century. The process of evolution of living nature, consisting of many
highly diverse processes, seems to be an end-directed movement. The end-directed
characteristic is explained by the conception of natural selection.
The conception of natural selection is acknowledged as one of the most
important notions in Darwinian biology (Ayala, 1970; Mayr, 1992, 1999, 2001).
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Basically, it is a mechanism of differential reproduction comprising multiple
processes including “differential survival, diferential mating success, and diferential 
fecundity” (Ayala, 1970, p. 4). The zoologist and philosopher of biology E. Mayr 
classifies the multiple processes of natural selection as related to two themes: (1) the
acquisition and maintenance of adaptedness of each kind of organism to its
environment (niche); (2) the origin and further evolution of the multitude of species
and higher taxa of organisms (1999, p. 372). The tendencies of perfection, variation,
differentiation, specification, reproduction and diversification can be found in the
organisms surviving the mechanism. Overall, the processes of biological evolution
and natural selection appear to be an activity toward a certain goal or end. This
understanding seems to suggest that evolutionary biology is a certain kind of
determinism since there is a goal or end directing the growth and evolving of
organisms. However, if evolutionary biology is examined carefully this
misunderstanding can be avoided.
There are three interrelated factors implied in the process of natural selection:
mutation, adaptation and environment. Research shows that adaptations of living
organisms are varied responses to environmental challenges; organisms responding
with appropriate adaptations survive or extinct. However, the “appropriate” 
adaptations occur in a “haphazard” fashion, “not compatible with a preordained plan” 
(Ayala, 1970). Evolution seems to lead to “improvement” or “progress”; natural 
selection appears to be an optimisation process. The process of natural selection leads
to the optimisation of the whole species and individual organism, every part
specialises to have the optimal function. The general definition of natural selection as
“the adapted and fitest survives” is tenable on the level of the whole species or
individual. None the less, Mayr (1992) points out that natural selection has no definite
and long-range goal and is a post hoc decision: “Adaptedness thus is an posterior 
result rather than an a priori goal-seeking” (Mayr, 1992, p. 131). Natural selection is 
the achievement of the process of chance variations.
Natural selection manifests end-directed optimisation of the evolutionary
process and brings critiques on the concept of telos of nature. Traditional teleology
uses the term telos as incorporating the meanings of “goal”, “end” and “purpose”. 
Evolutionary biology is helpful to make explicit the difference between them: a goal
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refers to a definite target which is anticipated when the process is undertaken; while
an end simply denotes to the termination of a process (Mayr, 1992). “Purpose” is used 
to refer to the feature of purposive behaviour towards a particular end or goal. The
definition of the term purposefulness given by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow
(1943) can be taken as a referential point; it is used to denote “the act or behaviour 
may be interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal --- i.e., to a final condition in
which the behaving object reaches a definite correlation in time or in space with
respect to another object or event” (1943, p. 18).31
Following this distinction, the concept of telos implied in organic nature may be
understood as an end rather than a goal. The understanding that evolutionary process
of organisms will attain a certain end-state or endpoint is actually acquired in human
retrospect. The telos as end is a post hoc conclusion of evolution. Furthermore, the
mechanism of natural selection appears to mark the features of telos of organic nature
and the growth and development of organisms, regulating by DNA, shows a tendency
of “programming” which can be analogised to the idea of divine design in the 
traditional teleology. The features of end-directedness and the tendency of
optimisation suggest a biological teleology.
However, this biological teleology is different from traditional teleology. Some
authors, such as Pierce (Mayr, 1992), suggest to draw out new terms to refer to this
biological teleology. Accordingly, different terms are provided to describe the varied
teleology.32 Many authors accept the term “teleonomy”, which was introduced in 
biology by C. S. Pittendrigh in 1958, to designate the developmental and end-directed
31 The definition of purposefulness given by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow can be suitable for
inanimate and animate objects. However, there are a lot of debates on this definition. See R. Taylor
(1950) Comments on a mechanistic conception of purposefulness. Philosophy of Science 17(4), pp.
310-317. I. Scheffler (1959) Thoughts on teleology. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
9(36), pp. 265-284. In this thesis, the definition of purposefulness by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow,
in my opinion, can be accepted partly but not completely. In my view, this definition is only suitable
for animate beings, viz. organism.
32 For example, Ayala (1970) points out that there are two classes of teleology in reference to the
agency giving origin to the teleological mechanism: internal and external teleology. On the one hand,
internal teleology means “the end-directedness of living organisms and their features”; furthermore, 
internal teleological systems can be used to explain natural selection. On the other, external teleology
denotes the end-directedness of the man-made tools, and external teleological mechanisms are
“products of human mind…the results of purposeful activity” (Ayala, 1970, p. 11). However, this 
interpretation, in my opinion, does not solve the confusion caused by the term telos in the field of
biology. It seems to identify telos as the first cause or the first mover which can be found in organisms
but does not exist in non-living beings.
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process of organisms (De Laguna, 1962; Mayr, 1992, 1999, 2001). Pittendrigh (1958,
p.394) states,
The biologist’s long-standing confusion would be more fully removed
if all end-directed systems were described by some other term, like
“teleonomic”, in order to emphasise that the recognition and 
description of end-directedness does not carry a commitment to
Aristotelean teleology as an efficient causal principle.
The above description sheds light on the difference between the concept of
teleomonic telos and that of teleological telos. Yet Pittendrigh does not give a clear
definition of teleonomy. On this ground, Mayr (1992, p. 127) refines the definition of
teleonomy as follows:
All teleonomic behaviour is characterised by two components. It is
guided by a “programme” and it depends on the existence of some end 
point, goal, or terminus which is foreseen in the programme which
regulates the behaviour. This end point may be a structure (in
development), a physio-logical function, the attainment of a
geographical position (in migration), or a “consummatory act” in 
behaviour. Each particular programme is the result of natural
selection, constantly adjusted by the selective value of the achieved end
point.
The neologism “teleonomy” might be a term which is not widely known. Overal, 
what is significant is that revolutionary biology reveals that teleology might be
understood in a way that could bring multiple interpretations and fertile meanings.
This evolutionary biological teleology (or teleonomy) manifests a living nature in
development, evolution and process. This concept of telos in biology is not
preordained goal determined by any transcendent deity but immanently embodied in
every organism. Moreover, the telos is not a fixed but a changeable “programme”. It 
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is not only a result of evolution but also a result in process because the process of
evolution is undertaking throughout.
4.4 Summary
We have found many different and complex meanings of the concept of telos and the
related views of nature. In reference to a physico-theological view of nature, it is
understood as a divine purpose which implies the meanings of preordained goal and
end point. This telos is immanent in and inseparable from nature. Within a
mechanistic view of nature, the concept of telos is used to refer to a transcendent deity
as well as a creator of nature whereby nature is separated from and regulated by the
external divine telos. In reference to evolutionary biology, the concept of telos returns
back to nature; it is taken as an immanent part of organisms.
In relation to different approaches to the concept of telos, three kinds of
conception of nature can be found. Which one could be more educationally
meaningful? Is it nature with or without divine telos, or with non-divine telos? What
difference will it make when different views of nature are taught in relation to
different concepts of telos? The educational implications might be understood from
two perspectives: the relationships between deity, nature and humans, and
metaphysics.
On the understanding of the relationships between deity, nature and humans, the
three views are profoundly different from each other. The differences interestingly
manifest changes of deity/nature/human relationships. The animistic view of nature
with immanent divine telos assumes the equivalence of nature and deity (although as
mentioned, Aristotle’s view of nature is ambivalent). From the perspective of the 
proponents of nature with immanent divine telos, nature which is taken as
embodiment of deity is the object for human beings to worship. We may find that an
animistic view of nature is relatively not as influential as a mechanistic view in
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current curricula. For most educators in modern times, it seems anti-intellectual to a
certain extent to teach pupils that there is divine purpose within nature.
The authors who argue for the perspective of nature with transcendent divine
telos such as Hume and Kant, on the one hand, attempt to ascertain the understanding
of natural phenomena through modern scientific (or Newtonian) explanation and, on
the other hand, keep their faith in God. Yet the faith in supernatural deity seems
contradictory to scientific knowledge. The separation of the fields of religion and
natural science could be one means to solve the contradiction between the
supernatural and the natural. Following this, nature is taken as the object created by
God for human use. The telos of nature is human beings. Nature is created for the
sake of human beings and thus should be under human mastery. As historian Lynn
White, Jr. (1967) points out that, according to Genesis, God creates human beings and
the other living and non-living beings. However, what is significant is that human
beings are made in God’s image; moreover, human beings name al the animals and 
thereby establish their dominance over them (White, 1967, p. 1205). White’s view is 
acknowledged to reveal the Judeo-Christian underpinning of anthropocentric thought.
The anthropocentric view will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6. We can find the
mutual relationships between the view of nature with transcendent telos, theism and
anthropocentrism.
As for the view of nature with immanent non-divine telos, the deity is
suspended. Human beings are taken as part of nature as they are results of evolution
as well as the other organisms in nature. In this sense, this view may provide a ground
for us to conceive a relatively egalitarian relationship between human beings and non-
human beings. From the perspective of biological evolution, human beings are not
necessarily supreme to the other living beings because theology no longer legimitises
human mastery over nature. The “relatively egalitarian” view, which is related to the 
non-anthropocentric view, will be given more space in Chapter 6. Overall, the
different conceptions of telos of nature offer us different orientations of the
human/nature relationship. It can be helpful for human beings to re-examine and
reconsider appropriately that human beings relate themselves to, locate themselves
within and treat nature. This point implies a request for a deliberative re-evaluation
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and ethical thinking in relation to nature and environment, which will be more fully
argued in Chapter 6.
On the metaphysical level, the views of nature with divine telos, transcendent or
immanent, can be found to be in more close relation to the philosophy of being than
philosophy of becoming. The view of nature with divine telos assumes a world
regulated by a fixed end (or goal) or ends (or goals). The view with immanent non-
divine telos, in my view, is more related to the philosophy of becoming. This
conception of immanent non-divine telos can be understood as a certain programme.
In my understanding, the three views of nature could be at the same risk of falling into
the trap of determinism although the former two may be more bounded than the last
one. The reason is as follows.
In the views of nature with divine telos, whether be it immanent or transcendent,
the idea of telos is a preordained plan for the subject to follow. The divine telos in
some sense sets limits to all beings in nature and regulates their activities and
development. For proponents, the divine deity itself might not be understood fully but
the beings and the world created by the deity can be known if proper means of
knowledge can be discovered, followed and educated for. However, there is optimism
about mastering nature after the Scientific Revolution. This point, which is related to
the theme of disenchantment and anthropocentrism, will be given more space in
Chapters 5 and 6. Here what needs highlighting is that the view of nature with divine
telos may assume determinism, which assumes that what happens has to happen
because any being, thing, event or action is the result of antecedent conditions or
causes, and from a given condition or cause the particular consequence must follow
(Mardiros, 1936). However, the ultimate and final cause or condition is the divine
telos.
For educators, there is a danger implied in the deterministic view because
determinism is liable to lead to fatalism33 that everything and everyone is predestined
already and the aim of education, in this view, is to transmit the truth in accordance
with the divine telos. Determinism can be defined as that all that happen have to
happen and all that people do have to be done because they are for the sake of the
33 Or, we may say that extreme determinism is fatalism. However, there is no borderline between
“moderate” and “extreme” determinism. In addition, the atempt to separate them may go beyond the
scope of this thesis. Here I use the term determinism in a more strict sense.
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final telos (Mardiros, 1936). This view suggests the ideas of necessity and fate as the
means and content of education. From this perspective, the cause and the end of
human beings or non-human beings, nature or human nature, are all predetermined.
Determinism in some sense seems to deprive human beings of their most precious
possession, their self-determining personalities, viz., their individual freedom.
Determinism is basically incompatible with ideas of free action, choice and
responsibility, both on individual and social levels and therefore, a deterministic
orientation of education might disregard learning about these ideas or even dismiss
them from curriculum.
As for the perspective of telos which is non-divine and immanent in nature, the
term “programme” denotes a plan which has existed prior to the initiation of the
activity of development. Mayr (1992, pp. 127-128) defines a “programme” as “coded 
or prearranged information that controls a process (or behaviour) leading it towards a
goal”. In some sense, this perspective seems to suggest the restriction and regulation
of the development of the individual on biological-physiological grounds. In some
respects, it leads to the biological determinism which seems impossible for human
beings to extricate from because the restrictions are physical and corporeal. Biological
determinism under the crown of modern natural science is even more influential and
persuasive than metaphysical determinism about the explanation of social life in the
modern times. Many thinkers, such as Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile
Durkheim, develop social evolutionism incorporating the ideas of natural selection
and evolutionary mechanism. For them, the task of education is to shape citizens to
comply with the inevitably pre-determined history, to maintain social order, roles, and
cohesion. However, this view shows strong deterministic sense and seems easily to
fall into the same trap of metaphysical or religious determinism. Moreover, this view
of nature with non-divine telos seems to be in opposition rather than accord with
philosophy of becoming.
It can be granted that the biological view might embrace determinism because
there are natural, biological and physiological limitations of individual growth and
development. Taking a microscopic view, individual growth and development is
controlled to a large extent by the natural programme, for instance, DNA. Yet the way
DNA that regulates human growth development is not as precise and rigorous as the
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software that controls the operation of hardware. There are always mutations and
exceptions in the physical, mental and environmental realms. This biological
limitation should not be reified as transcendental essence. Moreover, the process of
natural selection is unpredictable; it is a process full of opportunities, chance,
accidents and changes. Taking a macroscopic view, the telos as “programme” 
immanent in organisms is a result of evolution and still under evolution. It is not an
absolute, divine, and unchallengeable essence. As mentioned, there are chances of
mutation and adaptation during the process of evolution. Thus, the non-divine telos as
programme is still itself the process of changing, and becoming.
I conclude that an evolutionary view of nature with non-divine telos could be
more educationally meaningful and helpful than a view of nature with divine telos in
three respects: 1) It might remind educators and pupils of the unpredictability,
vastness and wonders in nature. This might help to overcome our human hubris in
relation to nature and develop a healthier, less arrogant attitude towards nature. 2) It
holds potential for educators and pupils to learn about freedom. In addition, although
both views share the similar possibility of falling into the trap of a deterministic
approach to education, the view of an open-ended, biological telos contains more
possibilities of change and alteration so that it may open the space of freedom for
individuals. 3) It implies the idea of embodiment to overcome the predicament of
disembodiment in our present curriculum. Moreover, human beings, as one
achievement of natural evolution, embody the “programme” or “telos” physicaly. In 
this sense, rationality is also one outcome of natural evolution rather than a gift from
any transcendental deity; human beings are thus corporeal beings integrating with
mind and body rather than beings with “souls”. This point invites us to ponder upon 
the meanings of embodied experience: our educational tradition and curriculum tend
to emphasise the intellectual faculties and related subjects, such as mathematics; by
contrast, physical education and embodied, emotional experiences are relatively
undervalued. The biological view of nature may give us potential to improve this
narrowness of focus in education and the implications related to the meanings of
rational humanism and embodiment will be explored more fully in the following
chapters.
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Finally, after explaining the differences which could be brought to enrich
education by various concepts of nature with a different telos, we can turn back to the
questions anchoring our exploration and to evaluate the benefits and hindrance that
different concepts of nature with different concepts of telos might bring to education.
What kind of concept of telos which nature implies could be most educationally
meaningful? Among these concepts of nature, I suggest, the one which can carry the
most copious possibilities and inspirations is the view of nature with non-divine and
immanent telos, which is biologically and dynamically constructed and embodied.
The concept of nature with a non-divine immanent telos implies freedom and activity
rather than determination and passivity of every individual. It is thus educationally




If we prefer the concept of nature as becoming to that of being, nature with non-divine
telos rather than one with divine telos, should we regard nature as enchanted or
disenchanted? Which view is more helpful for conceiving educational ideas and
practices? Which view would prove most helpful for extricating our current curricula
from over-simplifications? The aim of this chapter is to investigate disenchanted and
enchanted views of nature and their educational implications. It will demonstrate that
a disenchanted view is overemphasised and an enchanted view is undervalued in
mainstream educational discourses; thus one of the ways to improve the unbalanced
situation in education is to pay more attention to the enchanted view.
The concepts of “enchantment” and “disenchantment”are best understood
through their interrelationship. These two concepts have had varying interpretations.
A typical and widely accepted definition is given by Max Weber. According to Weber
(1948, p.155), “disenchantment” is defined as “rationalisation and intelectualisation”. 
Folowing this line, the concept of “enchantment” is often related to “premodern 
thoughts” and “disenchantment” with “modernity”. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
process of turning ancient animistic views of nature into modern mechanistic views
consists in the rejection of ancient ideologies of physico-theology and animism.
Refutation of physico-theology has already been discussed in Chapter 4; while the
rejection of animism which will be explicated in this chapter is the process of
disenchantment.
Some discourses related to the issue of environment or nature tend to make a
contrast between the premodern animistic view of nature and the modern
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disenchanted worldview (Beck, 1995). Yet this contrast conceals as much as it reveals
because it seems to suggest that the premodern view of nature is exclusively animistic
and the modern view of nature absolutely dedivinised. I disagree with a polarisation
of views merely according to a timeline. We will find that the enchanted and animistic
view is not exclusive in premodern times; a similar hue can be found in Romantics’ 
works of nature in the 19th century, for example, in Wordsworth’s poetry. 
First of al, the meaning of “disenchantment” is revealed by exploring the 
scientific and mechanistic view of nature. The mechanistic and scientific view of
nature can be taken as a great achievement of the Scientific Revolution. It reveals the
characteristic of the modern view as an attempt to find the truest, the most
standardised and unitary view of nature. For the disenchanted thinkers including the
early modern scientists and Enlightenment thinkers, scientific methods are the tools to
help to find the only one truth of nature, as the means to provide validity of the
standardised view and establish an autonomous discipline of “Science” providing the 
criteria of scientific knowledge. It will be argued that the aim of the disenchantment is
to establish “Science” by a series of activities including mathematisation, 
dedivinisation, rationalisation, and intellectualisation of nature. The exploration will
uncover the proximity of the idea of disenchantment with philosophy of being on the
metaphysical level and with some pitfalls of our present curricula.
Next, the meaning of “enchantment” is going to be explored by discussing the
Romantic view. It will reveal that Romantics, in particular, Rousseau and Wordsworth,
call for an intimate and agreeable relationship between human beings and nature by
appealing to mutual and reciprocal relationships between nature as a whole and
human nature.
This thesis offers a definition of the concept of enchantment of nature as the
emotional experience of appreciating the wonders and marvels of a still largely
unintelligible nature, whereas the concept of disenchantment of nature is defined as
the emotionless experience of intelligible, demystified and dedivinised nature. The
definitions are rough because there are two inextricable factors involved: a subjective
factor related to human responses and attitudes towards nature and an objective factor
related to nature itself. Both factors are interrelated and inseparable. When a concept
of disenchanted nature is under consideration, the concept must imply two things: an
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idea of disenchanted nature as an object of thought and subjective attitudes such as
indifference or impartial, non-personal dispassionateness. This disenchanted nature,
can or wil be completely, in Weber’s terms, rationalised and intelectualised (Weber, 
1948). Likewise, when we ponder on a concept of enchanted nature, we refers to
nature which has not been fully rationalised and intellectualised and is treated with
feelings, regard, or esteem. Yet the subjective and objective factors may be mutually
and paradoxically fortified; neither one is cause or effect. In my view, underpinning
the conceptions of disenchantment or enchantment lies a will, a wish or a hope. It is
because we wish to treat nature indifferently, we aim to disenchant it, and vice versa.
In like manner, it is due to our hope to care for nature, we would like to enchant it,
and vice versa. Overall, there is no disenchanted nature or enchanted nature per se,
but rather the conception of nature apprehended through our “disenchanted” or 
“enchanted” perspective. “Disenchantment” and “enchantment” are not only 
perspectives that we take, but also active, creative processes whereby we
conceptualise nature.
Moreover, these two attitudes may not be an either/or option for learners. For
example, scientists may have feelings of wonder and surprise about nature. As Ilya
Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 1985) says, the inaccessibility of knowledge of
nature can be understood in poetic terms, such as Tagore’s poetry. The problem is that
such feelings towards nature are not taken as main foci in mainstream education about
natural science. The above discussion of curriculum shows that current science
education, implicitly or explicitly, overemphasises the importance of rational
indifferent attitudes and underestimates affectivity in the process of learning about
natural science.
Then, the question “Is the enchanted or disenchanted perspective more helpful
for conceiving educational ideas and practices?” implies the folowing two questions: 
Is the attitude of caring or indifference towards nature more helpful for conceiving
educational ideas and practices? Which is most value-profitable in educating? The
picture of enchanted or disenchanted nature? Neither of the questions has priority over
the other; yet exploration of both will orient us towards a more meaningful learning.
Under this theme, it will be argued that an enchanted perspective might invoke richer
meanings for education than a disenchanted one.
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5.1 Disenchanted Nature and a Rational Attitude
This section aims at exploring the disenchanted view of “nature” and its implications
for education by focusing on modern scientists’ views. As mentioned, the 
disenchanted view assumes a rational and indifferent attitude towards nature and
aspires to take nature as an intelligible and controllable machine and fosters this
mechanistic view of nature by taking an objective and scientific stance. These
assumptions of scientific attitude and mechanistic nature are inextricably interwoven
in the process of disenchantment and they influence our education at present.
The process of disenchantment is a journey of establishing “Science” as an 
autonomous, objective and modern discipline including scientific knowledge, criteria
of knowledge and research methods. The final goal of Science is to make nature
intelligible. Many authors (Butterfield, 1949; Coates, 1998; Daston, 1998; Glacken,
1967; Husserl, 1970; Merchant, 1983) agree that the Scientific Revolution might be a
turning point in history for its great contribution of establishment of “Modern Natural 
Science”. Some authors date the year 1543 --- the year when Copernicus’ On the
Revolutions of the Heavenly Sphere (De revolutionibus orbium coelestium) was
published --- as a milestone of the modern view of nature (Collingwood, 1945). The
process of disenchantment, according to Weber (1948, p. 155), could be understood as
a process of “rationalisation” and “intelectualisation”. Thus in some sense, the 
Scientific Revolution initiates the disenchantment in history. However, the meaning of
nature is gradually transformed rather than there being a sudden change during the
long and complex process of disenchantment. We unpick the complicated process by
the following threads: 1) mechanistic view of nature, 2) a separation of religion from
natural sciences, 3) the transformation of the deity/human/nature relationship, 4)
mathematical methods and methodologies for probing nature and, 5) humanism or
strong anthropocentrism. However, these five threads, characterising the movement of
disenchantment, are intertwined, inter-referential and inter-dependent.
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First, the significant feature of disenchantment can be articulated as the
mechanistic view of nature by demystification or secularisation. Although a primeval
form of mechanistic view can be found in the ancient Greek philosophy of being; yet
the animistic view occupied many premodern thinkers’ minds. In premodern times, 
nature was taken by many thinkers as a living world full of soul. This is the so-called
animistic view. Having undergone the process of disenchantment, nature which has
been demystified is no longer taken as a living whole but a machine-like object.
Nature, in some sense, “lost its soul” (Daston, 1998, p.150). 
Daston points out that nature, after early modern times, is “no longer animated 
nor active” and “reduced to brute, passive, stupid mater” (Daston, 1998, pp.150-151).
Thus premodern nature with creativity and deity was transformed by the Scientific
Revolution into a neutral machine, blindly obedient to cause and effect (Daston, 1998).
For some authors like Daston, deity implies creativity; hence nature with deity is a
creative nature. However, I may not agree with Daston on this point. The discussion
about telos of nature in Chapter 4 has demonstrated that a secular view of nature could
be creative because dedivinisation or secularisation is not identified as mechanisation.
Yet for modern thinkers, dedivinisation tends to assume mechanisation; thus a non-
divine nature is “just a machine”. 
The disenchantment of nature, however, does not endanger the religious belief
in God. This is the second feature of disenchantment: a separation between the field of
deity and that of nature or between theology and natural sciences. This point can be
found in the leading figures of the Scientific Revolution. For example, Nicholaus
Copernicus (1473-1543), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564-
1642) who found the base for modern sciences are still devoted believers in the divine
harmony and the order of creation in the cosmos (Butterfield, 1949; Coates, 1998). In
Scribner’s terms, disenchantment is a separation between the fields of “magic” and 
“religion” (Scribner, 1993). This point is in tune with the discussion in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 has pointed out that modern thinkers separate the divine telos from nature
by the refutation of physico-theology and, in this process, they rerank god, humans
and nature.
The reranking between god, nature and humans is the third feature of
disenchantment in modern times. As mentioned, in premodern times, the relationship
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between God, nature and humans is to take both God and nature as superior to
humans. In modern times, this order has been rearranged as follows: the supreme is
the God, below are the humans and nature is at the bottom. It is apparent that the
human/nature relationship has changed.34 As Glacken (1967, p.376) points out, “most 
of the great names in early modern science did not deny design in nature nor the
validity of final causes…” What is more, 
[t]he adherents of the design argument saw in the new science the
means by which man could fulfil his destiny, under God’s plan and 
guidance, to improve the earth as his dwelling place; they saw that the
new principles of scientific investigation meant knowledge of natural
law, that the knowledge of law meant control over nature in the widest
possible sense. (Glacken, 1967, p.380)
In summary, the development of early modern science separates god or deity from
nature. With the levelling down of the status of nature the prestige of humans is
elevated. Early modern science “spelt the doom of Ptolemy and Aristotle” (Buterfield, 
1949, p.59), and replaced the animistic world with mechanistic nature. This process of
disenchantment and dedivinisation, inheriting and changing the ancient picture of
nature, depicts a mechanistic and atomist view of nature composed of a set of
miscellaneous and objective items.
Fourth, the movement of disenchantment consists to a large extent in the new
scientific methods including idealisation, observation, measurement, calculation,
mathematics, experimentation and reasoning. It is very obvious that these methods
still play very important parts in our current curricula of natural sciences. Previous
discussions have revealed that they are the main ways that pupils learn “how to learn” 
about nature in school. Husserl points out that the concept of idealisation can be
34 A similar discussion can be found in O’Riordan’s work (1989). He presents two modes to explain the 
relationship between god, nature and human beings. However, according to the nurturing mode, “God 
created the Earth, and then human beings. This is the original Hebrew version of the Genesis myth as
adopted by the more conservative Greek and Roman traditions…” (O’Riordan, 1989, p. 83). I may not 
agree on the point that God is prior to Earth in Greek tradition. It can be found from the previous
discussion on Demiurge that this artisan-deity is not prior to the world. O’Riordan, T. (1989) The 
challenge for environmentalism. In R. Peet & N. Thrift (Eds.) New Models in Geography (London:
Unwin Hyman), pp. 77–102.
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understood as the distinguishing characteristic of modern science. Modern science is
rooted in the Greek idealist tradition which “leads to the development of pure 
mathematics as pure science of ideas, science of possible objects in general as objects
determined by ideas” (Husserl, 1970, p. 310). The “mathematisation” of scientific 
methods denotes the idealisation and universalisation of all objects in nature that are
to be known through mathematics, especialy Galileo’s geometry. As Colingwood 
(1945) points out, modern science reaches its maturity with Galileo. Because of
Galileo’s geometry, “nature…becomes… a mathematical manifold” (Husserl, 1970, 
p.23).
The mathematisation is all-embracing: all things in the universe can be
quantified, measured, and calculated. In Galileo’s own terms, “The great book of 
nature can be read only by those who know the language in which it is written, and
this language is mathematics” (Devlin, 1996, p.344). Mathematics is taken as the
universal and powerful tool which can penetrate and grasp all of nature and all objects
within. Thus the modern scientists’ view of nature could be understood as 
“mathematised nature” and their methods could be understood as grounded on this 
idealised mathematics.
Kant promotes the tendency of mathematisation of modern natural sciences.
Kant defines rationalisation as a criterion of natural science in its definition and scope.
According to Kant (1786/1985), the doctrine of nature includes the historical doctrine
of nature and natural science. The former contains “the systematicaly ordered facts 
regarding natural things (which again would consist of the description of nature… and 
the history of nature)” (Kant, 1786/1985, p. 468). The later could in turn be divided
into natural science proper and natural science improper: the natural science proper is
the science which “treats its object wholy according to a priori principles” and the 
science improper that “according to the laws of experience” (Kant, 1786/1985, p. 468).
The definition of the science proper can be found in the description given by Kant:
Only that whose certainty is apodeictic can be caled science proper… 
That whole of cognition which is systematic can therefore be called
science, and, when the connection of cognition in this system is a
coherence of grounds and consequents, rational science… But when 
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these grounds or principles are ultimately merely empirical,… and 
when the laws from which reason explains the given facts are merely
laws of experience, then they carry with themselves no consciousness
of necessity (are not apodeictically certain), and thus the whole does
not in a strict sense deserve the name of science… A rational doctrine 
of nature, then, deserves the name of natural science only when the
natural laws that underlie it are cognised a priori and are not merely
laws of experience. (Kant, 1786/1985, p. 468)
According to the above, some features of the so-called proper, pure and rational
natural science can be discovered: the doctrine of science must be characterised by the
following features including 1) coherence, 2) necessity or apodeictic certainty, 3)
cognition a priori and 4) rational principles. The hierarchical dualism in epistemology
of early modern scientists is sophisticatedly adapted in Kantian philosophy of nature.
According to Kant, the science which is grounded on experience carries no necessity.
This empirical science is thus rather caled “systematic art” than science. For example, 
chemistry can never be taken as science proper because its principles “are merely 
empirical and admit of no presentation a priori in intuition” (Kant, 1786/1985, p. 471). 
On this view, mathematisation is an irreplaceable criterion to discriminate
science proper from science improper; Kant states that, “the principles of chemical 
phenomena cannot make the possibility of such phenomena in the least conceivable
inasmuch as they are incapable of the application of mathematics” (Kant, 1786/1985, 
p. 471). This point is in tune with what Kant states at the end of the Preface of
Metaphysical foundations of natural science that the metaphysical study of natural
science is to bring unison with “the mathematical doctrine of motion” (Kant, 
1786/1985: 478). However, this feature might be one of the widespread beliefs in
education. The discussion in Chapter 2 has shown the unreflective, uncritical
confidence in mathematics as a scientific tool in the present Taiwanese curriculum.
The appearance of new methods and methodologies implies an emotionless
attitude towards nature. Ancient cosmologists conceive nature by means of
observation and speculation with complicated and complex feelings including
admiration or fear; while modern scientists study nature by means of observation,
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measurement, calculation, mathematics, experimentation and reasoning --- without
emotions (or without conscious awareness of emotions). This attitude is highly rated
in science education. The goals of science education, as revealed in Chapter 2, include
comprehension of scientific knowledge and attitudes. The scientific attitude
intertwined with scientific methods is a mentality stressing indifference, disinterest,
objectivity and neutrality. It is in tune with what we have analysed in our science
education curricula: pupils are expected to have objective, neutral, indifferent and
disinterested atitudes towards subject maters. They are expected to “de-personal-ise” 
themselves.
New methods and technologies can strengthen learning of Science (consisting of
scientific knowledge and atitudes). Galileo’s telescope is a typical instance. As a 
scientific tool, the telescope avails human beings to observe nature from a certain
distance; more importantly, it alows human beings to be “indiferent observers” of 
nature and thereby turns nature into “indiferent stuf”.Nature is thus taken as an
“object” external to our subjective experiential field. There is and should be a certain 
distinction (and distance) between human beings and external nature according to the
modernist scientific view. The distance between human beings and nature is
demarcated as psychological and physical nature/human boundaries. For example,
mathematics produces psychological distance whereas Galileo’s telescope, one of the 
so-called milestones of the Scientific Revolution, 35 creates a physical distance
between humans and nature. Human beings are in some respects alienated from nature
and vice versa. However, what is indispensible are the rigorous and objective
scientific methods including mathematics, experimentation, observation, measurement,
calculation, and reasoning. From the perspective of modern scientists, human world
and natural world are separate and the communication consists in “Science”. Science, 
in one respect, assures the “quality” of natural knowledge because it is acquired
through rigorous methods and procedures; in some other respects, it sets limits to
human experience of nature and thereby reduces its emotional charge. This reduction
is one of the origins of the oversimplification of our present education. Yet this
drawback is usually ignored because the efficiency and performativity of Science is
conspicuous and powerful. As Bacon states, “Human knowledge and human power 
35 Copernican heliocentricism, Kepler’s clockwork analogy and Galileo’s telescope are regarded as 
three milestones of the Scientific Revolution (Butterfield, 1949; Coates, 1998).
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meet in one” (wel-known as “knowledge itself is power”) (cited in Coates, 1998, p.
72). Bacon’s words can be articulated in more detail as folows, “Human knowledge 
of nature and human power over it meet in one”. Folowing Bacon, the pursuit of 
deployment and exploitation of nature seems to be taken as the chief aim of learning
natural sciences; the (pragmatic) criteria of evaluation rely on assessment of
eficiency in ataining the aim. “If it works, it is true”. On this ground, a moto of 
learning modern science can be drawn out: the more efficiently a set of knowledge
makes use of nature, the more it is valued scientifically, and the more value it has to
be learned. None the less, I disagree with this simplified view of education about
nature because it reduces the significance of our living and learning. The danger of
meaning-deprivation is also implied in the next feature of disenchantment.
The fifth feature of disenchantment can be understood as humanism or strong
anthropocentrism although humanism predates modern science. The ancient Greek
post-Socratic philosophy is distinguished from the pre-Socratic philosophy by the
philosophical interest in human beings themselves (Copleston, 1966a). This interest
gains strength from modern science and begets strong self-confidence in human
beings and reason which is a key feature of modern humanism or strong
anthropocentrism. Modern humanism is inevitably connected with the trust in and
reliance on modern scientific methods and the implied scientific attitude. Reciprocally,
the efficiency and powerfulness of Science brings human beings much confidence
about their own ability to use reason, or rationality. The ability to learn and establish
Science is believed in as an exclusive talent bestowed by God and this belief is
strengthened by the catharsis and huge success of Newton and the Copernican
Revolution. This ability distinguishing human beings from other animals is rationality.
A good example of rationality could be the ability to use abstract ideas in order to
make rigorous and logical inference, calculation, generalisation, i.e., idealisation.
According to Edmund Husserl (1970), early modern thinkers’ geometrical and 
mathematical reasoning could be taken as the epitome of rationality. In their mind,
there is no sphere which mathematics cannot penetrate, investigate and apprehend ---
as long as it is “science”. 
Husserl points out that the most significant point of early modern science is to
transform the idea “fundamentaly”, to establish the universal philosophy which 
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marks of the “the beginning of the modern age”. This crucial change is the
substitution of the ancient idea for “mathematics (as geometry and as formal-abstract
theory of numbers and magnitudes)…” (Husserl, 1970, p. 21). For the ancients, the 
geometrical methodology is a “practical art of measuring” in a prescientific world.
Owing to Galileo, this practical methodology has been realised to “‘calculate’ with 
compeling necessity” and to make “possible hypotheses, inductions, predictions 
about the unknowns of its present, its past, and its future” (Husserl, 1970, p.33). We
may perceive a danger implied in the ambition of apprehending the whole of nature
by means of universal mathematics. It is, indeed, a reduction and the impoverishment
of the meanings of human experience and thereby results in the pitfalls of our present
education.
This problem can be alleviated by means of the source of meanings: our
everyday life experience, or lifeworld. Our experience of nature is originally rich in
potential; it is the source for us to comprehend and invent various possibilities of
expression, interpretation, conceptualisation and meaning. These meanings could be
revealed by different kinds of expression such as poetry, painting, music, and so on.
However, in order to meet the criteria of Science, human experience has to be purified;
what and how human beings experience nature has to be “idealised” and 
“standardised”. For modern scientists, the best instrument to idealise and standardise 
experience is mathematics. In order to meet the requirements of mathematics, the
objects to be surveyed have been “cleansed” of their impurities by the systematisation 
of mathematisation (Husserl, 1970). Geometry is a typical example. As an important
branch of mathematics, according to Husserl, geometry in ancient times is firstly an
“art of measurement” applied to the physical objects such as rivers, mountains and 
buildings. Then it reveals objective knowledge, the relations between the shapes of
the objects, through measurement. The “practicaly objectivising function” of 
geometry becomes “idealisedand thus turned into the purely geometrical way of
thinking” (Husserl, 1970, p. 28). Until early modern times, geometry is broadly 
applied to astronomy as well as on earth. Geometry is a mathematical praxis which
determines the ideal and pure shapes of practical objects. However, this
“determination” reduces some parts of experiences of the objects, the “vague”, 
“fuzzy”, or “ambiguous” parts of nature, which are parts of everyday life experience, 
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or lifeworld.
As mentioned earlier, everyday life experience is rich in potentials and
meanings. “So-caled” objective scientific knowledge can be seen as one part of 
everyday life experience and is the result of the process of abstraction or distillation.
Thus the mathematisation of nature is one of many views of the experiences of nature
rather than one totalising view. As Husserl states,
The perceived, the experienced as such, is thoroughly “vague”; it 
always stands, taken in harmonious experience, under the essential
law of a certain gradation of perfection which always exists as an ideal
possibility. Accordingly, I can have the same characteristic given more
or less “clearly”; and, no mater how clear it is, yet another gradation 
is still thinkable. (Husserl, 1970, p. 307)
Thus the modern scientists’ disenchanted view provides one of many views of nature
and knowledge. When this disenchanted view is taken as an infallible ground for
learning about nature, its companion is the danger of meaning-deprivation. For
example, in the view of Galileo, the truth of nature “consists in mathematical facts; 
what is real and intelligible in nature is that which is measurable and quantitative (a
positivist view). Qualitative distinctions…have no place in the structure of the natural 
world…” (Colingwood, 1945, p. 102). The danger of meaning-deprivation can be
found in Galileo’s perspective. 
The features of “mathematisation” and “idealisation” of disenchanted nature 
manifest a tendency of disembodiment which emphasise abstract, incorporeal,
perennial concepts. Its educational influence can be conspicuously found in our
present curricula. The discussion in Chapter 2 has shown that learning about nature is
mainly concerned with abstract concepts and quantified and measurable knowledge of
nature. Furthermore, subjects are evaluated according to how rational they are judged
to be; for example, mathematics is evaluated as highly important and physical
education as much less. In Taiwan, subjects related to science, literacy, numeracy,
social studies and science are caled “main subjects” and also “intelectual subjects”, 
the learning of which relies, to a very large extent, on the acquisition of knowledge
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within classrooms. The indoor learning about the “main subjects” tends to confine 
learning activities to rote learning and memorisation on the one hand, and to simplify
the subject matters into abstract ideas (which are accessible by written words and
convenient for rote learning) on the other. The other subjects, such as music, art and
physical education, are caled “sub-subjects”, the learning of which depends on the
action during the process. This division between “main subjects” and “sub-subjects” 
is problematic in many respects. For example, subjects are inappropriately classified
as important and unimportant; what is even worse is that teachers are ranked as well.
It is apparent that the division results in discrimination against and unjust views about
knowledge and educators. There could be complicated cultural and social factors
involved in this phenomenon. I do not aim to interrogate them in this thesis; however,
what I emphasise is that, if the disenchanted view dominates education, it could foster
the trend of disembodiment and result in unbalanced learning.
Some assumptions implied in the early modern scientific view of nature can be
found, some of which could be traced back to premodern thought. These assumptions,
fundamentally grounded on substance metaphysics, are elaborated and made explicit
through the process of demystification or disenchantment. They are as follows.
1) Mechanism. Nature is taken as a machine in which all parts and motions are
measured and predictable.
2) Atomism. Nature as the machine composed of the indivisible and
homogeneous substances --- atoms. The view that atoms are homogeneous
may be the point distinct from ancient atomism. Atoms in the ancient views
might be various kinds of atoms, such as earth, water, air, fire and void. In
Aristotle’s view, nature is composed of heterogeneous substances which 
differ in their causes. This qualitative difference makes little sense in
modern atomism.
3) Hierarchical dualism in epistemology. The nature learned through
idealisation and mathematisation is more reliable than that learned through
perceptual, empirical experience.
4) Dualism in cosmology. The fields of deity and of nature are separated. With
the separation, the fields of theology and of natural science are thus
distinguished from each other.
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5) Mathematised realism/essentialism. The best scientific theories describe the
essences of things in nature. The essences are the mathematical realities
behind the phenomena. Thus the final explanation of the world is to discover
the natural laws, i.e., the mathematical formula. In modern terms “A theory 
of everything”.
6) Anthropocentric hierarchy of beings. The beings or objects in nature are
ranked according to rational ability. This view is deeply rooted in the
Platonic-Aristotelian intellectual tradition.
The discussion above reveals “disenchantment” as a process of forwarding the task of 
“rationalisation” and “intelectualisation”. This process can be understood as having 
been initiated during the Scientific Revolution and is still underway. For educators,
some questions may need more consideration: Are we happy with the way we deal
with nature? Is knowledge about nature according to the scientific and disenchanted
view sufficient? Is the scientific attitude towards nature that we learn from curricula
appropriate? Is current learning about nature, which is strongly under the influence of
this disenchanted view, as educationally meaningful as it might be?
Some drawbacks have been highlighted in the above discussions including the
limited knowledge and the means or technologies of natural sciences, the alienation of
nature, the tendency of disembodiment, and the narrowing reduction of lifeworld
experience. These drawbacks all point towards impoverishment of meaning in
learning and living generally. Viewed in this light, the disenchanted view might not be
educationally desirable. We may need a different perspective to envisage nature, our
attitudes towards nature and ourselves to retrieve the meanings excluded by
disenchantment. Let us turn to the enchanted view.
5.2 Enchanted Nature and an Affective Attitude
The above exploration shows the problem of impoverishing meanings in education in
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the disenchanted view. This section continues to interrogate disenchantment and
enchantment: If the disenchanted view is not satisfactory to bring forth rich meanings
for education, will the enchanted view hold more potential for meaningful education?
In general, the enchanted view assumes that, on the one hand, nature is taken as
a living being and, on the other, human beings should treat nature with care, regard,
feeling and respect. This perspective is very conspicuous in Romantic discourse. The
following exploration is focused on Romantic ideas to reveal the meaning of
enchantment and the enchanted view of nature. Yet it is important to notice that the
idea of enchantment does not equate with the whole of Romantic doctrine.
First of all, although Romanticism is acknowledged as an important and broad
trend of thought in the 18th and 19th century, it is still difficult to find any clearly
unifying feature to justify the name of Romanticism because there are many different
authors and works (Garrard, 1998). For example, it is generally accepted that
Romanticism can be understood as a response or reaction towards the Enlightenment
and the related modernism and industrialisation. For some, Romanticism and
modernism are in tune; Stone points out that many Romantics hope to “reconceive 
nature as animated without jettisoning the epistemic and political values of
modernity” (Stone, 2005, p. 4).  In this sense, the Romantic view of human/nature 
relationship may not be the doctrine conceived by some contemporary ecocentrists,
such as deep ecologists, spiritual ecofeminists and others. For some, Romanticism
aims to defend nature and oppose modern fabrication including rationality, science
and technology (Feenberg, 1999; Stone, 2005). Inconsistent views can thus be found
within Romanticism. It is not monolithic.
Secondly, many Romantics take nature as an external and independent entity by
claiming the intrinsic value of nature. For example, according to Garrard,
Romanticism is “an unprecedented insistence on a kind of intrinsic value in nature, a
worth not reducible to an instrumental calculus of resource base or agricultural
potential” (Garard, 1998, pp. 113-114). In Garrard’s view, the intrinsic value of 
nature is the key of Romanticism. This point is suspicious to me. In my view, if we
follow this light to define Romanticism, it is easy to fall into the trap of reifying
nature and to base the idea of nature on the ground of philosophy of being. Some
contemporary ecocentrists follow this approach to Romanticism and seek inspiration
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from it to fight against anthropocentrism which is taken as a theoretical crux of
environmental problems. In my view, this may be an escape from one theoretical
problem by jumping into another one. Here I do not intend to discuss the debates
related to anthropocentrism, ecocentrism and the value of nature at this moment. What
is important to this thesis is that the Romantic understanding of enchantment is in
accordance with the previous exploration of the philosophy of becoming. Then, in
what sense does Romanticism inspire our understanding of enchantment in accord
with philosophy of becoming? Here we put the stress on the Romantic attitudes
towards nature rather than nature itself.
The Romantic attitude towards nature involves appreciation, care, sympathy and
admiration; in contrast, the Enlightenment thinkers’ atitude is rational, detached, 
indifferent and objective. Moreover, the ethos of Romanticism may include broad
trends reacting or resisting disenchantment by modern scientists and Enlightenment
thinkers (and very possibly as a response to the French Revolution) (Bate, 1991). Bate
describes Romanticism as conveying “a respect for the earth and a skepticism as to 
the orthodoxy that economic growth and material production are the be-all and end-all
of human society” (1991, p. 9). According to Travers (1998), the Romantics are 
described as rejecting “the ideas of the Enlightenment, believing that the philosophy 
of materialism and the principle of scientific rationality necessarily led to a
mechanistic and reductionist model of human nature, which had no place for the
spiritual or the transcendent. Instead, Romantic writers looked to nature, contact with
which, they believed, would restore to the individual a sense of the interdependence of
living things and a feeling for the organic evolution of life” (Travers, 1998, pp. 27-28).
Thus we may find that the Romantic attitudes towards nature may involve social
critiques.
In this thesis, I define “enchantment of nature” as “the emotional experience of
appreciation, wonders and marvels at the uninteligible nature” which is, to a large 
extent, inspired by the Romantic view. None the less, many Romantics take nature as
real divine and pre-existing, a position with which I take issue. Thus my approach to
enchantment is to focus on the aspect of “atitudes” towards nature: Romantic 
attitudes. Therefore, the feature characterising the Romantic view of nature is defined
by this thesis as a creative, inspiring, moving and inexhaustibly intelligible source, for
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which human beings have sympathetic, empathetic and appreciative feelings.
Compared with philosophical argumentation, artistic or literary articulation
seems more suitable to convey our sympathetic emotions towards nature and may be
more appropriate for use in teaching. Many nature-caring Romantics are known by
their literary works, such as Rousseau, Schiller, Goethe, Schlegel, Fichte, Shelling,
Blake, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. Among these numerous Romantic poets, William
Wordsworth can be seen as “the foremost Romantic prophet of nature” (Schenk, 1966, 
p. 162). Jonathan Bate dedicates his work Romantic Ecology to Wordsworth because
the poet “sought to enable his readers beter to enjoy or to endure life by teaching 
them to look at and dwel in the natural world” (Kroeber, 1994, p. 37). Raymond 
Wiliams (1973) also points out that the term “nature” is the most important word in 
Wordsworth’s poetry. His concept of “nature” can be seen as the anchor to understand 
how the Romantic culture relates itself to environment, for “the word [nature] 
probably focuses a cultural domain of contestation and transformation. The romantic
concern with nature, in fact, manifests a dissolution and reconstitution of conceptual
patterns by which natural phenomena had been understood…” (Kroeber, 1994, pp. 17-
18).
Therefore, the exploration of the concept of “nature” in Wordsworth’s poetry is 
our chief orientation towards the Romantic view of nature in this section. Before
explicating the view of nature in Wordsworth’s works, there is another author whose 
thought is worthy of consideration: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His thought ambivalently
intertwines the elements of Enlightenment and Romanticism and has had great
influence upon the Western intellectual legacy in many respects: as many scholars
point out, he directly influences Kant, Wordsworth, Emerson and indirectly a number
of contemporary environmentalists (Harrison, 1992; LaFreniere, 1990).
5.2.1 Rousseau’s nature
How can Rousseau’s view help us to think more about nature and education?
Rousseau’s thought embraces many contradictions, including his ideas about nature 
and human beings (Attfield, 2004; Harrison, 1992). Rousseau is well-known as a
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natural philosopher. However, his idea of nature is often limited to human nature
rather than natural environmental or nature as a whole; yet his view of nature or
human nature is influential in later developments in natural education or child-
centered education. Although his ideas of nature and education might not be
exclusively original and go much beyond the scope of some other Enlightenment
thinkers, such as John Locke (1975), as a bridge between the Enlightenment and the
Romanticism, Rousseau still plays a significant role. Rousseau is one of the crucial
figures who stimulated public interest in the issue of (human) nature and its
implications for an education conforming to human nature. Hence he can be
understood as illuminating the importance of child-centred education. The particular
contribution of Rousseau is that he makes prominent two elements implied in (human)
nature: freedom and individuality.
Rousseau’s idea of (human) nature is paradoxical. On the one hand, he adopts 
an economic and exploitative attitude towards nature when he states,
One must exploit or sell the old forests which no longer profit, but one
must leave standing all those that are still thriving: in their own time
they will have their use. (Rousseau; cited from Harrison, 1992, p. 126)
On the other hand, Rousseau exalts nature. (This is the point that makes Rousseau
well-known.) Not only in his classic Emile (1962), but also in Discourse on the Origin
and Basis of Inequality among Men (1973), Rousseau highlights the superiority of
original states of nature and the corruption of human civilization:
It is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species
removes it still farther from its primitive state, the more discoveries we
make, the more we deprive ourselves of the means of making the most
important of all. Thus it is, in one sense, by our very study of man, that
the knowledge of him is put out of our power. (Rousseau, 1973, p. 43)
We may know from the above that nature is taken as the source of norms and criteria
of truth and goodness. A contrast could be found in Rousseau’s view of nature. It is a 
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contrast between the unspoiled, pure nature and an erring, artificial corrupting society.
This view of nature may not be invented by Rousseau but reflects one of the
widespread notions related to nature as many Romantics thought. Implicit in this
contrast is a notion of taking nature as the source of norm and order, as a German
writer living in France states (Holbach, cited in Marshall, 1992):
Oh Nature! Sovereign of all beings! And you its adorable daughters,
virtue, reason, truth! forever be our only Divinities; it is to you that are
due the incense and the homage of the earth. Show us then, oh nature!
What man must do to obtain the happiness which you have made him
desire…
We shall see that error is the true source of the ills of our species; that
is …by taking the axe to the root of superstition, that we shal be able 
quietly to search for the truth, and find in nature the torch which can
guide us to felicity. Let us study nature… (Holbach, cited in Marshal, 
1992, pp. 227-228)
Moreover, Rousseau’s view of humanity is as paradoxical as his view of nature. In the 
first place, Rousseau believes that everything by its nature is good. As stated in Emile
(Book I: 10), “Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the author of things”. 
Human beings by nature should be good. In this sense, education should be launched
in accordance with human nature. However, in the second place, society, as the
outcome of human civilisation, is the root of coruption: “everything degeneratesin
the hands of man” (Emile Book I: 11). It seems paradoxical that human beings, whose
nature is good, turn into the root of corruption. However, the conceptions of
individuality, society and nature may be the pivot for elucidating the paradox. In
Rousseau and many other Romantics’ perspective, nature is the norm and standard of 
goodness; every individual is good by nature. What causes degeneration is the
“colective man”, “society” or “civilisation”. In more accurate terms, it is the 
collective man causing rottenness. The reason why many good individuals compose a
corupt society is not the focus of Rousseau’s thought. However, nature may provide 
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the reference of education for goodness. This point seems to be shared by many
Romantics including Wordsworth. Moreover, another solution for Rousseau may be
the request for “a political intervention within society to create new political forms 
which allows the recovery of qualities, such as empathy and cooperativeness, which
existed when men were closer to the state of nature” (LaFreniere, 1990, p. 48). The 
political resolution may go beyond the scope of this thesis and thus it is suspended.
Many authors point out that the view of nature in Rousseau is significantly
consonant with that of Wordsworth who in turn greatly influences the Romantic
tradition in environmentalism (Harper, 1923; LaFreniere, 1990; Quennell, 1970).
5.2.2 Wordsworth’s nature
Having deep and great influence on contemporary environmentalism and child-
centered education, directly or indirectly, Wordsworth’s view is a very important 
reference for exploring the Romantic view of nature. It reveals that the Romantic view
of nature includes the following characteristics: unpredictability, uncontrollability,
inexhaustibility and the power of inspiring rich meanings. The exploration of
Wordsworth’s thought wil make prominent the important Romantic concepts 
including individuality, liberation and affectivity and morally instructive meaning in
nature. We can find an interesting consonance and dissonance between Romanticism
and Enlightenment thought; however, both play important roles in present educational
theories and practices.
Nature in Wordsworth’s and other Romantics’ works seems to be a persistently 
recurrent theme. For many, Wordsworth’s works are acknowledged as the most
significant epitome of the Romantics’ view of nature. For example, some authors 
regard Wordsworth not only as a nature poet but also as a proto-ecologist (Bate, 1991;
Garrard, 1998). We may find some connections between contemporary ecological
thinking and Wordsworth’s ideas. The poet’s view holds much potential for 
envisaging education about nature as education from nature.
Next, let us take a deeper look of the poet’s view of nature. Wordsworth’s view 
can be explicated in the following five points:
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The first point is related to a prevalent feeling among Romantics against the
industrialisation and urbanisation which embody the substantially socioeconomic,
scientific and technological changes intertwined with the notion of disenchantment.
This feeling and the implied critiques towards modernisation and technologisation for
us contemporaries are still significant. Compared with the time of Wordsworth, our
world and nature have been drastically and irreparably changed. As described in The
Excursion (Book XIII):
…An inventive age 
Has wrought, if not with speed of magic, yet
To most strange issues. I have lived to mark
A new and unforeseen creation rise
From out the labours of a peaceful land
Wielding her potent enginery to frame
And to produce, with appetite as keen
As that of war, which rests not night or day,
Industrious to destroy!
(Wordsworth, 1888, http://www.barletby.com/145/)
Laments for ongoing changes and loss of familiar things can be heard throughout the
words above. They are described by Raymond Wiliams (1993, p.127) as “feelings of 
loss and melancholy and regret”. For educators, it is a reflection from deep inside: 
What kind of a world do we desire? What kind of nature can bring educators and
learners to approach the desirable world and thereby be worth teaching? The
reflection brought by the first point is related to the second one.
Secondly, nature may be taken as the source of redemption for human beings to
be liberated from the frame of city life and the ravage of social changes. On this view,
a nature worth learning can be a source; this source can inspire a sense of tranquility
and freedom. As Wordsworth (1888; 1984, p.375) depicts in The Prelude (Book I: 6-
8): “A captive greets thee, coming from a house/ Of bondage, from yon City’s wals 
set free,/ A prison where he hath been long immured.” None the less, nature does not 
only provide the shelter for human beings to be liberated from the psychological
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shackles of modern life;36 it is also the source of order, goodness and knowledge.
From the experience and contemplation of nature, the poet acquires aesthetic
enjoyment and feelings of peace and freedom. The experience of nature is the root of
poetic creating in many Romantic writers. Wordsworth’s Prelude (Book I: 41-54)
echoes the above view (Roberts & Gifford, 1998, p. 168):
For I,… felt within
A corresponding mild creative breeze,
A vital breeze … is become
A tempest, a redundant energy
Vexing its own creation. ‘Tis apower
……
Brings with it vernal promises, the hope
… and thought,…
Pure passions, virtue, knowledge and delight,
The holy life of music and of verse. (Wordsworth, 1888; 1984, p.376)
Nature has been bestowed with high esteem by the poet for it inspires creativity on
various levels including the physical, imaginative, emotional and artistic.
For educators, the aforementioned two points are still significant. The levels of
industrialisation and urbanisation at present are intensified; environmental
degradation is increasing. Somehow the poet’s laments should be heard to alert 
ourselves to the unexpected changes brought about by modern science and technology.
This attentive ethical attitude should be included in our education.
Thirdly, a harmonious human/nature relationship is conceived. It seems a
paradox that, on the one hand, human beings and nature are taken by Wordsworth as
an integrated whole; on the other hand, the individuality of human beings is
highlighted. The ecocentrism and anthropocentrism, or holism and individualism are
both included in Wordsworth and many other Romantics’ view. The ideas of 
observance of nature and of the Great Chain of Being develop into a holistic view in
36 As many authors point out, although the Romantics criticise the modern way of life, very few of
them could abandon the modern lifestyle (Coates, 1998). Thus, the modern problems of modern life are
basically psychological, not physical.
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the works of the other Romantics including Coleridge, Blake and Shelley (Kroeber,
1994). In this view, the relationship between humans and nature is oneness, unity,
harmony and interdependence. For example, the intense feeling for nature expressed
in Tintern Abbey reveals that Wordsworth’s feeling for nature is not merely an
appreciation of landscape but also a communion and integration with it. As
Wordsworth (1888) depicts: “Therefore am I still/ A lover of the meadows and the
woods,/ And mountains; and of all that we behold/ From this green earth; of all the
mighty world/ Of eye, and ear, --- both what they half create,/ And what perceive;…” 
A very strong intimate and close relationship between nature and the poet can be read
from these lines. This relationship is inseparable from and embodied in the poet’s 
sensations.
Some critics such as Marshall (1992) and Kroeber (1994) point out that there is
a view of pantheism and mysticism implied in Wordsworth’s poetry. For another 
example, Coleridge (2005) shares the general concept of nature with Wordsworth: “O 
the one life within us and broad,/ Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,/A
light in sound, a sound-like power in light,/ Rhythm in all thought, and joyance
everywhere ---/ Methinks, it should have been impossible/ Not to love all things in a
world so filed;……And what if all the animated nature / Be but organic harps
diversely framed,/ That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps/ Plastic and vast, 
one intelectual breeze,/ At once the Soul of each, and God of al?” (Coleridge, 2005, 
The Eolian Harp: pp. 26-30; pp. 44-48)
We may find that the poetry above attempts to encapsulate the organic and
inseparable interrelationship and intimacy between human beings and nature. Insofar
as human beings are one part of nature, human beings, by (human) nature, can and
should approach towards nature in a reciprocal way: the communion with nature is to
rejoin the whole which one belongs to. The most important point for educators is that,
according to Wordsworth, nature and human beings should be consonant, harmonious
and mutual. If human beings give their attention to this interrelationship carefully,
human beings can learn from nature. Nature is the nurse, the anchor, the guide and the
guardian of human beings.
…wel pleased to recognise
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In nature and the language of sense,
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul
Of all my moral being.
(Wordsworth, 1888, http://www.barletby.com/145/)
Nature for the Romantics is the object to be devoted to, identified and involved with,
and the root of criteria of ideas and practices as well as teacher. The way that nature
teaches is to invite us to be attentive, receptive and responsive to our inner world,
nature and their interrelationships. This point makes prominent the difference between
the Romantics and the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment modernists: as
mentioned, for modernists, nature is what human beings want to control; by contrast,
nature is what the Romantics wish to learn from. In this sense, the Romantics’ nature 
is enchanted through reunion; in contrast, the Enlightenment’s disenchantment is to 
separate human beings and nature. None the less, the confrontation between
disenchantment and re-enchantment does not imply the Romantics’ sheer renunciation 
of Enlightenment thinkers’ notions; both groups agree on the ideas of human 
individuality and potential emancipation. Their difference may consist in different
views about the relationship between individual, society and nature.
The fourth point is related to human nature, which can be drawn out of the
integrative and harmonious human/nature relationship. On this point, Wordsworth and
Rousseau have a similar view. They both take humanity as innately good. It can be
revealed in the following poems: My heart leaps up when I behold and Ode:
Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood:
The child is the father of the man,
And I could wish my days to be,
Bound each to each by natural piety. (Wordsworth, 1984, p.246)
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
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And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy! (Wordsworth, 1888)
Here we may find a shade of Neo-Platonism in these words: a divine whole includes
and is partaken of by all. This divine principle can be found in nature and human
beings. Human beings might forget about the divinity because of worldliness. Since
children are less “contaminated” than adults, they are “purer”. In this sense, education 
is to learn from children so that their “naturalness” could be kept and preserved. Here 
Wordsworth seems to hold Rousseau’s view that the divine and pure human nature is 
more easily to be found in children than in adults because it is likely to be
contaminated or corrupted during the process of growth. We may find that a view of
child-centered education has its root in the Romantic soil.
The last point is that Wordsworth shows deep regard for animals or non-human
beings. This view directs humans to reevaluate the moral status of animals which,
traditionally, have hardly been taken into moral consideration. There was a growing
interest in animal welfare in the eighteenth century. Many Romantic poets reproach
hunting for inflicting suffering on animals in the 18th century (Mortensen, 2000;
Perkins, 1998). In some sense, the new attitude towards animals embodies the
reconceiving of the human/nature relationship. In many poems Wordsworth expresses
deep sympathy with non-human beings and thereby shows the opposition to hunting,
especially in the poem Hart-Leap Well (Mortensen, 2000; Perkins, 1998). There are
two parts in this poem: the former delineates the story of hunting from the hunter Sir
Walter’s perspective; the later depicts it from the shepherd’s mouth. Although the 
first part of this poem does not highlight the suffering of the hunted hart, the scent of
reflectiveness against hunting can be read from the lines:
The poor Hart toils along the mountainside;
I will not stop to tell how far he fled,
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Nor will I mention by what death he died;
But now the knight beholds him lying dead.
Dismounting, then, he leaned against a thorn;
He had no follower, dog, nor man, nor boy;
He neither cracked his whip, nor blew his horn,
But gazed upon the spoil with silent joy.
Upon his side the Hart was lying stretched:
His nose half-touched a spring beneath a hill
And with the last deep groan his breath had fetched
The water of the spring were trembling still. (Wordsworth, 1888; 1984,
p.169)
The words above censure the cruelty brought from hunting in an emotion blended
with seriousness and calmness. On the one hand, Wordsworth reproaches the hunter
for his cruelty and ruthlessness. On the other hand, the suffering of the animal is
highlighted. This point may remind us of the opposite view of one of the founders of
modern thinking: Descartes, who denies animals’ ability to feel pain (Regan, 1983;
Singer, 1975). None the less, this view, implying a new conception of animals as
moral subjects, is deeply consonant with that of some contemporary advocates of
animal rights (Mortensen, 2000).
The second part of this poem elaborates the sympathy for animals in clearer and
deeper delicacy. There is a huge contrast between the attitudes towards animals of
Romantics and modernists. For example, the 18th century French philosopher N.
Malebranche describes animals as folows: “They eat without pleasure, cry without
pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing” 
(cited in G. P. Harrison, 1992, p. 219). R. Descartes has a similar notion that animals
are automata, without sense of pain. Viewed in this disenchanted light, animals do not
need to be treated with feelings because they do not, cannot and wil not “feel”. By 
contrast, Romantics embracing an enchanted view show feelings towards animals. As
Wordsworth depicts:
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Some say that here a murder has been done,
And blood cries out for blood: but, for my part,
I’ve guessed, when I’ve been siting in the sun,
That it was all for that unhappy Hart.
……
One lessen, Shepherd, let us two divide,
Taught both by what she shows, and what conceals;
Never to blend our pleasure or our pride
With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels. (Wordsworth, 1888,
http://www.barleyby.com/145)
At the end of the poem, Wordsworth expresses sentiment and compassion for the
other beings, which is a pivot for reconsidering the relationship between humans and
animals and the implying ethical issues. Here arises a question which is related to
human nature, ethics and education: if human beings are beings with morality or
moral sense, can this morality allow other creatures to suffer and ignore their feelings
and pains? Can we exclude animals from our value system or morality? For us
educators, Wordsworth poses a question which sets a starting point for educating for
the care of animals by means of senses.
Wordsworth’s poetry ofers the inspiration of what and how to learn animal 
ethics: curriculum and pedagogy. Both, in some respects, seem at odds with the
Enlightenment approach to education. For the latter, animals are non-rational or
irrational species so that they are not included as participants in moral participation. In
addition, senses are not to be taken as the main means of learning for they result in
vagueness, inaccuracy and mistakes. One of the important goals of the Enlightenment
approach to education is to raise the ability of using reason deliberately and acutely to
efface the ambiguities and errors caused by senses. Nevertheless, the Romantic
orientation of education takes a path opposite to the Enlightenment way. It is
interesting to find that this Romantic educational path is in tune, in certain respects,
with postmodernism; this will be argued in the later chapters.
The important point is that the meaning of nature of Romanticism is multiple,
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complicated and even inconsistent among different Romantics. However, some
interesting points can be drawn out from the Romantics’ view of nature.
Firstly, the Romantics view anticipates ecological thinking: nature is conceived
in a holistic view; there is reciprocity and interrelationship between all beings with
and within nature. Marshal gives an acute description of Romanticism that “paved the 
way for a genuinely ecological sensibility which recognizes the one in the many, the
interdependence of humanity and nature, and the reverberating harmony of the
universe” (Marshal, 1992, p. 297). 
Secondly, the Romantic view orients a moral thinking within which non-human
beings are included not merely as instruments but as moral touchstones by showing
the feelings and suffering of animals.
Thirdly, this view calls for attentiveness towards various experiences of nature.
In this enchanted view human beings can perceive themselves as one part of and
belonging to a whole. The Romantic feeling of belongingness reminds us of the
premodern philosophers’ cosmological view. I have pointed out in the previous
discussion that the exploration of the premodern view might help human beings to
imagine ourselves as one small part situated in the vast and remote cosmos. This
feeling of being an ancient cosmological thinker may help us to learn an ethical
attitude to be modest and respectful towards our world. Learning as a premodern
cosmologist can be seen as analogous to the Romantic feeling of belongingness in
nature: to be a “naturalist” --- “a natural human being in nature”. This belongingness 
is a means of resisting the alienation of human beings from nature due to
disenchantment. The human imagination, creativity and emotion for the other beings
and the world are inspired by nature. In this sense, nature is the source of
inexhaustible inspiration, reflection, innovation and creation for producing numerous
artistic, literary, philosophical, spiritual and ethical works.
There may be, however, some limitations in the Romantics’ view. The first is the 
anthropomorphist belief or the “pathetic falacy” (Marshal, 1992, p. 273). Secondly, 
although Romanticism is known as a revolt against the Enlightenment, yet the two
cultural trends share some common notions such as humanism and individualism. The
pursuit of human individuality and individual freedom seems to be a continuous
theme in Romantics’ works, such as the Romantics’ poetry, novels and the German 
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idealists’ philosophical works (Kroeber, 1994; Marshal, 1992). 
5.3 Summary
After all the discussions of disenchanted and enchanted views of nature, we may think
about how they can be helpful for improving curriculum. Can they help to extricate
our current curricula from the pitfall of over-simplifications? Can both views be
helpful or only one of them? What difference will these two views of nature bring to
education? Which view is more helpful for re-conceiving educational ideas and
practices? Finally, which view is more educationally meaningful and desirable?
Accordingly, let us first of all examine what difference could these two views bring to
educational ideas and practices.
1) On the educational subject
On this point, we may find that an independent, free and autonomous
individual is the human image as a goal of education which is approved by both
disenchanted and enchanted views. Yet this autonomous individual from these
two views has very different attitudes towards nature: for the disenchanted wing,
the most important task of education may cultivate a pupil as an enlightened and
independent individual, capable of controlling and making good use of our earth;
for the enchanted wing, it might be an affective person with attachment, feelings
and belongingness in nature. To be fair, the cultivation of a rational and
autonomous individual is equally important as an affective, attentive and caring
person in education. The problem in current education is the unbalanced
underestimation of the Romantic enchanted personality and overestimation of
the Enlightenment disenchanted ego.
2) On the curriculum
The disenchanted view focuses on the field of sciences or the fields
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modeling natural science to meet the criteria of “rigorousness”, 
“technologisation”, “standardisation” and “methodisation”. Educators 
embracing this view tend to choose and provide standardised and normalised
materials for pupils. For policy-makers holding the disenchanted view,
educational development should meet the requirements of “Science” to become 
a profession, thus various modern techniques, including technologisation,
institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and professionalisation are the models for
conducting educational theories and practices (Carr, 1997). In some respects,
educators taking the disenchanted view tend to evaluate learning materials with
the following criterion: curricula that are appropriate for learning or teaching
about nature can provide knowledge that can maximise and optimise efficiency
and performativity in exploiting nature. We may find that the demand for
“Science” is in line with, or may be seen as an initiative of the over-
simplifications of the present curriculum mentioned before: homogenisation and
disembodiment. Viewed in this light, the over-simplifications of the current
curriculum can be understood as the legacy of modern thinking. However, the
most important point is that learning of the useful and efficient may not be the
only means for bringing meaning to life.
The enchanted view tends to focus on learning subjects such as literature
and art. Educators having deeper belief in this view are prone to take curricula
in which it is easier to express subjective feelings and emotions in teaching.
These subject maters may not easily meet the criteria of “Science” including 
measurability, standardisation and mathematisation. In some respects, the
learning that matters to the advocators of the enchanted view is not how to make
good use of nature, but rather how to learn from nature in order to inspire more
meaningful connections with nature. This approach to learning might be helpful
to avoid the pitfalls caused by the disenchanted view and bring forth more
variety in the contents and the means of education and thereby beget more
choices and richer educational experience.
3) On education about nature
The disenchanted view implies a hierarchy of human beings and non-
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human beings. The knowing subject as a credible agent consists in its ability to
measure, to reason, to calculate and to find “the” “truth”. None the less, many 
authors (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972; Husserl, 1970; Kheel, 1995; Merchant,
1992, 1995; Rorty, 1993b; Spretnak, 1997, Warren, 1995) point out that this idea
of rationality, which is taken as the criterion to distinguish humans from non-
humans, is very likely to result in a danger of brutality of discrimination, and
even violence. According to Warren (1995), this view is a certain dominant
framework of mind, incorporating various forms of domination including
human over nature, men over women and the West over the non-West.37 The
notion of rationality is understood in terms of technical or instrumental
rationality only and becomes dominant (Habermas, 1971). This rationality can
be used as a totalitarian instrument to discriminate rational from irrational
beings and then to exclude the latter (Habermas, 1971; Horkheimer & Adorno,
1972; Rorty, 1993b). Scientific rationality is taken as the only useful and
efficient tool for attaining knowledge and the only criterion for judging. Based
on this, the Romantic calling for re-enchantment of nature can be understood as
a very humane request.
Against the disenchanted view, Romantics highlight the unpredictability
and inexhaustibility of nature for its inspiring human beings to have highly
spiritual, emotional and intellectual experience, e.g. the experiences of beauty
and the sublime. Thus, nature is a source beyond human recognition,
imagination and controllability. It is nature that orients and initiates human
creativity and meaningful experience. Nature in this sense is re-enchanted.
Human beings participate in, rather than subjugate nature. As one part of nature,
37 Some ecofeminists (Kheel, 1995; Merchant, 1992; Spretnak, 1997, Warren, 1995) name this
dominant framework which originates from modern thinking, e.g. Newtonianism, as “masculine
spirituality”. They attempt to find the resolution from nature but bestow the feature of femininity on
nature. In their mind, the feature of “Mother Nature” could be found in premodern or indigenous 
societies. As a possible source providing a certain resolution to the predicament caused by modern
thinking, “Mother Nature” could be learned from these societies or cultures. However, some authors
point out that people in premodern times had already converted the wilderness into controlled agrarian
fields by way of the unsophisticated technology of windmills, drainage and sluices. Since the
“substantial environmental modifications do not require the legitimation of a mechanistic world-view”
(Coates, 1998, p.77), it may not be fair to claim that human control over nature is one of the features of
modernity. Moreover, as Keller (1988, p.64) points out, “patriarchy is not essentially modern, for it
long predates modernity”;it may be appropriate not to take men’s domination over women or the
masculine spirituality as the distinguishing characteristic of modern thinking.
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human beings are interrelated and interconnected with all the other beings
within nature. On this ground, the Romantics claim that the objects of human
feelings, moral sensibility and responsibility should be extended to include non-
human beings. The most interesting point is that the Romantics make an
important distinction between individual and collective human beings to explain
the cause of the corruption: every individual by nature is good but degenerates
when he or she is posited in a collective. In my understanding, the Romantics
perceptively point out that loss of individuality, or in a more specific term, of
heterogeneous individuality, could be the origin of degeneration. The
communion with nature as the lifeworld experience is one of the means to
resume one’s own personal individuality. It is the starting point for practising 
natural education: learning from nature; as Wordsworth (1984, p. 131) states,
“Let nature be your teacher”.  
All in all, we may find that the disenchanted and enchanted views are both inspiring
and important for education. Yet the Romantic enchanted view is unjustly
underestimated in curriculum while the disenchanted view is overemphasised. This
unbalanced perspective in education has been taken for granted and has not been
under scrutiny. This neglect results in over-simplifications in present curricula.
Therefore, emphasis on an enchanted view in education may balance the existing
unjust and over-simplified curriculum. The Romantic enchanted view reminds
educators of the significance of the ideas, such as interaction and interrelationship
between humans and nature through the experiences of affectivity, emotion,
sentiments and affiliation, which have been undervalued. Viewed in this light, the
enchanted view is helpful for enriching and improving education.
Yet two points need notice when the Romantic enchanted ideas are adopted in
education.
The first challenge to Romanticism is that it is often taken (or mistaken) to be
related to sentimentalism, emotionalism and irrationality. The sentimentality of
Romanticism was liable to turn into “windy vapourings and self-indulgent
whimperings”(Marshall, 1992, p. 296). Some works seem to encourage a “morbid 
concern for decay…a deep discontentment with one’s lot which did not always
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translate itself into action, a mysterious melancholy, an inexplicable longing for
another shore” (Marshal, 1992, p. 296). For example, Keats lamented being “half in 
love with easeful death” (cited in Marshal, 1992, p.296). I do not deny that it is 
possible for Romanticism to result in sentimentalism and irrationalism if it is
inappropriately overemphasised. However, it is not proper to take an either-or,
polarized thinking perspective to ground education. Any exclusively singular, one-
sided view of education could lead into the crisis of oversimplification, whether it be a
disenchanted or an enchanted view. Thus here I emphasise the potential inspiration
that the Romantic enchanted view can bring to education, it does not mean that I want
to banish the disenchanted view from curriculum and education. The point is that a
balanced evaluation and inclusion of both views in education can be more helpful for
developing a meaning-rich curriculum than an unbalanced view.
The second challenge is about the connection between Romanticism and
totalitarianism. For example, the Nazis used the words of Herder and Nietzsche out of
context and the ecological sensibility implied in Romanticism was also used by the
Nazis as one of the roots of German ecologism (Biehl & Staudenmaier, 1995;
Marshall, 1992). However, we may argue that the totalitarian approach undermines
Romanticism by the elimination of the most significant element of this doctrine, viz.,
heterogeneous individuality. Moreover, it is, in my view, to a great extent, caused by
the reification of the ideas and values that are highly esteemed. This point will be
argued in Chapter 6. Indeed, what makes Romanticism valuable is its esteem of
freedom and individuality, which are exactly contradictory to totalitarian values.
A free and autonomous individuality may be a common idea shared by the
disenchanted modern thinkers and enchanted Romantics although they attempt to
interpret it on different levels. For the disenchanted modern thinkers, what
distinguishes the individual is autonomous rationality, for the Romantics affectivity.
On the level of the human/nature relationship, the individual is taken by the
disenchanted thinkers as the centre or core of nature, by the Romantics as one
integrative part. Nature for modern thinkers is an indifferent object, for the Romantics
an inseparable co-existence. For us, a learning about nature with feelings as well as
with reason can bring more meanings into our experience than a learning only
stressing rationality. Learning without heart, in some sense, is to learn to be machine-
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like. If animals had been devalued as automata because of their being (mis-)taken as
lacking feelings, nowadays we human beings have a convincing reason not to learn to
be automata: we have feelings and we can enrich our lives by learning about
deepening and widening our feelings --- our value-perspectives. An enchanted
orientation towards education, without completely ruling out the disenchanted view is




After exploration of the meaning of nature in relation to metaphysics, the idea of the
telos of nature and the issue of dis/enchantment, these further enquires arise: What
kind of human/nature relationships could be inferred from the previous discussions?
What inspirations could the related human/nature relationships bring to education? I
will argue in this chapter that the anthropocentric view, a very prevalent and yet
contentious idea in the fields of environmental ethics, sciences and (post)modernist
theory, is more related to the philosophy of being, the view of nature with divine telos,
and the disenchanted view than to the philosophy of becoming, the view of nature
with non-divine telos, and the enchanted view. The latter group of ideas could be
taken as grounds for conceiving a new alternative to anthropocentrism: I call it
anthropo-non-centrism. This chapter will argue that anthropo-non-centrism challenges
the traditional understanding of the human/nature relationship by re/construction.
Following this, anthropo-non-centrsim may shed new light on education.
Let me first introduce and define, in brief, the concepts of anthropocentrism and
anthropo-non-centrism used in this thesis. The concept of anthropocentrism and the
related environmental discourse have received much notice since the 20th century
partly because of rising environmental concerns. In general, anthropocentrism is
understood as one of the most crucial intellectual cruxes of human/nature
relationships and the resulting environmental problems (Griffin, 1988a, 1988b, 2000;
Merchant, 1992; Nash, 1989; Oelschlaeger, 1991; Purser, Park & Montuori, 1995;
White, 1967). Its underpinning philosophical ideologies are generally agreed as
modernism and Enlightenment humanism. In order to deal with environmental
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problems by changing the way of thinking, decision and action, many authors attempt
to find theoretical antidotes from the wing of counter-discourses such as biocentrism,
ecocentrism, deep ecology, and so on. Since modernism is taken as an important pillar
of anthropocentrism, the counter-thoughts of modernism, including premodern and
postmodern positions, are taken as possible sources of remedies for improving the
disorder caused by anthropocentrism.
In chief, this thesis argues that anthropocentrism which has been severely
criticised is a so-called strong anthropocentrism, underpinned by the mentioned
disenchanted view, theistic hierarchical view of beings, and philosophy of being.
Many authors (Leopold, 1949; Naess, 2005; Oelschlaeger, 1991; Purser, Park &
Montuori, 1995; White, 1967) assert that the strong anthropocentrism legitimises, to a
very large extent, human abuse of nature. This attitude or spirit is implicit in the
school curriculum. It is taken for granted, unseen and so powerfully conveyed to
pupils without much consideration or even awareness. In some respects,
anthropocentrism thus creates the pitfalls of our curricula. However, I am not fully
convinced by the appeals of some authors to the so-called opposite --- ecocentrism or
biocentrism. Some of the reasons have already been revealed above. In my view,
ecocentrists and anthropocentrists face a similar trap of thinking: a trap which is to
take a certain “centre” as a necessary condition for doctrines andpractices. The crux
of anthropocentrism lies not in “anthropo-” or “human” but in “centrism”. Thus eco-
“centrism” or any other “centrism” might not provide very proper clues for finding a 
solution to the predicament caused by anthropo-“centrism”. Moreover, granted that
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism can be taken as polarities, they both run the risk of
reification: one is to reify the idea of humanity, the other the idea of nature or
ecosystem. This will be explicated in the following section. On this ground, I thus
propose the concept of “anthropo-non-centrism” as the perspective resisting the idea 
of human self-arrogance. Anthropo-non-centrism, which is in tune with our desirable
views of nature discussed previously (philosophy of becoming, the concept of nature
with non-divine telos and the enchanted view), may hold more potential to extricate
human/nature relationships from the bounds of “centrism” and improve our present 
curricula.
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It will be argued that an anthropo-non-centric human/nature relationship might
inspire more possibilities for education than the anthropocentric view because there is
no longer one and only one centre as a totalising move to understand human beings
and nature; more perspectives could be included in education. The exploration of this
chapter will demonstrate that anthropo-non-centrism may bring forth a perspective of
human/nature relationships with less dominance and hubris but more deliberation,
attentiveness and sense of responsibility than anthropocentrism. Viewed in this light,
the anthropo-non-centric human/nature relationship could be more helpful to improve
human/nature relationships and increase and enrich the meanings of education.
6.1 Anthropocentrism and Nature
This section is going to clarify the meaning of anthropocentrism and discuss the idea
of intrinsic value of nature which has been taken as a key idea opposing
anthropocentrism: ecocentrism. The discussions will problematise and question the
ecocentric idea of intrinsic value of nature and point towards an alternative of
anthropo-non-centrism to replace anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. This will be
explicated in the next section.
There have been numerous discussions of the idea of anthropocentrism. For
example, Nash (1989, p. 10) defines anthropocentrism as taking human beings as “the 
measure of al value”. Eckersley (1992, p.51) defines it as “the belief that there is a 
clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature,
that humankind is the only principal source of value or meaning in the world”. Many 
authors point out that the term “anthropocentrism” is used to highlight the diference 
between human beings and non-human beings (especially animals) and legitimise the
status of human beings as moral agents (Braun, 2004; Grey, 1993).
Anthropocentrism can be recognised as taking human beings as the “centre” of 
the world and justifying human mastery over nature and all nonhuman beings. The
supremacy of human beings can also be understood as a self-arrogance or hubris
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because human beings take themselves as the most important organisms in the world.
In this view, the other living beings and nonliving beings are, of course, less important.
Anthropocentrism is thus criticised by Nash (1989) as human chauvinism or
speciesism. However, what causes human beings to take themselves as the highest
and most important creature in nature? What causes human arrogance when faced
with the other beings in nature? What justifies human beings as masters of nature?
The previous explorations have revealed that anthropocentrism is in some respects
highly related to the following different notions: the philosophy of being, the view of
nature with divine telos, and the disenchanted view.
In chief, the three philosophical notions above collaborate to outline, on the one
hand, nature as a predictable, controllable, and submissive machine and, on the other,
human beings as the highest beings in nature with the privileged rationality approved
by God. Rationality is the ability exclusively possessed by human beings; moreover, it
is a privilege approved by the divinity. The philosophy of being contributes to the
interpretation of a reality of nature composed of atoms in accordance with
mechanistic laws; on this view, everything in nature is fixed, stable, determined,
understandable, predictable and controllable by a certain mind --- by deity or human
beings. Nature, in this view, is often taken as something that could and should be
under mastery of deity and humans. Here we can find reinforcement of the conception
of nature with divine telos.
The conception of nature with divine telos privileges human rationality and
thereby legitimises human supremacy. Rationality is taken as an all-embracing and
exclusive human talent; it is all-embracing because it penetrates everything in nature
and attempts to grasp the essence; it is exclusive for no living beings in world except
humans can possess it. By means of rationality, human beings achieve “Science” as an 
absolute, autonomous, objective and universal discipline of knowledge to help human
beings demarcate human and non-human worlds, to define human beings themselves
as superior to the other beings, to justify human mastery over other beings.
Meanwhile, the disenchanted attitudes towards nature are encouraged and reinforced.
In education, the disenchanted view enhances an objective, indifferent and
emotionless atitude towards nature in the name of “Science”. These views encourage 
human sovereignty and hubris; in short, all the above ideas consummate an arrogant
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anthropocentric view of the human/nature relationship. The anthropocentric
orientation of education tends to take for granted human mastery over nature, human
self-arrogance and hubris, and human beings as the only criteria of all things and all
values in the world. Its adherents tend to convey them, largely unseen to pupils
through curriculum without much consideration or examination. An anthropocentric
view takes nature as an available, controllable and exploitable resource, a reservoir.
Many anthropocentric authors and educators are aware of the relationships
between environmental problems and anthropocentrism; they assert that improvement
and making “good” use of technology, an idea based on anthropocentrism, can solve 
the tension between environmental problems and anthropocentrism. Granted that
technology plays a very crucial role in this tension, the development of more
environment-friendly technology and education may be important for improving
environmental problems. What needs notice is that this technological approach is
based on anthropocentric thinking which can be very limited and needs to be criticised
in-depth. The technological approach is only an expedient solution for alleviating the
environmental crisis; it cannot undo the meaning-poverty in education caused by
anthropocentrism. This view and its implied hubris towards nature could still exert
great influence on education to transmit prodigal and reckless practices and
institutions even when people intend to make “good” use of nature. If 
anthropocentrism is taken as a basic assumption and the ways to solve the
shortcomings caused by it can only be contrived under this framework, the
possibilities of conceiving alternative human/nature relationships may be reduced.
The human/nature relationships could be impoverished. Thus I do not deny the
importance of seeking more environment-friendly technology in practice; but this
does not mean that anthropocentrism should be taken as the only perspective on
conceiving and educating in human/nature relationships.
These problems related to anthropocentrism include not only those which are
related to the three underpinning views of nature and have been mentioned in the
previous chapters, but also those concerning values and ethics.
According to many authors, such as Aldo Leopold (1949) and Arne Naess
(2005), the meaning of nature on the anthropocentric account is poor because
anthropocentrism devalues nature and takes nature as an “object” which, as mentioned, 
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is “merely a machine” and an instrument. Againstthis, they assert the intrinsic value
of al beings in nature. This belief is caled “universalism” or “ecocentrism” (Weston, 
1996; Nash, 1989). From the perspective of universalists or ecocentrists, the value of
nature is not merely instrumental but an end in itself, as an objective and intrinsic
value. For these authors, there is an intrinsic value in nature. For example, Leopold
(1949) describes “land ethics” as an ethics that “simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or colectively, the land”. 
Leopold’s view obviously takes non-human beings as participants in the moral sphere,
implying that human and non-human beings have moral values. Naess (2005) also
claims that, “The wel-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth
have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic values, inherent values). These values
are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.” (2005. 
p. 40) Moreover, these proponents of intrinsic value of nature take this idea as the test
of the legitimacy of environmental ethics. As J. B. Calicot (1995) states, “how to 
discover intrinsic value in nature is the defining problem for environmental ethics. For
if no intrinsic value can be attributed to nature then environmental ethics is nothing
distinct. If nature, that is, lacks intrinsic value, then environmental ethics is but a
particular application of human-to-human ethics”. Folowing these ecocentrists’ 
comments, the idea of intrinsic value of nature seems to be taken as key to bring forth
more and richer meaning for education. None the less, before we attempt to answer
this question “Does nature with intrinsic value bring more significant and richer 
meanings to education than without?” we need to think about the question first: “Is 
there any intrinsic value of nature?” or “Can the value of nature exist in itself?” 
There are many supporters of the idea of intrinsic value of nature: many authors
including Holmes Rolston III (1989a, 1989b), Callicott (1995), and Bonnett (2003)
argue for the intrinsic value of nature. According to Bonnett, the intrinsic value in
nature, a value in itself, lies in the “naturalness” of nature including the features of 
nature as self-arising and as origin inspiring numerous human experiences of its
values. On this point, a similarity can be found between Bonnett and Callicott: they
both atempt to justify the value of nature as intrinsic by integrating Rolston’s ideas. 
Calicot (1995) makes more efforts to develop a “postmodern account of intrinsic
value”. Calicot argues that the critical core of postmodernism is the decentring or 
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deconstruction of the Cartesian subject. Based on this point, Callicott argues for the
theory of intrinsic value whereby values as potentiality are actualised by situated
valuers. This is suspicious to me. If a value is constructed during the process of
interaction of valuing subject and the valued object, it is not appropriate to call that
value intrinsic.
As Callicott (1995) cites, Merriam Webster’s Colegiate Dictionarydefines
“intrinsic” as “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing”; then it 
seems reasonable to define “intrinsic value” as “the value belonging to the essential 
nature or constitution of a thing”. Folowingthis, I have two reasons to deny the
existence of “intrinsic value”. First, it is debatable that whether there is any essential 
nature or essence of a thing. According to the previous discussion, this thesis takes a
viewpoint of philosophy of becoming which casts doubts on immutable, unchangeable
and fixed ideas, concepts and essences. If the essence of a thing is doubtful, it is
doubtful for this thing or entity to have any intrinsic nature or property, be this thing
or entity a stone or a human being or an animal. Secondly, a “value” may not be any 
objective property but a concept bestowed by a valuer; this idea can be a subject-
dependent concept. It cannot exist on its own. That value is subjective or relational
does not mean that it is arbitrary or deceptive.
Even if we follow the views of Callicott and Rolston, value is determined,
evaluated and located in context; it does not exist purely in and of itself. In addition,
drawing on Rolston, Callicott points out that deconstruction of meaning does not
occur only on the concept of value but also on the valuing subject him/herself because
both are contextualised. If the valuing subject and the valued object can both be
deconstructed, apparently so can the “value”. On this ground, no value is intrinsic and 
exists in itself; any value is bestowed on the object during the process of evaluation by
one or more subjects. The existence of the object valued is different from the value
itself; thus, it is one thing to admit the possibility of the existence of nature, whether it
be raw material or intelligible, and another to take it as having internal value as
intrinsic to it. On this account, there is no intrinsic value in nature. In addition, it does
not mean that nature is totaly fictional; it is just not “ready-made” or “ready-to-learn” 
as it is.
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Now, it seems that our enquiry for solution to the anthropocentric predicament
returns to our original question but moves forward one step: Since the meaning of
nature evaluated and educated is limited from the anthropocentric perspective, is there
any other perspective that can provide richer meaning for life and education without
holding the ecocentric or universalist idea of intrinsic value of nature?
It has been shown from the above discussions about intrinsic value that the role
of humanity as a valuing subject is ineffaceable; in other words, humanity as an
epistemic or perceptive agent in the understanding of nature or world is ineradicable.
In some respects, anthropocentrism can be criticised but not totally denied. Therefore,
the true problem is: How can human beings understand nature without taking
themselves as the ultimate centre of the construction of meaning? How can human
beings deal with nature without reckless and excessive exploitation of nature?
For some authors, such as Andrew Light (2000), Bryan Norton (1984) and Jan
Deckers (2004), the division of the notion of anthropocentrism into strong and weak
could be a solution. Strong anthropocentrism is defined as the doctrine emphasising
the differences and discontinuities between human and nonhuman beings in order to
justify human exploitation of nonhuman beings (Deckers, 2004; Light, 2000; Notron,
1984). Strong anthropocentrism is taken as the crux of the environmental predicament.
Weak anthropocentrism, admitting the role of human beings without necessarily
vindicating the intrinsic value of nature, might thus provide improvement.
These authors argue for weak anthropocentrism, however, their conceptions of
this weak anthropocentrism are not equivalent. Among these authors, Norton’s weak 
anthropocentrism rules out belief in the intrinsic value of nature. Norton (1984, p. 135)
defines strong anthropocentrism as taking “unquestioned felt preferences of human 
individuals as determining value” while weak anthropocentrism as the theory of value
incorporating human felt preferences and desires as well as rational and critical ideals
such as living in harmony with nature rather than valuing nature intrinsically. From
his perspective, the assertion of the intrinsic value of nature runs the risk of
“questionable ontological commitment” (Norton, 1984, p. 138). 
As for Light, he divides anthropocentrism into strong, weak and non-. The most
crucial point of the weak anthropocentrism consists in the notion that human beings
have moral obligations to future generations to leave them a healthy environment;
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while non-anthropocentrism is distinguished by the point that there is intrinsic value
in al “natural” beings but not in “non-natural” objects or man-made objects (Light,
2000, p. 69). We may find that Light’s weak anthropocentrism assumes human 
intrinsic value while his non-anthropocentrism 38 is grounded on a distinction of
humans and nature which assumes an essential difference between human and
nonhuman beings. Both the idea of human intrinsic value and the essential
human/nonhuman distinction still fall into the trap of the essentialism of taking
humanity or nature as a certain, fixed and static entity.
According to Deckers, weak anthropocentrism “ataches greater moral 
significance to the intrinsic values that exist within the nonhuman world, and leads to
a number of practical behavioural rules…which would not be embraced by strong 
anthropocentrism” (Deckers, 2004, p. 360). Deckers points out that this weak 
anthropocentric ethics can be understood as weak egalitarian speciesism. The basic
doctrine of this weak anthropocentric ethics or weak egalitarian speciesism can be
summarised into the following two points. First of all, speciesism, meaning favouring
members of our own species, is a natural inclination and therefore is moral.
Interspecific discrimination (discrimination among different species) is allowed.
Intraspecific discrimination (discrimination between members of the same species) is
not allowed; this is egalitarianism --- since all human beings are members of the same
species, they are not allowed to be discriminated against. Secondly, nonhuman living
beings have intrinsic value because they have similar goals to human beings,
including survival, flourishing, or having experiences. Nonliving beings have their
intrinsic value since “they realise themselves in ways that are not entirely determined 
by external forces” (Deckers, 2004, pp. 359-387).
We may find from the above that Deckers’ view justifies the intrinsic value of
nonhuman living beings by means of anthropomorphism and that of nonliving beings
by means of teleology. In comparison with Light’s view, his view tends to advocate 
continuity between human and nonhuman beings, which is consistent with the
perspectives of philosophy of becoming and the evolutionary view of nature.
However, Deckers’ explanation of weak anthropocentrism does not convincingly 
38 In the terms of Nash (1984) and Weston (1996), the non-anthropocentrism in Light’s mind could be 
caled “biocentrism” or “sentientism”, admiting that al sentient living beings but not nonliving beings 
have intrinsic value.
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overcome the shortcomings of the strong anthropocentrism defined by himself and
cannot sufficiently lead to the attachment of greater moral significance to the
nonhuman world. According to his definition, strong anthropocentrism is described as
the doctrine emphasising the differences and discontinuities between human and
nonhuman beings in order to justify human exploitation of nonhuman beings. If we
make a comparison between these two versions of anthropocentrism we hardly find
from the weak anthropocentrism how to “repair” the diferences or discontinuities 
between human and nonhuman beings implied by the strong view; on the contrary,
Deckers’ weak anthropocentrism is nearer to strong anthropocentrism than he 
acknowledges because, basically, Deckers asserts the discontinuity between humans
and nonhumans and takes human intrinsic value as the ultimate criterion, which can
be seen as the legacy of strong anthropocentrism or Enlightenment humanism.39
Overall, although the authors above do not provide a sufficient and coherent
explanation of weak anthropocentrism, their distinction of anthropocentrism into
strong and weak helps to 1) pin down the theoretical crux of the human/nature
relationship and 2) reveal that human beings are the inevitable but not the
monopolised participants during the process of perceiving nature. Viewed in this light,
strong anthropocentrism can thus be understood as the notion that takes human beings
as the “centre” of the world, and the idea of the discontinuity and diferences between 
human and nonhuman beings which are often used to justify human supremacy and
hubris and human mastery over nature and all nonhuman beings. Furthermore, nature
39 There are two flaws in Deckers’ argument, which can be divided into two aspects: relating to non-
human living beings and non-living beings. On the aspect of non-human living beings, Deckers asserts
that non-human living beings have intrinsic value due to their human-like behaviours. We may find that
this assertion is grounded on the belief of intrinsic value of humanity. This belief is obviously the
legacy of strong anthropocentrism or Enlightenment humanism and weakens the critical power of weak
anthropocentrism. Following this, two points are in need of more clarification: first, animals have
intrinsic values because they behave like human beings. This point seems to suggest that human
behaviours can be used to prove human intrinsic value. But why? Because they are rational? On one
hand, if human intrinsic value is justified by rational behaviours and the underpinning rationality or
mind, can animals’ human-like behaviours be taken as a proof that they are rational beings and then to
manifest the intrinsic value of animals? Obviously this is a self-contradictory view. On the other hand,
if human behaviours are irrelevant to their intrinsic value, there is no point in using the analogy
between human behaviours and animals’ human-like behaviours to legitimise the intrinsic value of
animals. As for nonliving beings, according to Deckers, their intrinsic value is shown in their
realisation in ways “that are not entirely determined by external forces” (2004, p. 379). Deckers seems 
to suggest that nonliving beings realise themselves in accordance with natural laws which are not
determined by human beings. However, the concept of law is as arguable as that of intrinsic value.
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in the perspective of strong anthropocentrism is a resource at human disposal and
command.
In order to solve the problems caused by strong anthropocentrism, some critics
of anthropocentrism attempt to eradicate the differences by the assertion of the
intrinsic value of nature (as well as humans); however, this orientation is to mistake
the subjective conception as the objective idea and is possibly to lead to the danger of
objectifying and reifying the ideas of value, nature and humanity. Acknowledging that
nature has no intrinsic value does not necessarily imply a sweeping victory of the
strong anthropocentrism and its continuous arrogant dominion for future educational
ideas and practices about nature. Some other authors attempt to solve the problems by
revealing the anthropocentric over-emphasis on, and over-estimation of humanity;
“humanity” is thus taken as the target that needs to be examined, interogated, fixed, 
or even eradicated. However, the objectification and reification of the idea of nature
faces the same critique: “humanity” in the strong anthropocentric sense as wel as 
“nature” in the ecocentric sense are efectively taken as essences which are immutable 
and fixed properties. The issue of humanism (as in relation to essentialism) has
already aroused innumerable discussions; various modes of thinking such as
postmodernism, anti-anthropocentrism, anti-humanism, inhuman, posthumanism,
non-anthropocentrism, plural humanism and, eco-pluralism attempt to overcome
human hubris by various means of dealing with the idea of human subjectivity or
humanity, such as correction, amendment, reconceptualisation, erasure, or
deconstruction (Badmington, 2003; Braun, 2004; Curry, 2003, 2007; Derrida, 1969;
Stables & Scott, 2001; Weston, 1991). These postmodern positions can provide
inspiration for the development of the kind of weak anthropocentrism that this thesis
is pursuing. It is a perspective acknowledging interaction and intertwinement between
humans and nature without taking human beings as the only one centre nor
eradicating human beings as understanding agents. Weak anthropocentrism gives us
the inspiration that nature without any intrinsic value can still be taken as the source
of meaning and at the same time, human beings can be meaning-conceiving without
being the only carriers of meaning. The concept of nature without intrinsic value does
not denote a fictional nature; likely, the understanding of the human/nature
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relationship without human-centeredness does not imply the negation of human
subjectivity.
Following the discussions of the previous chapters and drawing on postmodern
ideas and weak anthropocentrism, I propose a notion of anthropo-non-centrism as an
orientation of recognising the epistemological primacy of human beings and
deconstructing the perspective of taking human beings as the centre of the world. In
my view, anthropo-non-centrism holds potential for leading our understanding of the
continuity between human and nonhuman beings and for the deconstruction of
human-centredness.
6.2 Anthropo-non-centrism and Nature
What is anthropo-non-centrism? What inspirations could it bring to our education to
improve the flaw of meaning-poverty caused by strong anthropocentrism?
In my view, anthropo-non-centrism is a vantage point which acknowledges
every human being as a starting point of weaving one’s own lifeworld but without 
taking the collective human beings as the ultimate and exclusive centre of significance
in the world. This view is conceived on the ground of philosophy of becoming, the
view of nature with non-divine telos and the enchanted view. From this view, the
understanding of the relationship between humans and nature could be more open and
inclusive; the boundary between humans and nature is reconsidered; more flexibility,
possibilities and meanings might be brought in the understanding of the human/nature
relationship. Overall, anthropo-non-centrism could point towards new and fresh
meanings for our education.
In order to justify this position, it is necessary to explicate how it is possible for
us to understand nature without taking ourselves as the ultimate convergent centre,
without monopolising human beings as the exclusive source of meanings, since, as
human beings, it seems impossible for us to conceive nature from a perspective other
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than our own. What may be helpful for us to make this exploration is to think how the
divides between humans and nonhuman nature, centre and margin, and “what human 
beings are” and “what they are not” have been formed. The histories of both humanity 
and humanism are mainly a history of humanisation --- defining what humanity is by
the exclusion of what humanity is not. The history of education in this sense can be
understood as a history of educating about the inclusion of what humanity is and the
exclusion of what humanity is not. Therefore, the history of education can be
understood as a record of exclusion and inclusion inevitably. On this view, animals
and machines are two very conspicuous representatives to be ruled out of the human
world through history. The exploration of animal and machine can shed light on the
process of establishing anthropocentrism and the implied problems: How do people
learn about animals? How do people learn and teach about machines? What kinds of
conception of animal and machine are implied during the process of learning?
It is undeniable that animals have always played an important part in stories,
fables, legends, myths and folklores in all cultures. These stories can be the sources
from which people learn about animals. Yet the huge number of the stories about
animals does not necessarily imply the same huge amount of meanings of animals.
Interestingly, the roles of animals in these stories are often depicted either in a
humanised way or as unintelligible monsters and ogres. The aim of the stories may be
to teach about the social and ethical codes but not the knowledge of animals
themselves. As Derida (2002) states, “We know the history of fabulation and how it 
remains an anthropomorphic taming, a moralising subjection, a domestication.
Always a discourse of man, on man, indeed on the animality of man, but for and as
man” (2002, p. 405). If animals themselves are taken as the object to be learned, it has 
been a tendency for animals to be taken as manipulatable and deployable resources for
human exploitation.
Animal experimentation and vivisection have been conducted since ancient
times. For example, Galen of Pergamon, the physician of Marcus Aurelius, used
vivisection to make studies of the functions of respiration and heart action. He
stressed an indifferent and pitiless attitude towards animals when conducting
vivisection (Maehle & Tröhler, 1987). The attitude towards animals is the
disenchanted attitude as discussed above. This kind of attitude is prevalent through
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many intellectual discourses in history. Aristotle, as mentioned, could be regarded as
an important initiator of biological science. In his related works such as History of
Animals, Aristotle gave detailed accounts of various functions of various body parts of
animals. The tone he describes is objective, neutral and scientific. For instance, he
divided blooded animals into four categories: oviparous and legless, oviparous and
biped or quadruped, internally viviparous and legless, and internally viviparous and
biped or quadruped (Cosan, 1998). The most important point is that the categorisation
is grounded on dissection, vivisection and anatomical thinking (Cosan, 1998). The
assumption is that animals are objects, not one of us --- human beings. Therefore
human vivisection is unacceptable and a violation, as Boyle states, “not only of 
divinity but humanity” (cited in Maehle & Tröhler, 1987, p. 20). The notion of 
divinity provides legitimacy for human supremacy as well as for human conducting
animal experimentation, dissection and vivisection.
The biological and physiological similarities and commonalities between animal
body and human body and structures disturb philosophers and scientists who have a
belief in the Enlightenment humanism before the advent of evolutionary biology. The
disturbance can be addressed as folows. Since human beings are God’s chosen 
creatures among various living beings, why are there physiological and physical
similarities between humans and animals? Thus we read the following idea from
Descartes and Malebranche’s works that, without any feelings, animals are beast-
machines or automata. For Descartes, animals are beast-machines that cannot feel
pain but only go through external motions which in humans are symptomatic of pain
“without experiencing its mental sensation” (Maehle & Tröhler, 1987, p. 26). In order 
to maintain the discrimination between human beings and animals and sustained the
objection of the biological and physiological similarities, anthropocentrists assert that
animals are machines which are apparatuses, contrivances and instruments, whether
their bodies and human bodies are alike or not.
“Animal” and “machine” are paradoxicaly combined as “beast-machine” --- in
theterm of Descartes: both are grouped into the same category of “nonhumans”. And 
thus in some respects, they are amalgamated as “automaton”. In general “animal”, 
“machine” and “automaton”, as nonhuman aliens or monsters, are taken as things with 
less importance and lower value; they are in the same group, the oppositional and
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subjugated group in relation to human beings. The features of the most occult and the
most distinct are amalgamated together and bring forth the concept of “automaton”. 
As Derrida states, “Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast
encampment of the animal…as in a virgin forest, a zoo, a hunting or fishing ground, a 
paddock or an abattoir, a space of domestication, are all the living things that man
does not recognise as his felows, his neighbours, or his brothers” (2002, p. 402). 
What is more interesting is that a paradox is deeply implied in the history of exclusion
of nonhuman beings, that is, human beings are defined themselves by defining the
others or aliens.
From histories we usually learn that animals are objects that have been raised,
farmed, hunted, captivated, domesticated, tamed, or trained by human beings.
Animals are the objects to be deployed and exploited during these relationships;
however, according to Derrida, it is because of animals that humans are humanised
through practising these actions. These human actions exerted on animals such as
farming, hunting, and domestication can be understood as “being after”, “being 
alongside”, “being near”, “being with”, etc (Derrida, 2002). These relationships
between humans and animals are mutually interrelated and inter-revealing. In this
respect, Derrida reveals the meaning implied in the human/animal relationship which
has often been ignored: the concept of animal is invented by human beings and at the
same time, human beings invent themselves by inventing animals (nonhuman beings).
According to Derrida, the Greek mythology of Bellerophon and Chimaera sheds light
on the relationship of humanity and animal: “He [Belerophon] represents…the figure 
of the hunter. He follows. He is he who follows. He follows and persecutes the beast.
He would say: I am (folowing), I pursue, I track, overcome, and tame the animal” 
(Derrida, 2002, p. 410). Moreover, there is a more implicit and deeper relationship
between humanity and animal in this myth: in order to hunt and kill Chimaera,
Bellerophon needs to tame Pegasus, archetypal horse, as well as his own half-brother.
Thus this human pursuit of animal is indeed a pursuit of an “other” self. It is insightful
for education: what and how educators teach about animals should be put under re-
examination and reconsideration. Animals are taught about in a way that tends to
emphasise the discontinuity and the opposition between human subjects and animal
objects.
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As mentioned, the stories of animals are actually the stories of humans, about
the animality of human beings: “Always a discourse of man, on man, indeed on the 
animality of man, but for and as man” (Derrida, 2002, p. 405). Derida reveals the
human/nature divide as a conceptual construction embedded in culture, tradition and
language. This process of identifying animal as “animal-machine” is a discriminative 
domestication exerted on animals by incorporating “animal” as the wild and the 
uninteligible into “machine” as the manageable and inteligible. This process is a 
discrimination operated by one species --- Homo sapiens --- on all the other species
that are taken not qualified as Homo sapiens and thereby are taken as an other
“whole” --- the Animal. Therefore he uses a neologism “animot” combining the terms 
of “animal” (animal/animaux) and “word” (mot) to represent “the Animal” (Braun, 
2004; Derrida, 2002). Since this process of discrimination has been deeply implanted
and embedded in culture and language, it becomes a repeated and almost automatic
operation of separating nonhumans from humans; in the terms of Italian Philosopher
Giorgio Agamben (2002), this process is an operation of the “anthropological 
machine” including two kinds of manufacturing acts: humanisation and animalisation.
In my view, this machine aims at manufacturing two main kinds of qualified products:
human beings and nonhuman beings, the civilised and the wild, the educable and the
uneducable. As Agamben states, this“anthropological machine”
…is at work in our culture. Insofar as the production of man through 
the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the
machine necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also
already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also always already an
exclusion). (Agamben, 2002, p. 37)
Overal, what inspirations can Derida’s “animot” and Agamben’s “anthropological 
machine” arouse for education?
In the views of Derrida and Agamben, the human/nature or human/animal
relationship can be understood from a viewpoint that goes beyond the accepted and
habitual tradition. The understanding of “animots” and “anthropological machine” 
helps us to envisage a position, a vantage point or a perspective which embraces
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different views of human beings and non-human beings, which can be referred to as
anthropo-non-centrism. Human beings and nonhuman beings are inseparable and
continuous in this light; human beings cannot be humans without animals. Anthropo-
non-centrism illuminates how the accepted thoughts are deeply influenced by
anthropocentrism: we, human beings, invent ourselves in the sense of inventing
nonhuman beings in order to construct human beings as the masters of nature. We set
forth the meanings of humanity by means of expelling the nonhuman beings from our
territory; actually, we expel and impoverish ourselves. Therefore, human beings
indeed are not the centre of this world, though we always (mis)take ourselves as such.
Thus we may infer that the concepts of human beings and animals exist on a
continuum; there is no distinct borderline in between. In this sense, the understandings
of human beings and of animal are continuous.
Some thoughts related to education can be made explicit.
First of all, the anthropocentric distinction between human beings and animals is
a discrimination against both groups. What is in common for both groups is that they
need to undergo the normalised treatment from the anthropological or cultural
machine to be “qualified products”. We are thus invited to ponder the following
questions: Are humans treated in the way that animals are treated? Is there any action
that is assumed to be “proper” for exerting on animals exerted on humans? If so, is it 
acceptable or allowable? For example, we always take it for granted to tame or train
animals; can we take it as proper to tame or train pupils? Can the process of learning
be understood as a process of receiving discipline or training or machining? What
does it mean by “a ‘humane’treatment of ‘animals’”? Certainly, the process of
edification, civilisation or normalisation is, in some respects, the process of
normalisation, standardisation and specification. The end of standardisation, whether
be it performed in school or in factory, is to produce qualified and accredited
outcomes, e.g. students with completion of GCSE or IGCSE exams. If we are not
comfortable about the thought that takes humans as machines, why do we accept
schooling as a process of civilising and edifying when this process is actually
practising the normalisation, credentialisation and standardisation of people? Why do
human beings subjugate themselves to the “anthropological machine”, whetherit be
in the names of tradition, culture, custom, schooling or any institution? Why do
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people yield themselves to the institution-machine to be rated, ranked, marked,
classified and trained, tamed, labelled and allocated? Why do people obey the
machining which leads to a uniform view and life with poor meaning? If education
should aim to lead people to learn and to live a more meaningful life, what should be
done to the present machinised schooling and curriculum?
In some respects, these enquiries in relation to animals shed light on the
inextricable and paradoxical relationship between humans and nonhumans. We have
found that, on the one hand, the concepts of humans and animals are interdependent
and interweaved; there is a mutual reliance; on the other hand, it seems unbearable for
us to imagine that humans and animals are treated in the same way, especially in
education. It is unbearable if pupils are treated in the way that animals are usually
dealt with. The sense of “unbearableness” invites us to reconsider in-depth how we
differentiate ourselves from animals, how the boundary between humans and animals
is drawn, how the boundary is fixed and reified and how the boundary exerts
oppression. The traditional anthropocentric view has already provided a lot of
arguments for discrimination against animals in theory and practice; these arguments
have been challenged and discredited. What needs notice is that the interrelationship
of humans and nonhumans is beneficial for problematising the taken-for-granted
things.
We used to treat humans and nonhumans in certain ways and attitudes. If we are
not very sensitive and critical to reflect and examine what we are used to, the sense of
“unbearableness” wil not emerge when customary ways are practised. Only when the 
customary ways of treating objects are changed, our sense of unfamiliarity appears
and the implied discrimination towards beings has been unearthed. Thus the sense of
“unbearableness” is educationaly important because it problematises the ways that 
we used to treat particular beings (including humans and animals) in particular ways.
Further questions arise: From the conventional perspective, is there any specific and
particular way of treating humans that cannot be exerted on animals, and vice versa?
Whether the answer is positive or negative, what is the reason? The considerations led
by the above questions are crucial for preventing the educational predicament of
meaning-impoverishment by the customary or habitual way of teaching. This point is
in tune with the previous discussion about the philosophy of becoming: the “reality” 
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of nature is that there is no fixed reality in and of nature; everything is becoming.
Meaning is constructed and perceived within these dynamic interactions and thereby
keeps relational and differing. Therefore, it can be suggested that all the ideas and
practices are questioned and examined continuously because nothing should be taken
for granted or accepted as it is. If the habitual ways of thinking and practice are not
questioned, their meanings might be fixed and restricted and could result to the
poverty of meaning, which is the crisis of education based on anthropocentric view.
The operation of the anthropological machine implies a social-political
discrimination. It was originally a process of drawing the distinction between humans
and nonhumans, revealed by Derrida and Agamben, a process of “machinisation” to 
manufacture or produce non/humans. This machine machinises all beings to
distinguish nonhumans from humans; the “nonhumans” can include animals and 
“unqualified” humans. For example, “the slaves, the barbarian, andthe foreigner, as
figures of an animal in human form” should be excluded (Agamben, 2002, p. 37). In 
his view, humans are thus animalised; in other words, unqualified humans are (taken
as) animals. Every individual being is like a part which is moulded, shaped and
welded by the huge machine. It is omnipotent but intangible, omnipresent but
invisible. It is deeply embedded and interweaved in culture, tradition and language.
No human being can be fully extricated from the fabrication of the established.
Viewed in this light, the anthropological machine is an all-embracing and all-inclusive
hegemony.
The anthropological machine is thus a means for exerting bio-power (to
distinguish between nonhumans and humans) and socio-political power (to
distinguish nonhumans in human forms from humans). As a vast and collective
achievement, it seems difficult to be escaped from for all beings. Processed by the
anthropological machine, humans and nonhumans are specified and regulated in a
particular way. The definition, specification and regulation are outcomes of human
civilisations, customs, cultures, languages and traditions which are crystallisations of
human common and collective experience. In other words, traditions, cultures,
languages and customs are the ideas and practices that have been implemented by a
group or groups of people for a period of time. Viewed in this light, the performance
of the anthropological machine is a process of exerting the establishing meaning
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through collective construction. The meanings of non/humans are constituted through
the operation of the vast collective machine which handles, arranges, organises and
structures the collective human experience. The above brings some deeper thoughts
concerning education to us: whether the collective experience should be taken as a
model for every individual to follow? If so, where does individual difference and
creativity emerge and be conserved? In addition, if the collective perspective is taken
as the only perspective for understanding and learning about the world, nature,
humans and nonhumans, we return back on the path of strong anthropocentrism
whose undesirability has already been argued. Therefore the critiques above lead us to
question and problematise anthropocentrism.
However, I do not mean to reject the collective experience, which, as a part of
culture, language and tradition, is also an inseparable part of every individual
meaning-construction process. The collective experience which is defined by this
thesis as “anonymity”, wil be elaborated in the next chapter. As long as humans learn
and understand, they interact with collective experience. What I mean to emphasise is
that individuality and individual difference should be greatly heeded and taken as
primary. Yet in the mainstream anthropocentric view, learning about collective
experience is taken for granted whereas individual difference is lessened and
suppressed. Actually, regarding learning, individual difference matters much more
than collective experience because every significant moment and experience is
individual and different from the others. Individuals cannot be moulded or shaped into
similar and alike people. Individuals must and should be individuals who are different
from each other even take the same process of machining-schooling.
Thus we still could find an exit or a fissure of the anthropological machine for
individuals to flee away. According to Agamben, there is a so-caled “bare life” which 
“is neither an animal life nor a human life”, but a zone “within which…the 
articulation between human and animal, man and nonman, speaking being and living
being, must take place” (Agamben, 2002, p. 38). In my understanding, this bare life 
denotes the fissure which provides the intermediate and intertwining zone of humanity
and animality. This fissure, in my view, lies in every individual embodied experience.
It is the primordial and embodied experience of the individual living being. It is an
occasion for individual freedom and difference to emerge and exercise. The individual
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embodied experience provides us a possibility to learn that every one is different from
any other and anyone holds potential for providing difference. This point will be more
fully argued in the following chapter.
This is a starting point for constructing our anthropo-non-centrism: the multiple
and heterogeneous individual views are the ground for understanding all beings in
nature. On this view, every being provides a perspective as a part of the view of
nature; yet no one perspective can and should override the others’. Even in our own 
internal field of understanding, we always conceive meaning from the process of
interacting with the others including human and nonhuman beings. In contrast,
anthropocentrism supposes that there is “one” perspective which can present and
represent the view of the whole of humanity. Its implied danger of impoverishing
meaning of life and education has been revealed and thereby needs improvement. The
discussion of Derida’s and Agamben’s critiques of strong anthropocentrism 
strengthens the argument for anthropo-non-centrism and, interestingly, gives the hint
of the significance of personal embodied experience, which will be pursued in the
next chapter.
6.3 Summary
In closing, the grounds for anthropo-non-centrism and the related critiques of
anthropocentrism can be summarised as follows:
1) The meaning of “human” is intertwined with that of “nonhuman” or 
“nature”; the understanding of “human” is constructed on the ground of 
drawing the distinction between humans and nonhumans.
2) Human or anthropo- understanding is always an understanding occurring in
changing relations including “being-with”, “being-along”, “being after”, 
“being near”, etc. Human understanding is always relational and cannot be 
monopolised by one centre.
180
3) Nature in this anthropo-non-centric view denotes a conceptual source which
inspires differences, e.g., different understanding, different interpretation,
and different meaning.
4) The discrimination against “nonhuman” (including “animal” and “machine”) 
exerted by the anthropological machine is at the same time, implicitly or
explicitly, exerted against human beings.
5) The process of meaning-construction incorporates the collective and
individual aspects while the latter is often ignored.
6) The individual aspect of the process of meaning-construction, as the zone
where individual difference lies, holds the potential for evoking more and
richer meanings and thereby offers an escape from the restriction of the
anthropological machine and anthropocentrism. This point may lead to the
investigation in the next chapter, aiming at exploring the ways of
experiencing nature and revealing the most educationally desirable one.
In close we may conclude from the above exploration that, as members of Homo
sapiens, we cannot deny that our understanding must be grounded on a “human” 
perspective. But this “human perspective” or “anthropological perspective” is always 
intertwined with the understanding of nonhuman beings. Moreover, this “human” 
should not be interpreted as a whole species because the ways of understanding the
world of every human being are always diferent to some degree. This “human 
perspective” is not a pure, single and central view. Thus I propose anthropo-non-
centrism as a perspective, acknowledging the others as participants in the process of
meaning-construction for every particular individual. On this view, nature
incorporating humans and nonhumans can be conceptualised as a source which
inspires inexhaustible and unpredictable understanding, interpretation and meaning.
This anthropo-non-centrism holds more potential for bringing more and richer




Following the previous discussions of meaning of nature and the educational
implications, two kinds of approach to learning are adumbrated: disengaged and
engaged. This chapter will argue that the disengaged approach to learning of nature
can be inferred from the philosophy of being/substance, the view of nature with divine
telos, the disenchanted view and anthropocentrism, and the engaged approach from
the philosophy of becoming, the view of nature with non-divine evolutionary telos,
the enchanted view and anthropo-non-centrism. The disengaged approach to learning
about nature may not escape from the educational predicament caused by the
philosophy of being, the view of nature with divine telos, the disenchanted view and
anthropocentrism; furthermore, it could undergird the predicament by accentuating
collective and disembodied experience. In contrast, the engaged approach will be
revealed as the more desirable process of learning since it can lead to a more authentic
and meaningful learning and living than the disengaged view by emphasising
individual and dynamic embodied subjectivity.
The discussion in the previous chapter has shown that any moment of learning
and living in experience is always an interaction between body-subjects who are
situated in established contexts. The conceptions or knowledge that one body-subject
learns are, to a great extent, contextualised in customs, conventions, traditions and
languages and thereby can be understood as part of the majority or collective practice.
There is one important feature implied in collective practice: anonymity. The
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collectively accepted practices are implemented in and by the collective public who
are not known in person; in Heidegger’s (1962) term, the colective public or the 
colective subject are the anonymous “they”. This is what I cal “colectivism”, a view
of dismissing individual difference and taking every person as an equivalent member
of a certain group. In this sense, everyone is “equal” and without diference; everyone 
is the same and nameless “One”. The most important point is that the anonymous 
one/they is all as well as one; meanwhile, the anonymous they are not responsible
since they do not and cannot engage themselves with anything. Drawing on Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, engagement is defined in this thesis as a responsible action
practised in person, authentically in her own name and no-one else’s. Only a lived 
individual, a personal, intending agent can be a responsible subject.
What is educationally noticeable here is that every process of learning is unique;
it does not take place in a nameless or a collective subject. The learning process is
unique: it can bring particular interpretation and meaning from the unique individual
during the process of incorporating individual and collective experiences. The
collective experience denotes the experience that is accepted by the majority or
collective public, or anonymous they. The process of learning can be understood as
incorporating the part of acquiring collectively-accepted commonsense via shared
language and the part of inciting particular individual meaning. It will be argued that
the disengaged approach to learning, which is also the mainstream view of learning,
pays much heed to the common knowledge but rarely attends to the individually
different meanings. In my view, for educators, what needs to be valued is the
particularity and difference that is the source of creativity, innovation and novelty. To
pay attention to this part of the process of learning will be called the engaged
approach.
Overall, my general concern about education can be addressed as follows: the
mainstream discourses of learning pay unbalanced and excessive heed to commonly-
accepted, commensurable and established human experience. They tend to take the
disengaged approach to learning for granted. It will be argued that this view ignores
individual difference and results in the disembodiment of our curriculum. This limited
view of experience is what this thesis cals the “disengaged” view. This approach 
could cause the problem of meaning-impoverishment because it loses the balance
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between common and individual experiences. An approach to learning should be
rooted in personal lived experience, viz. lifeworld. This approach, in contrast with the
disengaged view, is the “engaged” view, stressing the incommensurability, 
embodiment, uniqueness, dynamics and particularity of every experiencing
individual--- i.e., the embodied authorship.
The above thoughts lead us to the final theme regarding nature: that of nature as
engaged and disengaged. It will be argued that the disengaged construction is more
collectively embedded, viz., culturally or socially dependent, while the engaged
construction puts more stress on the personal and idiosyncratic aspect. It will be
demonstrated that the disengaged approach to nature could aggravate the educational
predicament caused by the philosophy of being, the view of nature with divine telos,
the disenchanted view and excessive anthropocentrism; whereas the engaged
approach, consonant with the philosophy of becoming, the view of nature with non-
divine telos, the enchanted view and anthropo-non-centrism, may provide
improvement for the problem. Furthermore, the difference between the engaged and
disengaged approaches to the meaning-construction of nature will be made explicit by
the discussions of nature as another pair of polarities: space and place.
At last, we might return to the interrogation of nature with respect to the aspect
of engagement and disengagement: What kind of process of meaning-construction
between human beings and nature is educationally meaningful? How might human
beings dwell, act and create in their surroundings in an educationally meaningful way?
After the exploration in relation to the polarised ideas of engagement and
disengagement, I will attempt to show that the engaged learning process of the
concept of nature can bring richer and more meaning to education and curriculum
than the disengaged view.
7.1 Disengaged Learning and Collectivism as Disembodied
Anonymity
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This section aims to clarify the meaning of the disengaged approach and to reveal
how this approach influences educational ideas and practices about nature. It will be
demonstrated that this approach stresses disembodied experience with regard to
individuals as well as collectivity. Any one of any group is understood as an
anonymous being in this view. In my understanding, disembodiment and anonymity,
as characteristics of disengagement, could not be compatible with an engaged
approach to learning. Yet these two characteristics are often ignored. We may find
that many educational discourses related to the concept of engagement claim
themselves to be engaged approaches to learning but they actually imply the key
characteristics of disembodiment and anonymity; thus, they are self-refuting in some
sense. The following discussion will point out that the mainstream view of the
engaged approach to learning is indeed symptomatic of the disengaged approach by
revealing the implied features of disembodiment and anonymity. This exploration can
bring us to reconceive engaged learning as embracing embodied lived experience and
unique individuality.
A lot of studies focusing on school or student engagement have been done (Finn
& Voelkl, 1993; Fredricks, Blumenfeld & Paris, 2004; Mann, 2001; McMahon &
Portelli, 2004). As McMahon and Portelli (2004) point out, most studies of school or
student engagement hardly discuss the philosophical meaning of the polarised
concepts of disengagement and engagement, and consequently these concepts become
popular, even empty and superficial catch-phrases or slogans. Thus it is necessary to
conduct a philosophical investigation of the concepts of disengagement and
engagement. This philosophical enquiry of the polarities will make explicit the
distinguishing features between the dis/engaged approach of learning of this thesis
from the others and help us to consider their contribution for learning about nature.
In general, the disengaged approach to learning has encountered many
criticisms. Although there may be various interpretations of this approach, some traits
are specified by authors as alienation, passivity, detachment, estrangement, lack of
commitment and identification (Finn & Voelkl, 1993; Fredricks, Blumenfeld & Paris,
2004; Mann, 2001; McMahon & Portelli, 2004). Let us take a deeper look. For
example, McMahon and Portelli (2004) criticise the current discourse related to
student engagement as insufficient engagement (or disengagement) and propose an
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alternative approach. According to McMahon and Portelli (2004), the current view
can be divided into two types: the conservative/traditional and the liberal/student
oriented conceptions. Within the framework of the conservative or traditional
conception, learning happens by means of “abstract conceptualisations of engagement 
that are meant to apply to all settings irrespective of differences in contexts and
needs” (McMahon & Porteli, 2004, p.62). McMahon and Porteli criticise that this 
teaching approach ignores the role of active engagement played by students during the
process of learning and puts too much attention on the responsibility of teacher. This
conservative conception emphasises the relationship between student engagement and
academic achievement and thus can easily be taken as an instrument for teachers. As
Finn and Voelkl state, “weview engagement as a sufficiently important construct to
be considered as an outcome in its own right…it may be possible to manipulate 
student engagement to avert some of the negative consequences that are seen when
students withdraw from class and school participation” (1993, p. 250). McMahon and 
Portelli (2004) point out that this view of student engagement can very easily become
a form of indoctrination and an indicator of pupils’ endeavours for learning the 
normalised goals and values approved by society. Learners are taken as passive
receivers who are losing their active ability to criticise. This learning is a learning of,
in Whitehead’s terms, “inert ideas”, which is to learn “ideas that are merely received 
into the mind without being ultilised, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations” 
(Whitehead, 1962, pp. 1-2).
All in all, the above discussions expose deficits such as mechanism, abstraction,
standardisation and determinism in this approach to learning but fail to identify the
cruxes of anonymity, collectivism, impersonalisation and disembodiment.
From the critiques of McMahon and Portelli, three features of learning in this
conservative perspective or disengaged approach, can be detected: learning as linear
process, learning as instrument and learning as academic-achievement-driven (--- or
in tune with the discussions in Chapter 4 --- “Science”-driven). From my anthropo-
non-centric view, this conception of learning is “machining” aiming to manufacture 
one particular kind of product --- students with “success” in particular exams or 
degrees. Students who have been “adulterated” to become like adults who educate 
them or “mind” them (give them their “minds”). 
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The liberal or student-oriented conception of engagement, drawing in the ideas
of Cothran and Ennis (2000), Finn and Voelkl (1993) and Smith, Butler-Kisber,
LaRocque, Portelli, Shields, Sparkes and Vibert (1998), broadens the meaning of
engagement and improves on the insufficiencies of the conservative approach, but it
makes the same metaphysical assumption as the conservative/traditional view: the
philosophy of being, atomism, mechanism, determinism, rationalism, and
anthropocentrism. This liberal engagement highlights the influence of the roles of
community and teachers in student learning and the importance of students’ voice but, 
for McMahon and Portelli, two major problems are still unsolved: there is no
questioning of the purpose of education and there is an overemphasis on the
procedural aspects of the treatment of engagement (McMahon & Portelli, 2004, p. 69).
Due to deficiencies of the mainstream conservative approach to learning,
McMahon and Portelli propose a critical-democratic perspective on engagement. This
approach is described as a process of interrelation between teachers and students
including the “mater of techniques, strategies and behaviours” and the “[intrinsic] 
purpose of democratic transformation” (McMahon & Porteli, 2004, p.70). I agree 
with McMahon and Portelli on the point that engagement is a dynamic process; yet
their view of engagement still suffers from some problems.
First of all, in the view of McMahon and Portelli, an engaged approach to
learning is a process driven by an intrinsic purpose of social transformation. There are
two flaws implied in this view: learning is still taken as a means of democracy and an
instrument towards a predetermined goal. On this point, there is not much difference
between the critical-democratic perspective of engagement and the former two views
that they attack. Therefore, their view on this point is not consistent. The second
related flaw is that the learning process is steered by a predetermined goal. In this
view, the process of learning becomes the implementation of a series of arranged
steps and thereby is a mechanical and inflexible procedure.
Furthermore, this view of engagement suffers from disembodiment and
collective anonymity. As McMahon and Portelli state, critical-democratic engagement
is generated “in a shared space, for the purpose of democratic reconstruction, through 
which personal transformation takes place” (McMahon and Porteli, 2004, p. 70). 
Following this, the personal transformation of the individual takes place for the sake
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of social need. To admit the fact that personal transformation takes place in the
process of interaction of individual and collectivity is one thing; to claim that the
purpose of personal transformation is social construction or reconstruction is another.
Education in this view is an instrument of society, to build every individual as a
member or a part fiting into the normalised social whole. McMahon and Porteli’s 
engaged learning focuses on enhancing the interconnection and interrelation between
students, educators and schools rather than individual self-exploration and self-
understanding. This approach tends to take learning experience as anonymous,
inauthentic and disembodied.
This feature of anonymity in learning approach cannot be detected only from
McMahon and Porteli’s view, but from many authors’ views. For example, Michael 
Oakeshott (1971), in a paper discussing the idea of school, argues that education is the
transaction between generations in which new-comers are initiated into this world to
become human, and learning as engagement must take place in a particular site ---
school. He seems to suggest that, first of all, education is a process of humanising to
turn potential humans into actualised humans. This view seems to assume the idea of
an “essence” of humanity. There could be a risk in the Oakeshotian view of taking 
engagement in school as a means of shaping pupils into a particular species of being
according to “the” human essence. The process of humanisation, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, could be understood as the operation of the anthropological machine, in
Agamben’s terms, which humanises humans while inhumanising nonhumans at the
same time. Hence the Oakeshottian humanism might lead a discrimination and
exclusion in order to educate young people to become more fuly “human” beings. 
Secondly, learning is taken as effort-taking work so that it needs learners to be
engaged. Engagement is thus understood as a commitment of learners to give in
school “where playful occupations are broken of whenever they cease to provide 
immediate satisfactions” (Oakeshot, 1971, p. 48). Oakeshott seems to interpret
“engagement” as a particular ethical action occuring in a particular place --- school.
Fredricks, Blumenfeld and Paris (2004) define learning engagement, in tune with
Oakeshot, as students’ identification with school and participation in school-related
activities. However, this view seems to suggest that schools are the only place for
learning and thereby are separated from the other places in life. What concerns me is
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that this view takes learning activity as an activity exclusively taking place in school
as wel as secluding learning from living. Indeed, this “securing” of learning (making 
it “safe”) as a peculiar activity merely suitable for school might fix and inactivate the 
learning process to some extent. The concept of engagement in major learning
discourses is restrictively understood as a process of how the established ideas and
institutions, or in Oakeshot’s term (1971, p. 48), the intelectual, imaginative, moral 
and emotional inheritance, are initiated and tranferred to pupils; how the individuals
submit themselves to the collective memory and experience in a particular setting
only.
In relation to the previous discussion, this restrictive perspective on engaged
learning or, in a more appropriate term, disengaged learning can indeed be seen as the
domestication of the anthropological machine. The inauthentic approach to
engagement encapsulates the previous philosophical positions rejected by this thesis:
the philosophy of being, the predetermined teleological view, the disenchanted view
and the collective anthropocentrism. The above discussion has argued that the
disengaged approach characterises collective, disembodied, impersonal and
nonindividual experience, whereas the engaged approach is, in contrast, distinguished
by embodied, personal, individual and private experience. We can find that the
engaged approach in the present studies focusing on the collective and impersonal and
nonindividual experience in my definition is more validly definable as a form of
disengagement. It can be summarised as follows: the object of learning or curriculum
is assumed as predictable, fixed, controllable and exploitable; the learning process is
taken as consisting of scheduled, planned and rigid procedures; the learner is expected
and taught to be rational, objective and emotionless. Learners oriented by this
approach are taught to be distanced and alienated from the objects to be learned.
Overal, I do not deny that individual atachment to community, say, pupils’ 
attachment to school, is important for learning. What I aim to make visible is that
individual attachment to or identification with the group cannot be confused with
individual engagement with one’s own lived experience. What I argue against is to 
take the individual as an impersonal, anonymous and homogeneous, equivalent
component of a group. What I reject is to take the individual compliance with
collectivity as the primary end or driving force of learning. This is not the individual
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“engagement” with the colectivity but ratherthe burying of the individual (and
individual difference) in the group. What is a more important point is that an
anonymous one cannot be responsible for him/herself. When one takes oneself as an
anonymous part of collectivity, it can be the beginning of irresponsibility because one
holding the anonymous view does not make decisions and act on one’s own. This 
view can be addressed in Heidegger’s terms to be a “non-committal just-surmising-
with-some-else” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 218). Anonymity is diferent from identification
or atachment. In the former situation, one loses one’s own uniqueness and 
responsibility, whether it be intentionaly or unintentionaly, and speaks not in one’s 
own voice.
Thus a truthfully and genuinely engaged learning should be a process which can
be experienced only individually, personally, and immediately. No one can genuinely
or completely experience any other’s experience. One can make sense of the other’s 
experience only (but importantly) by way of imagination, sympathy, empathy and
interpretation; in more accurate terms, understanding of the other’s experience is an 
attempt to make similar sense of the object that the other person experiences. All
experiences are experiences of something; there is no experience as experience void
of content. The content of experience, e.g. sensation, perception or understanding, is
the meaning constructed by the interaction between the experiencing subject and the
experienced object. People can approach the same object but their experiences of this
object cannot be exactly same because the understanding of experiential content, the
meaning is constructed internally in private, individual and personal ways. No matter
how similar the meanings of diferent people’s experiences have been understood and
interpreted, there are always nuances. No two minds are identitcal. People may use
the same symbol or sign or concept to describe a certain object in nature; however, the
significance and meaning apprehended varies from person to person. A responsible
agent should be an individual who can decide her own actions based on her own lived
experience. Viewed in this light, learning as experience lived by every individual is a
process which varies from person to person, but, fortunately, with sufficient shared
overlaps to make communication and cooperation possible. Learning is a process
exclusively practised in a person. Therefore, the individual heterogeneous lived
experience should be taken as the ground for learning. The disengaged approach can
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be characterised by adopting collective and anonymous experience as the perspective
of understanding while the engaged approach locates meaning-construction and
meaning-conceiving as grounded in personally heterogeneous experience. The
genuine engaged approach to learning should be a learning process originating from
an individual’s particular immediate, direct, and pre-reflective lived experience, or in
phenomenological terms, lifeworld (Lebenswelt).
7.2 Engaged Learning and Lifeworld as Embodied Authorship
The concept of lifeworld in the field of philosophy is acknowledged to be first
highlighted by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (Hung & Stables, 2008; Husserl,
1970; Leiss, 1972; Ströker, 1997; Van Koppen, 2000). Husserl’s idea of lifeworld 
may be influenced by his contemporaries including Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin
Heidegger and it has influence on others such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred
Schütz. The interpretations of this term are not totally consistent and unified. Even
Husserl does not use this term in a very strict and consistent way. There may be
different interpretations of the concept of lifeworld. For example, W. Dilthey (1985)
describes lifeworld as folows: “A lived experience does not confront me as 
something perceived or represented; it is not given to me, but the reality of lived
experience is there-for-me because I have a reflexive awareness of it, because I
possess it immediately as belonging to me in some sense. Only in thought does it
become objective” (1985, p. 223; cited in Van Manen, 1997). Although this
description can be more fuly explicated, Dilthey’s description of lifeworld reveals its 
significance consisting in the characteristics of immediacy and pre-objectivity of
experience and shows great potential for understanding the engaged approach to
learning through lived experience (or lifeworld) as I will attempt to show.
Dreyfus and Todes (1962) take the lifeworld as an intermediation of the
adjoining worlds --- prepersonal world and the objective and scientific world. As for
Kullman and Taylor (1966), the term of lifeworld is used to denote the pre-objective
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world but not the everyday experience and scientific world. According to Hung and
Stables (2008), the idea of lifeworld can be understood from two orientations:
lifeworld as a field of experience common for all and lifeworld as a personal and
private world of immediate and lived experience. On this view, the idea of lifeworld
includes disengaged and engaged approaches to experience. Most authors pay
attention to the former orientation to take the lifeworld as an assemblage of collective
experience rather than an individual field of personal experience. In contrast,
Merleau-Ponty highlights the significance of the latter orientation: lifeworld as the
realm of authentic, personal, individual, irreplaceable and, most importantly,
embodied experience (Hung & Stables, 2008). Many authors agree that the Merleau-
Pontian approach to the lifeworld could bring the best benefit for education because it
marks out the significance of “body” or “body-subject” (Van Manen, 1997). It wil be 
argued that the Merleau-Pontian idea of lifeworld and the implying intertwinement
between lived experience and body-subject could deepen and broaden the meaning of
engaged learning. Furthermore, the “body” (or body-subject) implies potency to
counter the anonymity of the disengaged approach. The idea of body or body-subject
is not only a pivot for understanding the concepts of engagement and lived experience
(lifeworld). It also hinges on individual difference. The body presents the authorship
of lived experience and therefore the individual uniqueness and particularity can be
interwoven. It will be argued that the lived experience with authorship can point
towards rich and fecund meanings for education. Next, let us explore the idea of
lifeworld in chief by way of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Then we can go deeper into
the educational implications.
First of all, for the purpose of this argument, the idea of lifeworld will be taken
to denote “personal, subjective and embodied experience” (Hung & Stables, 2008). 
As a source of abundant and pre-analysed experience, lifeworld can be described as
“the ‘subjective-relative’ a priori” (Husserl, 1970, p. 140). This subjective-relative or
relational a priori is a ground for generating and constructing various meanings on
different levels of understanding such as scientific and artistic cognition, emotion and
attitudes. The lifeworld as personal, private and unique lived experience is the ground
for constructing meaning and various kinds of knowledge such as scientific,
humanities and artistic knowledge. Some may argue that scientific knowledge implies
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universality and objectiveness. However, the “universal” or “objective” knowledge, 
on the ground of the discussion in the previous chapters, is constructed in a discursive
space. The terms, “objectivity” and “universality” are used to denote the degree or 
extent of the acceptance, effect and performativity of the knowledge in focus. The
claim that a certain kind of knowledge is objective and universal indeed denotes its
relatively high degree of satisfactory acceptance, effect and performativity. It does not
mean that this kind of knowledge is absolute, complete and perfect. Complete,
objective, universal and perfect knowledge may be a dream of human beings but not a
fact. A statement for which universality is claimed can never be verified. We would
need to live for ever to collect all the evidence for it. Even Karl Popper, arch
objectivist, insisted on that. It was his reason for adopting “falsifiability”. If one 
claims that “Al swans are white” then an observation of one black swan can falsify 
his/her claim.
Therefore “objective” knowledge can be understood as a construction of the 
“subjective-relative” lifeworld. Lifeworld, as obviously existing, “contains meaning-
and validity-implications whose exposition leads again to new phenomena…” and 
“…everything objectively a priori, with its necessary reference back to a
corresponding a priori of the lifeworld” (Husserl, 1970, p. 112, p. 140). Moreover,
“this reference-back is one of a founding of validity… A certain idealising
accomplishment is what brings about the higher-level meaning-formation and ontic
validity… of every other objective a priori on the basis of the lifeworld a priori…” 
(Husserl, 1970, p. 112, p. 140). Merleau-Ponty elaborates this thought with the
folowing description: “The whole universe of science is built upon the world as 
directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and
arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by
reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order
expression” (2003/1962, p. vii/ix). Lifeworld is thus the primal and inchoate 
experience, the immediate objects of consciousness, the phenomena, the lived
experience.
It can be found from the Merleau-Pontian perspective that personally and
subjectively engaged experience is the fundamental base for bringing forth the
collectively and commonly disengaged experience because the personal, individual
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and primal experience is embryonic for various shared meanings to generate and
develop. To further this point, it is personal experience on which the collective
experience can be based, brought out and constituted; the personal, individual lived
experience justifies the possibility of establishing collective experience. Therefore, the
engagement with one’s own personal experience is more fundamental and desirable 
for learning than the commitment to collectivity because it can bring forth more and
rich meaning from every unique lifeworld. The meaning of learning consists in its
vividness and embodiment taking place in every body of living flesh. Any experience
of learning must be learned, apprehended, understood, interpreted and acted on on the
personal level, then this experience has “means” for this subject. Then it is possible 
for this subject to learn it, to possess its meaning, to practise and to use it with others.
This is the second-order learning on the level of collectivity.
The next significant insight to understand the concept of lifeworld is the idea of
body or body-subject. Body, in my view, is the pivot of every unique lifeworld of
lived experience; on this base, different individuals as particular living beings can
work together to construct various and multiple common worlds. The construction,
participation and sharing of the common worlds must be grounded on every unique
individual experience because every engaged act can occur only in a living bodily
individual rather than an anonymous, abstract and disembodied collectivity.
According to Husserl, the ego-subject is a living body of consciousness,
perceptions, acts and kinaesthetic movements: “…participating in this [bodily aspect 
of things] is our living body, which is never absent from the perceptual field, and
specificaly its coresponding ‘organs of perception’ (eyes, hands, ears, etc.). …they 
function in seeing, hearing, etc., together with the ego’s motility belonging to them, 
i.e., what is called kinesthesis” (Husserl, 1970, p.106). On this point of body-subject,
Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1988, 2003/1962) elaborates and expands
Husserl’s idea and reveals an idea of a dynamic, experiencing body. This idea of body 
implies profound and fertile meanings for education. According to Merleau-Ponty, the
body is a starting point for the individual to own one’s world through embodied 
experience. Viewed in this light, the uniqueness of individual lifeworld is displayed
by the embodied action of the subject. This characteristic of bodily lived experience
can be caled “authorship”, highlighting that this subject, without fixed and closed 
194
identity, open to changes, can be distinguished from the others. This point may be
helpful to keep education away from the trap of disembodied anonymity.
Overall, the meaning of lifeworld and the body-subject and the related
educational implications can be explicated along the following lines:
1) The lifeworld (consisting of lived and living experiences) is a process of
becoming which is under the continuous and dialectical course of
construction and deconstruction, taking part in, taking apart, and so on.
2) The lifeworld is the ground for generating understanding and meaning. The
engaged approach can be helpful to evoke richer and more meanings than
the disengaged one.
3) The body-subject lives and also authors its own unique life. The body-
subject paradoxically incorporates concrete embodiment and incomplete,
narrow-but-continuously-opening-expanding subjectivity without being
taken as a soul- or mind-entity.
First of all, it has been revealed that the lifeworld is a realm of lived and bodily
experience as well as a dialectically ever-renewed and ever-becoming process without
imaginable limits. This process is in dialectical becoming: one’s lived and living 
experience is always moving between construction and deconstruction, taking part in
and taking apart, devouring and producing, filling and emptying, etc. During the flow
of living experience, the body contains and constitutes the meanings of oneself and
one’s multiple worlds; however, self-awareness and the knowledge about the worlds
are flexible, mutable and dynamic. This does not mean that all knowledge and
existence are imaginary, fictitious or even illusionary but rather that the knowledge to
be learned is experienced, sensed and learned in a particular way and thus other ways
of making sense, interpretation and understanding should be welcome. This point is in
tune with the philosophy of becoming.
Merleau-Ponty manifests the dynamic meaning of the body-subject through a
particular approach to investigation: “pathological reduction” (Hung, 2008). By 
conducting the pathological reduction on the morbid motility of brain-injured patients
and some psychological experiments, Merleau-Ponty reveals one very crucial
meaning of “body” that has often been ignored: the body-subject is a participant,
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engaging with the surroundings, with other body-subjects and with objects during the
meaning-constructing-and-comprehending process. This body-subject is a becoming
subject rather than a fixed or a monadic ego. The body can attend, adapt, respond, act
and react to the surroundings and the others even after this body is recognised or
diagnosed by “normal” people as “morbid”. For example, a classic and well-known
eight-day experiment which has been discussed by Merleau-Ponty (1962; 2003/1962)
was conducted by G. M. Stratton on himself (1897a; 1897b; 1897c; 1899). Stratton
wore glasses to change the retinal images into inverse vision. According to Straton’s 
(1897b) observation and report, the scene on the first day was “entirely upside down”. 
On the last day Stratton found his body adapted into the state of harmonisation of the
new experience especially when he acted actively such as walking or rocking the chair;
while when he was in the passive state, e.g., sitting, the old or pre-experimental
localisation of his body reappeared. After the end of the experimentation, Stratton
took off the glasses; for hours he felt that the scene had a “strange familiarity” and “a 
surprising, bewildering air” (Straton, 1897c).40
This case shows that the self or the body-subject is an inevitable participant in
the processes of meaning-constructing but it is neither a stable and passive object nor
an omnipotent master who can manipulate his/her own experience and manufacture
meaning at his unlimited disposal. These processes are mutually intertwined (evolving
40 The whole experiment can be briefly introduced as follows. This experiment was conducted by G. M.
Stratton on himself in 1896 (1897a; 1897b; 1897c; 1899). Stratton wore glasses to change the retinal
images into inverse vision. According to Stratton’s (1897b) observation and report, the scene on the
first day was “entirely upside down”. Any movement of hand or body is laborious and embarrassed.
For instance, “in pouring some milk into a glass, [Stratton] must by careful trial and correction bring
the surface of the milk to the spout of the pitcher, and then see to it that the surface of the milk in the
glass remained everywhere equally distant from the glass’s rim”(Stratton, 1897b, p.344). On the third
day the subject began“to feel more at home in the new experience”(Stratton, 1897b, p. 349). He could
watch his hand when he wrote without hesitating although he still used the wrong hand to grasp an
object. Since the fourth day, “actions appropriate to the new visual perceptions frequently occurred
without any conflict or apparent tendency to react by a misinterpretation of visual positions”(Stratton,
1897b, p. 352). He could move his hand to the proper position with progressively rare correction when
washing hands or having breakfast. Movements were getting easier and less wayward during the latter
days. Stratton stated on the fifth day, “When hand and object were both in sight I did not, as a rule,
have to calculate or try to find the direction and extent of movement necessary to reach the object, but
merely fixed my attention on the thin, and the hand laid upon it without more ado, except for an
occasional slight correction of the direction”(Stratton, 1897b, p.355). On the last day Stratton found
his body adapted into the state of harmonisation of the new experience especially when he acted
actively such as walking or rocking the chair; while when he was in the passive state, e.g., sitting, the
old or pre-experimental localization of his body reappeared. After the end of the experimentation,
Stratton took off the glasses, for hours he felt that the scene had a “strange familiarity”and “a
surprising, bewildering air”(Stratton, 1897c).
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together) with the interactions between the body and the surroundings, between the
self and others. Every being in every experiential realm is both participating and
effecting; moreover, everyone anchors her own lifeworld through her unique body
and various dialectical interactions with the surroundings and others. Every body is
unique and, on this view, is constructing its own special lifeworld and its meaning.
What is revealing is that no body should be taken as “disabled” because any body is 
“able” in different respects and to diferent extents; even a “patient”, who is in 
traditional thinking diagnosed as disabled or unhealthy or diseased, is “able” in some 
sense. The patient’s body operates, perceives, experiences, interacts and makes sense 
with the world in a way that is diferent from the “normal” people. Thus there should 
be no body taken as unable (or disabled) to learn as long as she lives. Viewed in this
light, every living body experiences and interacts with the world and constructs
meanings in its own particular way. Yet this individual nuance is often ignored and
replaced by the collective distinctions by age, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, culture
and so on. This invites stereotyping, preconception, discrimination, and other forms of
suffering and suppression of individual differences.
The above case reveals rich significance for education by showing the vivid
body as potent with potentials, flexible and open to changes. This body authors or
builds itself as a habitual body through perceiving, responding to and interacting with
the world. Yet the body is not fixed or limited within the habits it authors; the habits
will be adjusted with change in the surroundings, some of which changes it causes.
Paradoxically, the habits reveal the authorship of this body-subject for there is
distinctiveness of every habit. The most important point is that life sustains and
continues its dynamics all the time whether it be regarded as normal or abnormal,
healthy or morbid, weak or strong. Living as learning as well as learning as living is
an on-going process that cannot be halted; the living/learning process includes
continuous interactions of various lived experiences and movements such as breathing,
digesting, seeing, touching, perceiving, sensing, thinking, reflecting, imaging, etc. We
live as we learn and we learn as we live. Every moment is meaningful; every
lifeworld is meaningful --- to different degrees in different aspects. Thus one of the
most important tasks of education is to help students have meaning-rich experience,
not merely meaningful. As Merleau-Ponty states:
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…we shal need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears
to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far
as we perceive the world with our body. But by thus remaking contact
with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover oursel[ves],
since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and,
as it were, the object of perception. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 206)
The above description manifests a very important implication for education: the way
of having engaged experience in-depth is to “reawaken our experience of the world … 
in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body”. 
In short, embodied and first-person experience plays the crucial role in learning. This
point invites us to consider and develop a learning approach to nature, which can help
students to reawaken their own experience of nature through their body, and in so far
as they perceive nature with their body. Moreover, it also invites us to consider
whether the curricula or subject matters provided for pupils can help students to
develop their own embodied experience through learning; whether the curricula can
inspiringly help students to construct new meanings to challenge what they have
constructed.
Secondly, the lifeworld is the ground for generating various, plural
understandings and meanings. The lifeworld as lived and pre-objective experience is
the ground for constructing different forms of knowledge according to different
themes, in different contexts, for different purposes. As mentioned, lifeworld can be
understood as an assemblage of raw experiences which are rough, germinal (seed-like)
but full of potentials; it is the realm of pre-objective, embodied and immediate
experience. 41 The lived experience is raw, coarse, rough, gross, unstructured,
41 There may be different interpretations of the concept of“lifeworld”(Lebenswelt). Dreyfus and Todes
(1962) take the lifeworld as an intermediation of the adjoining worlds --- prepersonal world and the
objective and scientific world. As for Kullman and Taylor (1966), lifeworld is used to denote the pre-
objective world but not the everyday experience and scientific world. However, in our opinion, both
views are partly right and partly wrong. Lifeworld is the world taken by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as
the fundamental origin for various levels of world such as the scientific and artistic worlds. Everyday
life experience is a part of the lifeworld and provides abundant, pre-analysed experiences as the basis
of the various levels of world. However, this thesis takes Merleau-Ponty’s view as the main perspective.
As he states, “The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we
want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and
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disorganised, etc. Lifeworld is the experience which is “unthematicaly” apprehended, 
perceived and sensed and can be understood from numerous perspectives to bring out
diferent interpretations or, in Husserl’s term, thematisedknowledge. The ambiguous
and primal lived experience can be the source of objective and thematic knowledge
after undergoing the process of “thematisation”, that is a certain way of 
phenomenological reduction and organisation in a broad sense, including combining,
identifying, distinguishing, considering, thinking, valuing, planning and acting
(Husserl, 1970, pp. 108-109). Lifeworld is the ground for generating various objective
worlds according to different themes through various phenomenological operations or
reductions. The thematisation is a process of making visible the invisible, making
explicit the implicit, and making intelligible the chaotic and unintelligible. The lived
experience is immediate, rich and disordered to some extent. The process of
thematisation is a treatment dealing with the lived experience to bring out clear and
ordered knowing.
Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation may help us to have in-depth
understanding of lifeworld. Husserl defines lifeworld as “the grounding soil [der
gründende Boden] of the ‘scientificaly true’ world and at the same time encompasses 
it in its own universal concreteness” (Husserl, 1970, p. 131). Moreover, “As lifeworld 
the world has, even prior to science, the ‘same’ structures that the objective sciences
presuppose in their substruction of a world which exists ‘in itself’ and is determined 
through ‘truths in themselves’…” (Husserl, 1970, p. 139). Viewed in this light, 
lifeworld is the embryonic rudiments of experience based on which various
abstractions are performed and various results reduced, such as natural science, social
science, and art. Every individual can construct his or her many different worlds
according to different “vocational atitudes” or “habitual direction of interests” in his 
or her field of experience:
…the “objective” a priori is grounded in the “subjective-relative” a 
priori of the life-world or…for example, mathematical self-evidence
has its source of meaning and source of legitimacy in the self-evidence
of the life-world. (Husserl, 1970, p. 140)
scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-
order expression”(Merleau-Ponty, 2003/1962, p. viii/ix).
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In general, lifeworld as the lived experience is the root for producing various kinds of
knowledge. This point reveals a very important thought for educators: since lifeworld
is the ground for generating meaning, how can we bring more and richer meaning
from it? How can we keep or enhance its fertility?
In my view, the engaged approach could be more helpful to evoke richer and
more meaning than the disengaged one. As mentioned, the disengaged approach can
be characterised by adopting the collective and anonymous experience as the
perspective of understanding while the engaged approach is characterised by locating
the meaning-construction and meaning-conceiving grounded in personally
heterogeneous experience.
In some sense, the disengaged approach adopts or appropriates experience
without in-depth deliberation, examination, reflection, attention, enquiry, critique and
care. Therefore educators and learners through this approach tend to be uncritical
towards their educational experience in relation to curriculum or schools. They tend to
accept the ready-made “stuf”, which can be understood as colective experience, 
without further questions. Education tends to be taken as a means to transmit the
accepted and established knowledge --- the collective, common, pre-determined and
anonymous experience. This approach to learning tends to become memorisation and
rote learning and becomes meaning-poor. In schools, almost every thing provided to
pupils is pre-organised such as curriculum, teaching plan or time table. Schooling
means in this view to lead pupils to learn through the pre-organised process and, in
some respects, through a disengaged process. However, it is undeniable that the
learning of the well-organised subject matter is important because education is in
some respects the transmission of human cultural heritage and intellectual
achievements which are disengaged, disembodied and common experience. I do not
deny the necessity of learning about collective experience. But it does not mean this
disengaged approach to learning should be the only, singular, linear, one-dimesnional
way of learning. Furthermore, the disengaged approach to learning could enfeeble the
meaning in experience since it does not stress the variously individual interpretations
of experience which can generate personally different meanings.
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The above discussion thus reminds educators of the significance of the engaged
approach to the embodied and immediate lived experience in education which has
often been neglected. As revealed, the engaged approach locates the meaning-
construction and meaning-conceiving in personally heterogeneous experience. Thus it
can bring about various interpretation and meaning from lifeworld. The engaged and
disengaged approaches are not mutually sharply discrete ways of dealing with our
own experience. They denote two types of ethos or style of dealing with our own
experience: the disengaged approach deals with our own experience with less care,
thoughtfulness, attentiveness while the engaged one with more attentiveness,
deliberation, reconsideration, re-examination, critiques, reflection, caution and care.
Thus the disengaged approach pays less heed to the personal interpretation of and
interconnection with the learning experience than the engaged one; by contrast, the
engaged one deliberates upon the learning experience with more regard, care and
effort. They are not completely clear-cut distinct approaches to learning but rather in a
continuum. However, according to the above, the disengaged approach could lead
learning into relative poverty in meaning while the engaged one tends towards relative
abundance in meaning. In other words, the engaged approach holds more potential to
bring out more and richer meaning than the disengaged one.
Finally, there is a deep ethical implication in the idea of body-subject. The
body-subject anchors individual diference and thereby implies one’s own authentic 
authorship of lived experience. The authorship of a subject confronts the risk of being
a nameless part of the anonymous “them”. The idea of responsibility can be inferred 
from a unique individuality because only a special, independent and self-determined
person can be responsible for her own action and decision. If any moment of engaged
learning occurs, it is experienced personally, vividly, in a body --- in the flesh. Thus
an engaged learning is a learning to be responsible because this engaged experience is
an action practised by the subject, who is aware of herself as an author responsible for
her own action.
If people are taken as an anonymous part of a “group”; their individual 
differences will be ignored or suppressed. In that case, there is no (personal)
authorship, self-decision and responsibility. Therefore, it is very important with regard
to education and ethics that every body is seen as unique; every lifeworld of every
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body is thus different (but of equal value). The body lives and authors a unique world
by coordinating various and complex sensations and perceptions, interacting with the
surroundings, and constructing meanings during the process. We may find that the
Merleau-Pontian body is in tune with the autonomous and particular subjectivity of
the enchanted view.
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, the idea of body is not understood as a fixed ego
but a dynamic and continuously opening-minded self. This perspective is in tune with
the philosophy of becoming and the anthropo-non-centric view as mentioned in
previous discussions. As Merleau-Ponty describes:
I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of
behaviours and a certain world, and I am given to myself merely as a
certain hold upon the world; now, it is precisely my body which
perceives the body of the other and discovers in that other body a
miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of
dealing with the world. (2003/1962, p. 412)
What the body constructs is not a closed but an open realm within which the other is
experienced as a participant. In other words, the other must be part of my lifeworld.
According to Merleau-Ponty, my body and the other’s comprise a system, as “two 
sides of one and the same phenomenon”; my body and the other’s compose an 
existence “of which my body is the ever-renewed trace” and therefore my body can be 
understood as inhabiting “both bodies simultaneously” (2003/1962, p. 412). In this 
view, the understanding of one’s own bodily experience must be inseparably 
intertwined with the experience of the other. The body-subject invites intersubjectivity
in her own life because the body-subject or bodily self is known through its
experience of the other bodies. The bodily self is a being-with-other or co-being. The
idea of body holds the potential for overcoming dualism and solipsism and suggesting
an understanding of human experience from an inclusive and heterogeneous
perspective. Therefore, the self or the identity of the body-subject is constituted and
lived through a dynamic, ever-becoming and ever-renewed process of embodied
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experiences of “self-and-as-others”. There is no fixed “essence” to determine the
individual; yet every lifeworld is lived with authorship.
In summary, a disengaged approach to learning can be defined as a way of
dealing with our own learning experience with less care, thoughtfulness, attentiveness;
it tends to accept and adopt the established normal, normalised collective and
anonymous experience as the main part of learning. By taking this approach, learners
are discouraged, intentionally or unintentionally, from investing more concentration,
attention, thoughtfulness and consideration in the learning activity and tend be passive,
inactive, and debilitated in relation to the ready-made material. They are minimally
engaged with the object to be learned. Thus the meaning obtained through this
approach is meagre, shallow and inert. Learners will not invest much thought and care
in what they are learning about; they just learn by rote. In this sense, learning is
“shalow and surface”, in the terms of Marton and Säljö (1984). 
The disengaged approach to learning about nature is more often found in
schooling and formal education than the engaged view because what and how pupils
learn about are pre-designed and pre-structured in schools. The objectives, aims,
purposes and values of curriculum are pre-decided and provided to pupils. Curriculum
is often believed to offer the basic and well-arranged parts of collective experience.
The learning regulated by curriculum is inevitably a learning of collective experience.
In order to achieve the goal of curriculum, educators tend to focus on leading pupils to
acquire the collective experience, viz. the accredited basic knowledge and skills rather
than helping pupils to develop their own ways of understanding and interpretation of
the curriculum. Therefore, the learning led by curriculum can easily turn into the
disengaged approach and the meaning acquired could be meagre, enfeebled, weak and
stagnant if educators put too much attention on the collective experience.
In contrast, the engaged approach can be defined as the learning approach to
experience with more attentiveness, deliberation, reconsideration, re-examination,
critiques, reflection, caution and care; this approach tends to locate the meaning-
construction and meaning-conceiving grounded on personally heterogeneous
experience. Learners taking this approach are encouraged to commit more attention,
thought and care to the process and subject matter of learning. The concentration,
deliberation and thoughtfulness invested in the process achieve learners’ engagement. 
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This approach can inspire more and richer meaning than the disengaged one by
relating personal individuality to the learning process consisting of material and
activity. This engaged approach is similar to what Marton and Säljö (1984) call the
“deep approach to learning”. 
The deep learning, or the engaged approach to learning, pays much heed to the
lifeworld, to the personal embodied and lived experience. The lifeworld is germinal
and holds potential for bringing about rich meaning since it can undergo various
thematic operations such as theorising, organising, idealising and refining from
different perspectives. Thus an engaged approach to learning is to help learners to
relate their own lifeworld to the subject matter, to bring out meanings. The more
relations can be established, the more meanings can be constructed, and the more
engagement can last. Any subject matter can be learned with much engagement, as
long as it inspires much “meaning” to the learner. As Merleau-Ponty states, “Al my 
knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my own
particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the
symbols of science would be meaningless” (Merleau-Ponty, 2003/1962, p. ix). The
engaged approach to learning may remind educators and learners of the significance
of engaged and embodied experience and paying more attention and effort to relate
every occurrence of learning to our own personal lifeworld to bring more and richer
meaning from every moment.
I do not aim to reject and exclude the disengaged approach from the field of
education and that is not possible, anyway, because they are not mutually distinct
from each other but lie along, on a continuum, or spectrum. What this chapter aims at
is to manifest the significance of lifeworld as lived experience for learning: from the
personal and heterogeneous lived experience; the engaged approach could bring more
abundant and fertile meaning to education than the disengaged approach; however,
current schooling, curriculum and pedagogy tend to lead students to learn through the
relatively more disengaged approach. Therefore, educators should bear in mind the
importance of learning through engagement and be careful to help pupils to relate
learning activities to their own lived experience during the process in schools where
the disengaged approach to learning is the mainstream.
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7.3 Engaged and Disengaged approaches to Nature as Space and
Place
After the elucidation of the meaning of disengaged and engaged learning, we may
turn to explore how these two approaches can improve learning about nature in more
depth. It can be inferred from the previous discussion that, in general, the way that we
learn about nature in school to a great extent relies on a disengaged rather than an
engaged approach --- viz. our own personal, direct and immediate experience.
However, I do not assert that the disengaged approach to learning needs to be totally
abandoned and replaced by the engaged approach in school but rather propose that
educators pay more heed to and include the engaged approach in curriculum and
teaching. The following discussion aims to manifest the meaning of experience of
nature from these two learning approaches and the difference between them; this
manifestation may help to draw out ideas for countering the limitations of the
disengagement of the current curiculum. The meaning of the concept “nature” can be 
revealed from the geographical aspect: nature as surroundings or environment. The
concepts of “space” and “place” can help us to understand how we learn about the
natural environment and how we relate ourselves to nature through disengaged and
engaged approaches.
Many authors point out that “space” and “place” are an indivisible dyad to 
understand our spatial experience (Casey, 1996, 2001; Feld & Basso, 1996; Tuan,
1975, 1977). The dyad of “space” and “place” can be used to explore our experience 
of nature as environment or landscape. Edward S. Casey (1996) has proposed an
interesting question about whether the experience of space precedes or succeeds the
experience of place. Folowing the dominant modernist view, “space” is taken as 
“absolute and infinite as wel as empty and a priori in status” and therefore “place 
becomes the mere apportionings of space, its compartmentalisations” (Casey, 1996, p.
14). The dominant view can be understood as the disenchanted view which has been
discussed earlier in Chapter 5. As Chapter 5 has explicated, the aims of modern
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scientists and thinkers are to establish a set or sets of mathematical, objective,
universal, and absolute scientific knowledge for explaining nature, and to provide
eficient and useful instruments for exploiting nature. “Space” is one of the necessary 
transcendental conditions for such knowledge to be possible. The conceiving of space
in terms of formal essence and taking space as the condition a priori of mathematical
principles can be understood as a distinguishing feature of modern thinkers including
Galileo, Newton, Descartes, et al. For example, Newton divides space into “absolute”
and “relative” (or “relational”); however, the later kind of space belongs to the 
former kind; it seems an encompassing volumetric void containing and positioning
everything (Casey, 1996, 2001). Moreover, Kant (2004), one of the most influential
thinkers of Enlightenment modernism, claims that “space” and “time” are 
transcendental idealities as “two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of 
knowledge a priori…”; the concept of “space” is “a necessary representation a 
priori… as the condition of the possibility of phenomena…. [and] the basis for 
external phenomena”. Overal, from the perspective of these modern thinkers, there 
seems little doubt that space-time is one of the necessary and fundamental formal
conditions for human recognition (Hung & Stables, forthcoming). In this view, the
experience of space seems to precede the experience of place.
However, if we return to the positions of the enchanted view, anthropo-non-
centrism and the engaged approach, it is doubtful whether or not the general, abstract,
absolute and objective space exists; and thus it is more doubtful that the experience of
space precedes the experience of place. If we change the view of examining our
experience of space carefully and deeply, we might have different findings. As Ong
(1969) describes, modern people take for granted the recognition of physical nature as
something visually perceived and ignore the visually perceptual embodiment
embedded in this recognition. The sense of sight in the modern disenchanted and
disengaged approach is taken as the most important channel of knowledge. In other
words, the disengaged approach to knowledge depends greatly on vision. According
to Ong (1969), this tendency can be caled “visualism”. The folowing two reasons 
may argue against the tendency of visualism of the disengaged approach and reveal
that the experience of space is not anterior but posterior to that of place.
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The first reason is related to spatial perception. First of all, if we are in the
position of a modernist, we might agree that “space” should be like an external, 
invisible, general and absolute “container”, with no limits. In that case, the visions of 
the world and the senses of space should be coherent and consistent all the time. If we
propose a question, which has been asked by William Molyneux in the 17th century, to
the modernists, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to
distinguish between a cube and a sphere [be] made to see: [could he now] by his sight,
before he touched them ... distinguish and tell which was the globe and which the
cube?”42 the answer should be “yes”.43 However, it is interestingly found from
empirical studies that the truth is not what is supposed to follow from this modernist
thinking.
Neurologist Oliver Sacks (1993) proposes two cases in different periods of time
which are worth notice. One of the cases was a boy born blind in the 18th century and
the other in the 20th century, an adult who lost his vision when he was very young.
The two cases demonstrate that these patients have no sense of space as “normal” 
people do; even when they “regained” their visual ability they could not make sense 
of their visual and spatial experiences. For example, Virgil, the patient in the second
case, after days of surgery and “learning to see” through his tactile memory, could see 
parts of an object separately such as “an angle, an edge, a colour, a movement --- but
would not be able to synthesise them, to form a complex perception at a glance” 
(Sacks, 1993, p. 5). The above examples show that people could have the sense of
lived place without the sense of visual space. The sense of lived space could be
established from the bodily movements without visual sensation. People may rely on
olfaction, acoustic and tactile experiences and the sense of taste to be aware of a place,
to find a place, to posit a place, or to be situated in a place.
The second reason is related to the comparison between the senses of space and
place of premodern and modern peoples. If a modernist, disengaged approach to
nature is true, then the sense of “space” as an external, invisible, general and absolute 
42 In 1688 and 1693 William Molyneux sent Locke two letters and proposed the same question. The
description cited here is extracted from the second letter written in 1693. Locke did not pay much
attention to this question when Molyneux proposed it in his first letter. (Jacomuzzi, Kobau & Bruno,
2003)
43 Interestingly, Locke gave a clear answer in the second edition of Essay Concerning Human
Understanding:“No”(Jacomuzzi, Kobau & Bruno, 2003; Sacks, 1993).
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container should be universal for all people. None the less, according to the studies of
anthropologists, the native people give “place” prior value to “space”. After years of 
study on the desert aboriginal people --- Pintupi --- of Central Australia,
anthropologist F. R. Myers points out that the “place” for the Pintupi people is the 
central or prior feature among all geographical features (Casey, 1996). Another
anthropologist Steven Feld (1996) has similar findings. Feld (1996) made his
ethnographic research on natives in New Guinea. It is shown from Feld’s (1996) study 
that the sense of place of the natives consists of sensation, especially sound but not
sight. In Feld’s (1996) research, the rainforest where the native people Kaluli live is 
described by the terms related to various bodily movements and multiple sensations.
One of ways to demonstrate the relationship between people and the place they are in
is how people name the place where they live. For the Kaluli people, the place is to be
heard, touched and felt but not only observed. Sometimes they even hear much which
they do not see due to the surrounding region being profuse with exuberant rainforests.
The way native people learn about and know environment is different from modern
people. “Naming” is one way to signify, learn and relate the object, whether this be an 
object, a person, a place or a substantial thing. It can be found that the way of naming
place of the natives is very different from modern people who depend greatly on
visual forms. For example, in Kaluli language, “fele”, “do:m” and “eleb” are names 
indicating landforms. Here follow the intriguing descriptions about the placenames of
Kaluli provided by Feld (1996, p. 104):
The term fele is related to the word fe, “thigh”, and refers to a 
relatively wide, flat expanse of land that rolls off and downward to
either side…Do:m segments always imply the existence of fele above,
below and/or to the sides. Do:m has the same phonological shape as
the word for “body” in Kaluli…
In any case, fele and do:m are hardly experienced autonomously as
interconnected land formations. They are inseparable from the equally
prevalent by far more sensuous presence of waterways. …Eleb refers
to the place in an ascending or arching elevation where creek water
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stops…. In fact, water stops by moving along the do:m, up toward the
fele. (Feld, 1996, p. 104)
Feld (1996) points out that although there is correspondence between terms of the
landform used in English and in Kaluli, “there are considerable difficulties both in 
linguistically glossing and in paraphrastically evoking much sense of the distinctness
and interconnectedness of do:m, fele and eleb as either bodily or landscape images.
Names like these three inevitably seem far more abstract when one reads about them
in English than they must feel to Kaluli people, who experience them directly as signs
of the sensual obviousness of place” (Feld, 1996, p. 105).  
It can be found from the above that the human/nature relationship in modernist
culture is more disengagement-orientated than in premodern culture and this
phenomenon is highly relevant to the modernist predilection for visual ability and
abstract thinking. The instance above manifests that place-names embody Kaluli
people’s self-identity and their own lived experience of place, therefore the naming of
the place can be understood as an activity of self-locating and self-placing.
Overall, some thoughts in relation to learning about nature can be drawn out of
the above: 1) place-naming is a particular engagement of confronting anonymous and
meaning-poor space; 2) nature is a pivot of experience of continuously dialectical
polarities, e.g. dwelling and venturing, strangeness and intimacy, disentanglement and
entanglement, outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion, and so on.
First of al, the activity of “naming” a place can be understood as action of 
transformation of a detached space into an intimate place, an alienated area into the
familiar place and, a disengaged world into an engaged territory. To name a place is
an activity to turn an anonymous, homogeneous and occult space into an acquainted,
concrete and sensible location; in other words, to name a place is to shed a light on
somewhere in darkness by bestowing meaning on it. As Steele (1981, p.9) defined it,
the sense of place is “an experiential process created by the seting, combined with 
what a person brings to it” (cited in Manzo, 2003, p.47). Feld’s study resonates with
Ong’s (1969) view that the modernist culture does not give as much value to the 
sensations other than vision as the preliterate cultures do.
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To name a place is one embodied activity of how we relate ourselves to the
environment, to give the meaning of a place to a space, to give a personal or private
meaning to it. It is also an act of locating and placing oneself in an unfamiliar
environment, an act of constituting the relationship between oneself and the detached
surroundings, an act of finding and constructing meaning of one’s world. That is why 
the sense of place is prior to that of space in the context of phenomenology. The
phenomenology of the sense of place of native people echoes with the view. To think
in another way, there is a world or a field for us to act, within and towards which we
can act, and finally, the meaning of which is partly, never completely revealed
through the acting. Through the act the boundary between the abstract space and the
existential space has been demarcated. This is an environment where we can hold
sway and operate through our own experience.
Secondly, nature can be understood as a pivot of dialectical experience. The
experience of nature is always in change. Nature at the first impression seems to be an
unfamiliar, dangerous, unintelligible and wild place. Human geographer Tuan (1986,
p. 11) has pointed out that the words “forest” and “foreigner” are both derived from 
the Latin foranus, meaning “situated on the outside”. According to J. S. Mil (1999,p.
262), nature could be understood as the synonym of “anarchy and reign of teror”, 
bringing about “injustice, ruin, and death, by a huricane and a pestilence”. The
natural world seems to be the opposite realm of the human world and human home in
contrast can be understood as the most “humanised” realm. Human experience of 
wilderness may denote the experience of the non-human world as a whole or, in
Oelschlaeger’s (1991) or Birch’s (1995) terms, the experience of the “other”. Nature 
in this sense can be taken as the synonym of wilderness, brutality and irrationality and
thus be understood as the epitome of the highest estrangement and alienation. On this
point we may understand why in much recent human history, we seem to have aimed
at overcoming nature by various technologies and instruments to transform (or tame)
the strange and unfamiliar nature into a familiar and docile place. This process is in
tune with the movement of disenchantment and the operation of an anthropological
machine.
On the one hand, human beings seem to have the desire to conquer and tame a
ferocious nature into a subdued place; on the other, human beings seem to have the
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lust for its wilderness, wildness, vigour, unpredictable changes, viz. “naturalness”. As 
poet Shelley describes in Alastor,
Many a wide waste and tangled wilderness
Has lured his fearless steps; and he has brought
With his sweet voice and eyes, from savage men,
His rest and food. Nature’s most secret steps
He like her shadow has pursued… (Sheley, 1994, p. 4)
Nature can be found to be both the epitome of strangeness and the source of
inspiration and sense of novelty. Thus Sheley’s poem trenchantly portrays the human 
eagerness for novelty and difference, for new experiences in unknown places,
especially among wild nature. Viewed in this light, it can be inferred that nature as the
source of wilderness, wildness, strangeness and estrangement orientates a potential
process of learning difference. The experience of nature is an on-going process of
paradoxical dialectics: humans launch a journey in pursuit of wild nature by means of
domesticating the wild. It could be understood, on the one hand, as a process of
pursuing the strangeness by means of familiarising it and, on the other, as a
paradoxical process of conserving the familiar by means of metabolising the novelty.
Learning is a like process of devouring, digesting and assimilating novel things into
components on the ground of what has already been absorbed and composed.
Therefore we are eager to experience surprise, strangeness, peculiarity and
extraordinariness in nature; however, we also attempt to obtain solace, quietness,
safety and intimacy from nature.
7.4 Summary
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In closing, let us return to the educational concern of this chapter: How can the
disengaged and engaged approaches benefit our learning and learning about nature?
Let me summarise these two learning approaches.
The disengaged approach to learning gains more nourishment from the
philosophy of being, the view of nature with divine telos, the disenchanted view and
anthropocentrism rather than the philosophy of becoming, the view of nature with
non-divine evolutionary telos, the enchanted view and the anthropo-non-centrism.
Educators taking the disengaged approach tend to focus on experience with the
characteristics of fixedness, disembodiment, collectivity, and anonymity and to take
education and curriculum as a means for the normalisation, standardisation,
homogenisation and socialisation of learners. Educators and learners taking the
disengaged approach tend to accept the established knowledge of the subject matter
and pay less attention, concentration and care to develop new conceptualisations, thus
learning tends to be “surface” rather than “deep”. When learners take this approach to 
nature, they are likely to learn about nature by rote. The learning of nature takes place
only within classroom or in textbook; it can hardly be related to the learners’ own 
lifeworld. In this sense, “nature” means unimportance or even nothing to them; the 
meaning of nature is poor, or “thin”. Yet the impoverishment results from the 
disengagement of learning process, not from “nature” itself. Also, the mainstream 
assumptions about nature in this approach are easily accepted without further critique
and examination. For example, nature is taken as a mere resource for human
exploitation; humanity as rational beings should have mastery over our earth. Or,
nature is mechanistic, static, predictable, controllable, mathematised and should be
subjugated to humans who are rational, emotionless, indifferent, impartial,
nonpersonal and objective. The most far-reaching significance is that people adopting
this disengaged approach are liable to take themselves as anonymous and ignore their
own personal responsibility. With regard to nature, people who are disengaged from
nature will hardly relate their own lived experience to nature and hardly take care and
responsibility for their individual acts towards nature --- because nature does not
mean much to “me”. We can only take our own personal responsibility and pay
attention to the object upon which our own actions act, when it has particular meaning
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to “me” as an ireplaceable individual. Therefore, a learning for being responsible 
needs to be engaged as much as possible.
The engaged approach is based on the philosophy of becoming, the view of
nature with non-divine evolutionary telos, the enchanted view and anthropo-non-
centrism. This approach pays heed to the personal and particular individual lived
experience that is embodied, dynamic, changing, transient and private. This learning
approach to nature may encourage pupils to conceive various meanings of nature from
their own lifeworld, to find or to invent the connection between their own lived
experience and nature. For example, it has been argued that one of the bodily acts
particularly pertaining to environment is to name the place. Ostensibly, naming seems
to be an abstract activity because it is an invisible act which is signifying with a
concept. However, the key point is that the process of naming the place through the
manifold embodied sensations may be more meaningful than through unitary
sensation especially vision. In addition, it has been argued that to name a place
through personal embodied experience is a means to make the place personal and
unique. Thus it is also a process of self-rootedness or self-localisation in this place. In
this sense, a learning that is attentive, responsive and sensitive to nature is a process of
learning of self-locating, self-positing, and self-dwelling. It relates not only to finding
the position of oneself in an environment, but also to positing oneself in this
environment. It is not only to learn where we are, but also to learn to invent/create
where we are.
Thus nature can be more closely related to the lifeworld and be conceptualised
as “source” since the concept of source denotes the features of dynamics, 
unpredictability, and inexhaustibility; furthermore, taking the engaged approach,
people might give more care, attentiveness and attention to nature. It is more
important for educators to encourage learners to take this approach to learning
because every person is taken as a particular and unique being; this unique individual
who cannot escape from her own responsibility must learn to be responsible. The
responsibility can be taken only by the person who makes her own decision and action;
nobody can take responsibility on the other’s behalf; no one can live the other’s life, 
although we do partly appropriate and we are partly appropriated in the other’s lived 
experience. This implication could point towards a rich ethical learning about nature,
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ourselves and others as ourselves. Anything that I decide or act towards nature should
be my own personal responsibility which cannot be shifted to anyone else.
To summarise, the engaged approach to learning can be characterised by the
following features:
1) treating subject matter with attentiveness, care, concentration, responsiveness,
sensitivity, consideration, reflection, examination, scrutiny, critique and
responsibility;
2) continuously referring to one’s own lifeworld;
3) being opening-minded towards and generating differences and meanings;






…[I]f a man would be alone, let him look at the stars.…The stars 
awaken a certain reverence, because though always present, they are
inaccessible; but all natural objects make a kindred impression, when
the mind is open to their influence. Nature never wears a mean
appearance. … Nature is a seting that fits equaly wel a comic or a 
mourning piece. … In the woods, is perpetual youth … In the woods, 
we return to reason and faith…
(Emerson, Nature, 1849)
There was a chaotic formation of matter, before the existence of
Heaven and Earth. It was so noiseless, so shapeless, all alone and
unchanging, It is moving around endlessly. It can be the mother of
Heaven and Earth. I do not know its name, but call it Tao. If I must I
name it Great Reality. … Tao is great, Heaven is great, Earth is great 
and Humanity is also great. There are four great realities in the
universe, and Humanity is one of them.
(Lao Tsu, Dao Te King)
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8
Enriching Education about and for Nature
through an Authoring View
The above discussions explore the meanings of the concept of nature and its
educational implications in the context of five themes. This exploration is set out on
the concern of the impoverishment of meaning in education. This pitfall can be
detected from the current curriculum in which the concept of nature is oversimplified
and taught without in-depth reflection. In order to have a more meaningful education
and life, it may help to bring a more meaningful conception of nature to education.
The exploration of the concept of nature guided by different themes, paradoxically,
does not give a simple, clear and distinct definition of nature but reveals the numerous
possibilities of understanding of nature. The more the concept of nature is interrogated,
the more complicated conceptions can be found. This does not mean that the
exploration of nature is futile; on the contrary, it shows that if the concept of nature
can be understood from an appropriate view or views, its abundant and profound
relational meanings can be revealed and its inspiration for education can thus be more
widely and variously developed. How can nature be understood in so many,
rainbowlike ways? One of the reasons is that an understanding of nature is
interdependent with concepts of humanity, world view, divinity, value, and
nonhumans. The meaning of nature is embedded in the network of relationships of
other concepts. What matters is that different perspectives on nature result in different
understandings of different networks of relationships in which nature is involved.
Some networks relate the concept of nature to many different ideas, concepts, images;
they inspire many different kinds of emotions, responses and experiences and thereby
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give rich meanings; these kinds of networks embody multiple relations and meanings.
Some relate nature to scanty ideas and experiences; such perspectives produce simple
relations between the concept of nature and other ideas or experiences and thus bring
impoverished meanings to human understanding.
Following this, current oversimplification in curriculum takes for granted
understandings about nature, humanity, human/nature relationship and knowledge
which are poorly related. The previous scrutiny has argued that these poorly-relational
underpinnings are philosophy of being, the concept of nature with divine telos, the
disenchanted view, anthropocentrism and the disengaged approach. These notions are
hereafter generaly refered to as “anonymising orientation”. The concept of 
“anonymity” used here denotes the state of being anonymous, viz. the state of being
no different from the other. This view describes a perspective which tends to
understand beings in the world in an abstract and general way. In the terms of social
phenomenologists Alfred Schütz (1962) and Maurice Natanson (1973), we meet
anonymous people in daily life or social life; these anonymous people are known as
“the postal clerk”, “the poker player” and “the miser” but not in person. Their 
personal features are anonymous and irrelevant to me. According to Schütz and
Natanson, these people matter to me in terms of the roles that they play in my social
life but not their personal, individual particularities. They are equivalent,
homogenised and atomic beings that Schütz (1962) and Natanson (1973) refer to as
“the social types”, not vivid, living and characteristicaly different persons. In respect 
of general social phenomena, it seems tenable to take social typification as one
perspective on the understanding of human life. This general, common typification
assumes a certain “sharing of constructs and interpretations” among people’s daily 
lives and thereby this “sharing of constructs and interpretations” could provide the 
basis for communication and coexistence (Natanson, 1973). None the less, this
anonymising view might not express and tend to ignore individuality and individual
differences which could be tremendously important in education. As Natanson
reminds us,
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The consideration of the problem of typicality suggests a delimitation
on what interests and concerns men in daily life, a motivational curb, a
pragmatic motif of sorts. (Natanson, 1973, p. 17)
The anonymising view could result in the ignorance of individuality since “the 
specificality of my or your perception of an object is irrelevant to the way in which it
is understood or handled for ordinary purposes” (Natanson, 1973, p.17). Viewed in 
this light, the social typification is a certain technique of homogenisation and
disembodiment. Therefore, students and pupils, who are supposed to be regarded by
educators as unique individuals with irreducible differences and thereby treated with
consideration of their personal traits, needs, concreteness and uniqueness, could be
taken as people of a kind without considering their personal idiosyncrasy. What
concerns me more in this thesis is that this perspective could impoverish the meaning
of life and education because human beings and educational ideas and practices,
whose diversity and heterogeneity should be respected and attended, now, could be
neglected through homogenisation and disembodiment.
In contrast, as argued, there are different ways of understanding the concept of
nature which are diferent from the above “anonymising orientation”. These views 
can bring richer and more multifarious (multiple and various) meanings to education
and thereby help to confront the oversimplification. These views include the
philosophy of becoming, the view of nature with non-divine telos, the enchanted view,
anthropo-non-centrism and the engaged approach. These five views are hereafter
refered to in summary as “authoring orientation”. There is no clear-cut boundary
between the anonymising orientation and the authoring orientation; each other
represents a tendency or emphasis in understandings of nature and their expressions in
education. For example, an educator can make acquaintance with his/her students by
accessing their personal details of registration information or by individual learning
through interaction between the teacher and the students in person. The former
approach can be generally understood as the anonymising orientation, while the latter
the authoring orientation. The crucial point of an authoring orientation is that it is an
on-going process of the understanding and interpretation of human beings and the
world. Even if an educator makes acquaintance with his/her students through their
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individual embodied interaction, it does not mean that this teacher can achieve a
perfect understanding of students and maintain a reliable and long-term relationship
with them. This is because the understanding of every human being cannot be and is
not fixed; on the contrary, it is changing and shifting. No one interaction of a
particular moment in a particular occasion can produce a perennially valid framework
for reading and understanding of anyone.
The authoring view stresses the following characteristics in education:
becoming, subject in deconstruction and reconstruction, embodiment, engagement,
anthropo-non-centric subject, individuality, inter-subjectivity, and lived experience.
The concept of “author” is used to mark out the process of living and learning as 
personal, individual, particular, unique, irreplaceable and non-human-centred. The
individual embodies and is embodied in her attitudes, decisions and actions; yet she is
not a closed monad. A subject is open to and invites participation and contribution of
the other subjectivities. She is an irreplaceable, unique author who is an agent of her
lifeworld, who is authoring her lived experience with spoken or written signs,
symbols and words or non-verbal expression which are contextualised with other
subjectivities. Thus the subject in education is a learning subject as well as an object
to be learned from and with. She authors a track of her own but that track includes
many other people in the “pick and mix” of al the people who have influenced and 
flowed into her. The revealing, making visible and making sense of the authorship is a
process of learning as living; it is a learning to recognise that the body-subject
inevitably implies individuality, and that the individual uniqueness and particularity
are inevitably embedded in her own decision and action, as wel as in everyone else’s. 
More importantly, to admit authorship is to admit inescapable responsibility. We
speak, and act, in our own name and in no-one else’s. We can do no other. 
In the last chapter, I shall attempt to give a summary of the whole thesis about
what has been found and how it can extend meanings for education. The exploration
of this thesis starts from the existing over-simplified understanding about nature in
curriculum. The over-simplified view of nature results from an unbalanced and
excessive reliance on anonymising-oriented philosophical assumptions. My
suggestion is that giving weight to the authoring-oriented view in education can help
to improve the oversimplified curriculum and pedagogy.
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Part I has identified two main oversimplifications in the present curriculum. The
Taiwanese curriculum guidelines have been taken as an example for detailed
discussion. These two main oversimplifications are defined by this thesis as
“homogenisation” and “disembodiment”. “Homogenisation” denotes the view that 
nature is understood in the curriculum as composition of many homogeneous
components such as atoms. “Disembodiment” refers to the notion that the pedagogic 
methods in curriculum rely too heavily and narrowly on cognitive and abstract
thinking. These two oversimplifications are symptoms indicating that there are hidden
philosophical assumptions about nature, humanity and their relationship. These
assumptions need to be exposed, criticised and examined.
The aims of Part I, consisting of five chapters, are to criticise how “nature” has 
been conceptualised and learned about in the mainstream curriculum through the
anonymising view, and to demonstrate how it can be understood and learned about
through a different authoring view. For example, the ideas of determinism and
mechanism are imported by the philosophy of being, the view of nature with divine
telos; the emotionless, indifferent and objective attitudes towards nonhumans are
supported by the disenchanted view. The implications for education include the
features of standardisation and normalisation. In this view, educational institution and
educators are taken as the tool aiming for cultivating (constructing or manufacturing)
the “normal” member of the group. In order to shape pupils into the “standard” and 
“entitled” people in the name of citizen with basic cognition and skills, curriculum
and school are taken as instruments and workplace for schooling as “educational 
engineering”. Schooling as machining tends to lead pupils to learn to be anonymous, 
normalised members of the collectivity by fostering their disengagement and
estrangement from their own, individually subjective, lived experience. As German
philosopher Bernhard Wadenfels (1994, cited and translated by Stoller, 2000, p. 181,
n.3) states, “What is peculiarly paradoxical about anonymity is that I and You have 
the feature of no one, no-body, not merely despite, but in having a name”. To be 
anonymous can be understood as a rupture between the individual and one’s own 
action, between the body-subject and one’s own lived experience; anonymity is the 
renunciation, denial or unawareness of one’s own responsibility. Al in al, the 
anonymising-oriented education tends to discourage the generation of meaning and
220
the sense of responsibility in education and life by fashioning heterogeneous learners
into homogeneous people with the same model. Children are schooled and normalised
into adults like their educator-minders.
In order to confront the pitfalls caused by the anonymising-oriented education, I
propose the authoring orientation which is grounded on five contrasting views for
conceiving nature, humanity and education: the philosophy of becoming, the view of
nature with non-divine telos, the enchanted view, anthropo-non-centrism and the
engaged approach. It has been shown from the previous chapters that this authoring
orientation in general could help us to understand humans, nature and the relationship
in between, in the concepts of process, becoming, interaction, inexhaustibility,
dynamics, flexibility, creativity, lived experience, embodiment, and engagement. On
this ground, education is conceived as an on-going process pregnant with inspirations,
differences, otherness, alterity, challenges and rich, plural meanings.
Overall, the educational implications of the authoring-oriented view can be
depicted in three respects: meaning of education in general, education about and for
nature and nature in a particular system of education (the Taiwanese curriculum).
8.1 Meaning of the Authoring-oriented Education
The implications of the authoring view for education can be revealed in the respects
of metaphysics, epistemology, educational anthropology, and ethics.
1) The authoring view in respect of metaphysics
The previous discussion has shown that the metaphysical position that the
authoring view takes is a philosophy of becoming. Following this, the reality of
living process is changing and becoming; “the” fixed or static “Reality” in life, 
society or history is a self-contradictory notion. It is neither desirable nor
possible. Living organisms of all kinds are continuously changing and evolving
together, mutually creating and being created by each other. Living organisms
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are distinguished from non-living matter by acquiring the ability to reproduce
and multiple themselves. A traditional view of education tends to define ideas
and practice on the ground of philosophy of being to build a normalised,
standardised, measurable, predictable and controllable educational model. This
static view of education actually sets limits to what and how to learn and teach
during the process of education. Although life as a changing process cannot be
completely regulated and controlled, the static view limits, determines and
narrows down, to some extent, the possibilities and meanings of life and
education.
In contrast, the authoring view values the more dynamic, becoming aspect
of life. This view can be understood as an evolving thought; the previous
discussion about telos of nature shows that the living process of beings, as
individuals or as species, is a process of interaction and interrelation between
beings and surroundings. In other words, it is an evolving process of mutual
creation and being created. There seems to be a certain purpose guiding the
development of species or individuals. However, the exploration of the previous
chapters shows that, in order to develop a meaningful education, a purpose
directing the development of organisms preordained or predetermined by God
or some other existence beyond the process is not necessarily helpful for
improving education because everything is in process and changing, conceiving
of an external fixed purpose could limit the educational process and its
dynamics. For example, in a highly credentialist society, the major goal of
education is taken as acquiring diploma rather than experiencing deep learning
process. Credentials are taken as educational ends which are predetermined and
external to educational process. In this case, it is more important for educators
to provide and students to gain an easier and quicker diploma than to have rich
and meaningful learning experiences during educational process. In this view,
the end of education is more important than its process and activity. The
unbalanced emphasis of the “end” of education or schooling can impoverish the 
meanings implied in the educational process, such as intellectual acquisition,
psychological satisfaction, friendship, joyfulness, wonders, engagement, sense
of participation, sense of devotion, collaboration with others, and laboriousness.
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What is possibly worse is that the over-emphasis of credentials tends to result in
“instrumentalisation” of education. Educational activities are exerted for the
sake of credentials which are predetermined and external to the educational
process. From this perspective, individual differences are insignificant; students
need to adapt themselves into this instrumentalised educational model.
Eeducation is used to machinise (and tame) students rather than help students to
be free, active, critical, reflective, sensitive, attentive, responsive, responsible
and creative.
In contrast, from the authoring view, education can be broadly understood
as the process of having meaningful experiences and lives. It is not a certain
specified model for one to be adapted into but a vivid practice in life. A purpose
which is helpful for bringing out a meaningful education and understandable is
within the process. The purpose is formed and shaped during the process; it is
an outcome of the evolving process. “Process” can be understood from various 
perspectives. It can be understood as a process of the evolution of a particular
biological species; it can also be understood as a series of actions of a single
individual; furthermore, every part of the series of action can be separately
taken as a small-scale process. Therefore, the process of life of any individual
can be seen as composing innumerable small-scale processes. Every piece of
process is an interaction with the surroundings and the other people within the
surroundings.
2) The authoring view in respect of epistemology
Grounded on philosophy of becoming, the authoring view takes
knowledge and the way of acquiring knowledge as constructing in the process
of interaction between subjects and natural and cultural world. How and what to
know in this view can be understood as products of interaction between subjects
and culture, society and history. The constructed knowledge could be common
for many and incommensurably personal. For example, a nation or country for
patriots is real to fight for, while for anarchists, its validity is arguable. The
common knowledge originates from human commonalities, such as history,
society, tradition, language and culture. Common knowledge is constructed and
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shared by humanity via languages, as a collective. The authoring view reveals
the limitation of common or collective knowledge: that is, common knowledge
cannot provide fully appropriate explanations for personal lifeworld.
Since everyone’s lifeworld is heterogeneously different and unparaleled, 
the meanings implied are personally irreplaceable and different. The personal
meaning of one’s life is crucial for one to be diferent from others, not to be 
identified with others. The irreplaceable meaning of life can be understood as
the key to make one an irreducible and irreplaceable one but not any others in
this world. Therefore, it is important to highlight the epistemology of personal
knowledge and meaning in education. It is the central point of the authoring
view of education in respect of epistemology.
3) The authoring view in respect of educational anthropology
The focus of the authoring view in the respect of educational anthropology
is to demonstrate the meaning of the dynamic self. From this perspective, an
individual establishes his or her selfhood or identity during the changing process
of living and learning. This view takes an individual as an irreplaceable author
of him- or herself who incorporates different roles: an inventor, an adventurer, a
rational agent, and a perceptive poet. These roles are not totally separated but
interdependent.
How can a person as an author be an inventor? As Heraclitus states,
“Upon those who step into the same rivers, diferent and diferent waters flow” 
(Kirk, 1951, p. 36). World and life appearing stable and static actually change
continuously. This world is often taken for granted so that tiny, slow or subtle
changes are easily ignored. If it can be seen from different perspectives with
careful attention, the differences will be made visible. Furthermore, creativity
and innovativeness emerging from the process of differing, changing, renewing
and becoming will be become explicit. Although not all differences emerging
are useful or helpful in every respect, yet it is more possible to find creativity
that can contribute to the world in abundant differences than in scanty
differences. Education adopting a philosophy of becoming gives more support
and encouragement for the production of differences and creativity than
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adopting philosophy of being. An authoring-oriented education taking up the
position of philosophy of becoming encourages an education of creativity.
An author is an adventurer who takes the risk of being open to new
experiences. An education of creativity can be understood in relation to the
process and the goal. Such an education encourages a process of learning and
teaching to be inventive and experimental and thereby supports the innovations
of curriculum or pedagogic methods. Moreover, such an education intends to
cultivate individuals to be and dare to be creative --- the courage to be, and to
become different. To be creative, in some sense, implies to be different from
and chalenge the accepted and established “correctness”, orthodoxies, theories 
and practices. Thus a creative person has “courage” to chalenge and make 
breakthroughs in the existing establishment. The cultivation of such courage in
students is one of the important meanings of the authoring-oriented education.
An author is an actor and agent. Things are not intending agents. As
mentioned, every piece of process is an interaction with the surroundings and
the other people within the surroundings. Every interaction implies decisions
and actions. Thus the authoring view of education emphasises the co-evolving
interaction and interrelation of individuals and their surroundings and it
encourages individuals to decide their own actions and to set goals or purposes
for the processes. The learning of decision-making and action is an activity for
the learner to devote oneself to the here and now moments of living. A learner is
free to create him- or herself on the one hand, and his or her authorship is
created, on the other hand, through the interaction with others within the
surroundings. The subjectivity of this individual as an author embraces other
subjectivities; thus the subjectivity of this author is not solipsistic but inter-
subjective, embedded in the context where he or she is situated. Thus an agent
acts in the relationships with others. I cannot say “I” without you, to say it to. 
An author is a poet. A poet is also an inventor, an adventurer and an agent.
As Rorty (1989) describes it, a poet is a self-creator who recognises and
appreciates contingency as the reality of language, selfhood and community.
The Rortian poet is an ironist who attempts to articulate with private language
rather than common vocabularies since “the opposite of irony is common sense” 
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(Rorty, 1989, p. 74). Thus the Rortian poet as ironist creates meanings which
are unique and personal. In this sense, this Rortian poet can be understood as the
author for whom this thesis argues. However, what distinguishes a poet from an
inventor, an adventurer and an agent is her affectivity to the world. The author
as poet is sensitive to the others’ emotions and feelings in the world and 
responds to them. The poet’s response to the world does not merely rely on her 
rationality but also afectivity or, in Rorty’s term (1993b), sentimentality. 
4) The authoring view in respect of ethics
The authoring view of education has deep implications for ethics of
responsibility. As mentioned, the human image in the authoring view is an
irreplaceable and unique individual; she authors herself (and she is authored) in
every moment of inter-action. She is responsible for every decision and action
that she makes. This understanding is significant for countering the tendency of
escaping individual responsibility from the anonymising perspective. People
tend to avoid individual responsibilities and duties in the name of “they” 
(Heidegger, 1962) --- it seems to be right and safe to do things as people (they)
do. First of al, “do as people do” keeps one away from the danger of resisting 
convention and customs. Resistance of convention or tradition is dangerous
because it could make one different from people and no longer one of them.
Secondly, if a public decision or action brings unpleasant results, no specific
person should be blamed or take responsibility. The self-anonymising and the
implying irresponsibility often appear in the pretext of identification of a group.
I do not oppose democratic mechanism for making decisions for public. What
needs to be emphasised is that people taking part in the process of public
decision-making should be very conscious of fact that his or her own will is a
part of it. He or she is the one who contributes to the result, who should be
responsible for it. From the perspective of authoring view, everyone is an author
of her own deeds; the author should be responsive, attentive and responsible for
herself, for others and for the environment which is influenced by her decision
and action. This understanding could be fundamental for developing an
authentic ethical education.
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8.2 Authoring-oriented Education about and for Nature
The above has shown that the concept of nature can contribute towards the
understanding of education as a dialectical process and, moreover, deep engagement
can enhance this process. This process can be unpicked in depth from two aspects.
1) First of all, there are three roles that nature can play during the process of
learning: (1) learning about nature: nature as an object that is to be learned
about; (2) learning in nature: nature as the surroundings within which
learning takes place; and (3) learning from nature: nature as a guide which
provides tacit and non-verbal inspiration.
(1) Nature is a significant source of knowledge and inspiration. It can be
understood from various perspectives with various tools and
technologies and thereby provides different kinds of knowledge. For
example, Galilean-Newtonian science provides us with a view of a world
which contains features of, say, three-dimensional spatiality and linear
temporality. While new physics, such as Einstein’s relativity theory, 
challenges, or extends a Galilean-Newtonian worldview. “In Newtonian 
physics, time, like space, was considered absolute and independent. With
Einstein, notions of ‘before’, ‘now’ and ‘after’ in an arow of time going 
in one direction become relative terms”. As for general relativity, “it 
describes the gravitational field as a space-time continuum ‘curved’ or 
‘warped’ in the presence of mater…puts an end to absolute time…With 
the general theory of relativity, space and time are now thought of as
dynamic qualities in an interelated and interdependent universe” 
(Marshall, 1992, pp. 376-377). However, although Galilean-Newtonian
science is severely challenged by new physics, it does not mean that it is
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invalid. On the level of daily life experience, Galilean-Newtonian
science still works well and provides useful explanations. For most
ordinary purposes we take it, and a flat, stationary earth, for granted. On
a micro-world, quantum-mechanical level, the limits of its validity
appear and new physics provides new explanations. The point is that
nature can be understood as a source of knowledge. Yet the acquisition
of knowledge depends not only on nature but also on human beings. The
process of acquiring knowledge from nature can be an active process of
meaning-constructing through distilling and thematising lived experience
of nature (Husserl, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 2003/1962).
(2) Nature is an important environment for learners to be situated and
positioned within. Nature is an environment which cannot be replaced by
any man-made environment. Some built environments may provide
human beings with partly similar but not exactly the same experience of
nature as, for instance, in a zoo or garden. The natural changes of nature
itself are not yet completely predictable or controllable. The resulting
human responses, such as fears, wonders, joyfulness and surprise, are
also unpredictable parts of our own nature. Thus nature as surroundings
is a unique and valuable place. The importance of nature as an
environment for education can be understood in the respect that it is a
“proto-field” for learning about life which develops into various kinds of
subject, such as biology, and botany. However, the significance of nature
for learning is that nature is the field for us to dwell in, to have direct and
bodily experience both with other human and with non-human beings
and thereby helps to develop authentic learning.
(3) Nature can be a guide. As mentioned, nature is a source of inspirations; it
can be understood as many and various aspects as possible and arouses
various responses, feelings and thoughts. Thus nature can be understood
as a guide, a teacher (Wordsworth, 1888). Many authors agree that if
human beings can keep themselves in attentive, sensitive and responsive
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receptivity for nature, more inspirations will emerge (Wordsworth, 1888,
1984). There are two very important points in learning from nature:
solitude and humility.
Firstly, nature is wordless. This means that nature does not speak
human language directly. If nature can be taken as a guide or a teacher,
her teaching is speechless. Thus nature as a tacit guide can be also
understood as a text from a broad view (Stables, 1997). Silent learning
from nature occurs without words; it is also a tacit process of reading of
non-verbal text. If a wordless dialogue between learners and nature can
arise, it is an intimate encountering between inward and outward.
Company may spoil the possibility of the speechless learning from
nature; human language is convenient and available for use so that it
preoccupies our mind. Thus solitude is a very important condition for
non-linguistic learning to occur. Many authors (Caranfa, 2007; Rainsford,
2003) are aware of the significance of solitude for education, for
example, the aforementioned Romantics including Rousseau (1962),
Wordsworth (1888, 1984), Emerson (1849) and many other poets or
philosophers.
Secondly, in order to learn from a speechless or non-verbal teacher,
being humility, or modesty, awareness of not-knowing is also a key.
Nature is not like a person, who can be actively intending, meaning or
“wanting to say” anything to anyone. Nature cannot actively or
consciously teach human beings. Lessons of nature have to be acquired
through interaction between nature and humans. Human beings need to
be careful, attentive and responsive in humbleness in order to learn
things that humans cannot give: “One impulse from a vernal wood,/ May 
teach you more of man;/ Of moral evil and of good/ Than all the sages
can” (Wordsworth, 1984, p. 131). In the terms of Halpin (2006), to learn 
from nature needs not only human direct experience of, but also human
power of imagination about, nature. To learn from nature, or to be led by
nature, is a dynamic process within which the learner has her own
personal unique contact with nature. To be humble in learning from
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nature is crucial because this attitude demonstrates that this learning is
not sheer human creation ex nihilo, a fiction in mind, but the outcome
inspired by and interacted with a source both external to human beings
and internal, inside us. This point is important for conceiving the human
image as an author from the perspective of my authoring-oriented
education: this author is a living being who is independently self-
determined and inter-dependent with others. She is solitary but not alone,
unique and plural.
2) In order to optimise the fruits of learning about nature, which means to make
learning as meaningful and interesting as possible, learners are required to
be or led to be deeply engaged in the process. The learning process could be
mutually reciprocal for both learners and nature so long as it is deeply
engaged.
Learning could be superficial or deep. As mentioned in Chapter 7,
learners give more attention, attentiveness, care, mindfulness, regard, heed,
responsiveness and responsibility to the object that is learned about in a
deeply engaged approach than in a superficially engaged or less engaged or
disengaged one. Consequently, learners acquire more and richer meanings in
a deeply engaged approach than in a disengaged one. The deeply engaged
learning does more help than the disengaged one for learners to connect the
particular moment of learning with other lived experiences, to relate present
to past and towards future, to create new and different meanings from what
has been known, to interact with other subjects within the surroundings, to
construct relationships with the world. In this light, more mutual reciprocity
can emerge in the process of deep engagement than in that of “impartiality”, 
“objectivity”, non-personal, disinterested disengagement.
All in all, the authoring view of education stresses the inextricability of the concepts
of nature and human and thus the current curriculum and pedagogic methods can be
improved by continuous re-conceptualisation and re-examination of the taken-for-
granted assumptions. “Human” and “nature”, or “human” and “nonhuman” are 
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inextricable and interdependent concepts not merely from the perspective of natural
science or ecology, but also from the perspective of language. Human survival
subsists on nonhumans; human understanding encompasses the meaning of
nonhumans. Thus to teach about the human world and natural world as separate
should not be assumed as a matter of course. Educators and curriculum designers
always need to bear in mind that the education about the human/nature relationships is
an on-going changing, complicated and dynamic process. As revealed, the concept of
nature or nonhumans in the present curriculum is mainly taught in the fields of
science education and environmental education. It has been demonstrated that there is
a strong tendency in these fields to take nature as an external and real natural world
full of static, mechanistic, predictable, controllable and exploitable entities.
Accordingly, educators might need to pay more heed to the complex and multiple
conceptions of “nature”during the process of teaching. The process of education is an
on-going process of questioning and interrogating. Viewed in this light, the following
questions may be prompts for educators to keep reflecting and refreshing the meaning
of nature in curriculum and pedagogic methods:
1) What explicit or implicit meanings are referred to when the term “nature” is 
written or spoken in curriculum and teaching process?
2) What assumptions are implied when “nature” is an issue that has been taught?
3) What kind of conception of nature is accepted and taken for granted? Is it
justified?
4) What kind of conception of nature has been denied or ignored by the current
curriculum and why?
5) How do we implement the authoring-oriented education of nature? What
kind of practical pedagogical methods are in tune with the authoring-
oriented education?
6) How can we acquire as many and rich meanings as possible from the
lifeworld? How can we relate our own lifeworld to nature?
7) What kind of attitude and action towards nature will be inspiring and
desirable for life?
8) How can we position ourselves in nature? How can I learn myself through
this positioning?
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9) How do I unveil nature through unveiling myself? And, how does nature
unveil me through its being unveiled?
10) What meaning of nature has not been considered during the process of
leaning? How different can nature be?
8.3 Nature in Curriculum from the Authoring-oriented Perspective
At this section, let me return to the Taiwanese curriculum guidelines to demonstrate
how educational philosophising might benefit practices. The discussions above may
be helpful for conceiving an improvement of Taiwanese curriculum guidelines. The
analysis in Chapter 2 shows the general pitfalls of over-simplification and the
particular problems of the G1-9 CG. With regard to the general pitfalls, I suggest that
continuous questioning and critique during the process of learning might keep the
learning alive and meaningful. With regard to the particular problem in the Taiwanese
curriculum, I propose these suggestions in more detail:
1) Three problems of the Taiwanese curriculum have been identified in
Chapter 2 including mis-juxtaposition, arbitrary combination of irrelevant
ideas and ambiguous environmental ethical assumption. A more thoughtful,
deliberate and unequivocal pragmatics of language in curriculum should be
achieved; the meaning of the term or concept related to curriculum should
be under careful and scrupulous consideration and clarification before being
used in the curriculum. For example, sensory abilities, such as observation
and reasoning, like inference should not be simply taken as performance of
the same kind. These unequivocal pragmatics might include:
 The meaning of the key terms should be carefully re-examined and
given clear and distinct definition, e.g. nature, environment, nonhuman,
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and human. Although these terms may not have clear, distinct and
specific definitions, the implied ambiguities should be exposed
 The implied philosophical assumptions should be highlighted and
discussed. The taken-for-granted assumptions should be exposed,
pinpointed, re-examined and criticised such as substance metaphysics,
mechanism, atomism, anthropocentrism, and modernist, positivist
scientific views. Educators and learners are invited to ponder upon the
related questions: What kind of philosophical assumption such as
epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, etc. could be involved and
interpreted? What kind of effects or debates will be caused if different
philosophical assumptions are introduced and adopted?
2) Learning about nature in the Taiwanese curriculum should be more diverse
and innovative in its contents and pedagogical methods. As revealed, nature
is chiefly taken as a synonym of natural environment from the perspective of
substance metaphysics; therefore, nature is taken as an external, static, fixed
and detached world; modern scientific methodology is taken as the sufficient
instrument for learning about nature. This modernist view tends to limit the
meaning of how and what to learn about nature and should not dominate the
perspectives of curriculum and pedagogical methods. Different views and
approaches to learning could be included such as minority views, Taiwanese
indigenous perspectives, alternative practices, etc. These differences might
inspire more fruitful conceptions of nature and human beings.
3) With regard to cultural context, it may be more difficult for educators in
Taiwan to take the perspective of the authoring view than the anonymising
view. Greatly influenced by Confucianism, Taiwanese society in modern
times tends to understand human beings in terms of their social relations and
statuses rather than their personal characteristics and uniqueness (King,
1985; Ling and Shih, 1998; Munro, 1980). There is a strong collective
tendency in Confucian tradition to take persons as social existences priori to
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independent beings. I do not deny contextualisation as a part of human
existence. What concerns me is that the collective perspective of Confucian
tradition tends to define human beings as social beings “only”; human 
beings are determined by and fixed within their social relationships. What
concerns me more is that the social relationships are taken as static and
determined, then human beings embedded in such unchangeable relations
fail to make self-decision and become inauthentic, anonymous and, worse,
irresponsible.
One bit of evidence showing the tendency towards anonymity can be
found in the conservative reactions to curriculum reform in recent years in
Taiwan. There are two cornerstones of the Taiwanese curriculum reform:
the deregulation of the monopolised publication of textbooks by government
in 1996, and the mandate of the new curriculum guidelines since 1999.
Since then, different versions of textbooks have begun to be published and
school teachers are entitled to choose from various versions44. In some sense,
this situation can be understood as a phenomenon of liberalisation and
democratisation: educators can enjoy more freedom to choose textbooks and
compile teaching materials according to their teaching profession. Yet a call
for one single unified version of textbooks has appeared in recent years;
supporters including educators and scholars claim that multiple versions of
textbooks impose heavy burden on learners because they need to take
national examinations. Without ascertainment of which version of textbook
will be the source of test questions, learners have to memorise the contents
in all versions.
From my point of view, the resistance of free choice and the appeal to
one single unified curriculum result from the implied anonymising view. It
can be found from this phenomenon that educators anonymise themselves
and circumvent the risks and responsibilities of making curriculum
decisions.45 Moreover, they take learning as a mechanical process with a
44 Textbooks which are available for choice must pass the examination of National Examining Board in
advance.
45 There can be more analysis and discussions on this issue from the authoring view. They are related to
politics of curriculum which may go beyond the scope of this thesis. The discussions can be developed
in future studies.
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very simple aim of memorising. We can find a strong tendency towards an
anonymising view about knowledge, learning process and curriculum
implied in this conservative reaction to educational reform in Taiwan,
Viewed in this light, the emphasis of the authoring view is important for
constructing a more responsible and responsive attitude towards education
in Taiwan.
8.4 Epilogue: self-authoring as anchoring meanings in the flux of life
In closing, the exploration of this thesis manifests the meanings of nature from
different aspects; the manifestation helps to define my educational perspective as the
authoring view which embraces philosophy of becoming and embodied subjects. This
philosophical position admits the reality of life and nature as dynamic becoming.
Everything is in flux. Every living being is becoming, every moment. With every
breath I take, I change, and I am changed by, my world. However, the authoring view
manifests a truth of life: a life is achieved by an author; an author creates her own
changeable but distinctive self-identity who withstands and enjoys becoming through
continuously self-creating. This process can be a continuous dialectic of writing and
obliterating, constructing and deconstructing, including and excluding, being born,
growing, reproducing, decaying, dying and being reborn. It is also a process of
interaction between internal and external nature, individual and collective, self and
aliens, nature and human nature. Learning about nature inescapably implies learning
about human beings ourselves and vice versa. Learning about nature in a poorly
relational way implies learning about my own living in meaning-poor terms.
Some words from Merleau-Ponty help to illuminate the human/nature
intertwinement, interdependence and inter-revealing:
Regarding Nature, the concern was to study it as an ontological leaf---
and in particular, regarding life, the concern was to study the
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unfolding of the leaf of Nature---regarding the human, the concern is
to take him at his point of emergence in Nature. (Merleau-Ponty, 2003,
p. 208)
Life, nature and humans are inextricable in some sense. Education is to shed light on
the process of the dynamic interrelationship. Thus the above words might be extended
as follows: Regarding education, the concern is to keep the process anew, alive and
meaningful. Yet what educators need to bear in mind is that the meaning only exists
for and can be established by an embodied individual. Meaning is the meaning for me
rather than anyone or human-in-general; an object as well as nature can have different
meanings to different persons. The meaning must be achieved and experienced by the
irreplaceable individual; this is the process of authoring: the writing of my own
meaning in life. Education from this perspective can be understood as the task of
encouraging the learner to author her own lifeworld. It seems an insignificant task,
compared with many great ideals taken as the aim of education; however, the small
task might bring significant and unparalleled meaning to every one of us.
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